Robert E. Charney

The applicant brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against the respondent for breaching provisions of a prior family court order relating to the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL) referral, reconciliation counselling, and access logistics.

The court applied the three-part test for civil contempt and found that the respondent wilfully refused to comply with the clear requirement to complete and submit an OCL intake form within 14 days of the order.

Alleged breaches relating to reconciliation counselling and provision of access logistics were not proven to meet the contempt standard.

The court emphasized that contempt is a serious remedy requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt and should be used cautiously in family proceedings.

The respondent was found in contempt only with respect to the OCL intake form requirement, and the penalty phase was adjourned.

The plaintiffs sued a former 50/50 shareholder and his father-in-law after a closely held corporation failed and remained indebted to a lender connected to the other shareholder's family.

The court held that the parties' oral arrangement to share profits and liabilities did not amount to a personal guarantee or an agreement to pierce the corporate veil, and did not displace the ordinary principle of limited shareholder liability under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The court further found that the alleged lender never entered into a binding loan agreement with the corporation and made no actionable pre-contractual representation.

The claim and counterclaim were both dismissed.

The plaintiff's employment was terminated, which immediately ended his long-term disability (LTD) coverage under the employer's group policy.

Two months later, he became totally disabled in a motor vehicle accident.

The employer inadvertently continued paying LTD premiums, and the insurer initially denied the claim based on lack of total disability and late filing, while reserving the right to investigate eligibility.

The plaintiff argued the insurer waived the termination date of the policy.

The court dismissed the action, finding no waiver because the insurer lacked full knowledge of the termination and did not unequivocally intend to relinquish its right to rely on the policy's termination clause.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, brought an application for a declaration that he did not have a pecuniary interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act regarding an appeal where his son acted as counsel for the appellant.

The applicant argued that his deemed pecuniary interest was so remote or insignificant that it fell under the exemption in s. 4(k) of the Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a reasonable elector would likely conclude that a father would be influenced by his son's direct involvement as counsel in the matter, and therefore the interest was not remote or insignificant.

The respondent was successful on a motion preventing the applicant from moving their two children outside of Barrie.

The respondent sought costs of $3,531.25 under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The court fixed costs at $1,000, payable at $100 per month, noting that while the applicant's decision to move for employment and lower rent was reasonable in other circumstances, it was not practicable given the children's best interests.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, brought an application for a declaration that he did not have a pecuniary interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act regarding an Ontario Municipal Board appeal in which his son's law firm represented the appellant.

The applicant named Her Majesty the Queen as the respondent, following previous case law, but the Crown declined to participate.

The court declined to decide the application on its merits, finding that the relevant municipalities should be given notice and an opportunity to participate to ensure an adversarial context and a complete review of the facts.

This was a costs endorsement following a family law motion heard over three days, including issues relating to sale of the matrimonial home, payment of utilities, and a contempt allegation.

Treating the three hearing dates as a single motion, the court found the applicant was substantially successful even though contempt relief was refused.

The respondent had deliberately breached an earlier order by placing the home in mortgage default as a form of self-help, which the court held warranted sanction through costs.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the applicant and fixed at $8,206.89.

In an insurance action arising from a denied long-term disability claim, the defendant moved during trial to amend its statement of defence to add express reliance on a termination clause in the group policy.

The court held that Rule 26.01 requires leave to amend at any stage unless the responding party would suffer prejudice not compensable by costs or an adjournment.

Although the timing of the motion was criticized, the court found any prejudice could be addressed through procedural accommodations, including a short adjournment, further discovery, or recalling witnesses.

The amendment was therefore permitted.

The applicant father brought a motion for leave to proceed before a case conference and sought temporary equal parenting time on an unsupervised basis after criminal proceedings and peace bond terms interrupted contact with the children.

The court held that, although the matter was not urgent in the strict sense, it was in the interest of justice to hear the motion because the father's parenting rights had been interfered with without family-court consideration and the criminal undertaking specifically contemplated access arrangements.

Applying the best interests of the child under s. 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court found no safety basis for supervised access and ordered temporary unsupervised parenting time.

The court declined to impose a nesting arrangement or equal temporary parenting schedule, and instead ordered one evening per week and one day each weekend pending a case conference or further order.

On a family law motion, the applicant sought a restraining order, temporary sole care and custody, and supervised access for the respondent pending investigation by child protection authorities.

The court held that the best interests of the children required a temporary supervised-access regime, relying particularly on the respondent's historic conviction for sexual assault of a young child, the children's very young ages, and the need to await the Children's Aid Society report.

Temporary sole care and custody was granted to the applicant, the restraining order was continued, and disclosure of CAS records was ordered.

Costs were reserved.

The applicant brought a family law contempt motion alleging breach of prior orders requiring interim support, mortgage and household expense payments, provision of a credit card for gas, and cooperation in listing the matrimonial home for sale.

The court held that the monetary obligations, including the gas credit card arrangement, were payment orders within the meaning of the Family Law Rules and therefore could not be enforced by contempt.

As to the non-monetary provisions relating to sale preparation and listing of the home, the competing affidavit record did not establish wilful breach beyond a reasonable doubt.

The contempt motion was dismissed.

On an addendum to an earlier family law endorsement, the court considered whether a charge against the former matrimonial home should be amended to capture additional retroactive support arrears accruing between the motion date and the date of decision.

The court accepted the moving party's calculation and increased the charge by two additional monthly support payments, amending the total secured amount to $44,298.00.

The court also reviewed a claimed error in the cost outline but declined to vary the prior costs award.

The applicant moved for judgment for unpaid severance payments required by a consent family law final order, and for a charge on the matrimonial home to secure support arrears, severance payments, and unpaid costs.

The court held that the severance payments were intended as a vehicle for interim support and were to continue until the corporate employer ceased operations, which occurred later than originally contemplated.

Judgment for $24,000 was granted against the respondent personally, and a charge of $40,570 was imposed on the matrimonial home under s. 34 of the Family Law Act.

The respondent's cross-motion concerning an alleged CRA-related indemnity debt was adjourned to permit a final opportunity to provide proper documentary proof.

The applicant, as the successful party, received costs on a substantial indemnity basis.