Rick Nathanson

The court sentenced the offender for a sexual assault committed against a co-worker who had driven him home after a work shift.

The assault involved persistent sexual advances, forced kissing, and digital vaginal penetration in the complainant's car, and the court treated breach of trust, degradation of sexual integrity, and the need for denunciation and deterrence as significant sentencing factors.

Although the offender had later been convicted of other sexual offences connected to the same workplace, the court held under the Coke principle that those later convictions could not be used as aggravating factors for this offence.

Applying the totality principle in light of the offender's existing consecutive penitentiary sentences, the court imposed a further consecutive sentence of 15 months, three years' probation, a lifetime SOIRA order, and a DNA order.

In a judge-alone sexual assault trial involving two co-worker complainants, the Crown sought admission of extrinsic similar fact evidence from two other incidents and also sought count-to-count use of the complainants' evidence.

Applying the similar fact framework from *Handy*, the court excluded the extrinsic incidents because their probative value did not outweigh prejudice, but allowed count-to-count use of the two charged incidents based on their persuasive degree of connection.

On the merits, the court found the accused's evidence concerning one complainant incredible and accepted that complainant's account beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in a conviction on one count.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt on the second count because of material credibility and reliability concerns affecting that complainant's evidence, and entered an acquittal on that count.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and uttering threats against his estranged wife, brought an application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for production of Toronto Children's Aid Society records relating to the complainant's care of their children.

The applicant argued the records were relevant to the complainant's credibility and a motive to fabricate related to child custody.

The court found the first-stage test for likely relevance was met and reviewed the records.

At the second stage, the court largely dismissed the application, finding the undisclosed portions had a high privacy interest and lacked probative value, though it ordered the disclosure of a limited category of unredacted information.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and uttering threats, sought the appointment of the same judge to hear both a pre-trial third-party records application under s. 278.2 of the Criminal Code and the subsequent trial.

The court denied this request, clarifying that a case management judge is empowered to hear such pre-trial applications under s. 551.3 of the Criminal Code.

The decision emphasized that a trial judge can revisit pre-trial rulings made by a different judge if fresh evidence or a material change in circumstances arises, as explicitly permitted by s. 551.1(4) of the Criminal Code and common law principles.

The accused was convicted of two counts of sexual interference against a 14-year-old victim on January 27, 2014.

The offender, then 36 years old, gave the victim hallucinogenic drugs (ketamine and ecstasy) at his residence and engaged in multiple acts of sexual contact, including digital penetration, attempted intercourse, and fellatio.

He also photographed the victim during the sexual assault.

The sentencing hearing addressed the Crown's request for a 4.5-year penitentiary sentence and the defence's request for a blended sentence of one year imprisonment followed by one year conditional.

The court imposed a total sentence of 4.5 years (54 months) imprisonment, with 2 years on the first count and 2.5 years consecutive on the second count, along with a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act order and a DNA order.

The offender, a bar manager, was convicted of sexual assault and voyeurism after luring an employee into a basement office, sexually assaulting her, and surreptitiously filming the assault.

The court found the predatory nature of the offence, the breach of trust, and the voyeuristic purpose to be highly aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to a global term of 18 months imprisonment, followed by three years of probation, along with DNA, weapons prohibition, and sex offender registry orders.

The defendant, Enzo Dario De Jesus Carrasco, was charged with sexual assault, voyeurism, and transmitting an intimate image.

The court found the defendant's testimony to be untruthful and inconsistent with text messages.

The complainant's evidence, despite some inconsistencies, was found credible and consistent with corroborating text messages.

The court convicted the defendant of sexual assault and voyeurism, finding that the touching was sexual, non-consensual, and that the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the basement office where she was filmed.

The defendant was acquitted of transmitting an intimate image due to reasonable doubt regarding criminal intent, based on a text message indicating the image was sent by mistake.

Following a jury's guilty verdict for gang sexual assault and administering a stupefying drug, the court delivered reasons for sentencing Gavin MacMillan and Enzo DeJesus Carrasco.

Each offender received a total sentence of nine years imprisonment (seven years for gang sexual assault and two years consecutive for administering a stupefying substance), with credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court found that the victim never consented to the sexual activity, and the offenders had no mistaken belief of consent, rejecting their characterization of events as consensual BDSM.

Ancillary orders included DNA, lifetime prohibition, 20-year SOIRA, and non-communication.

The Crown brought an application during a trial for gang sexual assault to admit the expert testimony of an emergency room physician and a sexual assault nurse-examiner.

The proposed evidence concerned the effects of alcohol and drugs on the complainant's consciousness and capacity to consent, as well as the interpretation of her physical injuries.

The accused opposed the physician's evidence, arguing she lacked toxicological expertise and was biased due to her advocacy for sexual assault survivors.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it relevant, necessary, and reliable, and held that the physician's social media posts did not demonstrate an inability to provide impartial evidence.

The accused, charged with gang sexual assault and other offences, brought applications under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual comments, gestures, and interest in a sex club to support their defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The court dismissed the application regarding the prior sexual comments and gestures, finding the evidence irrelevant and based on prohibited twin-myth reasoning.

The court permitted limited evidence regarding discussions about attending a sex club solely to provide context for a text message sent by one of the accused, with strict instructions against using it to infer consent.

Evidence of conversations immediately prior to the sexual encounters was ruled admissible.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion arguing that recent amendments to the Criminal Code eliminating peremptory challenges in jury selection should not apply retrospectively to their trial.

The court applied the rule of coordinate jurisdiction, noting that two other Ontario Superior Court judges had already ruled the amendments were procedural and applied retrospectively.

Finding no cogent reason to depart from those decisions, the court dismissed the application and ordered jury selection to proceed under the amended procedure.

The Crown sought to admit a post-arrest statement made by the accused, who was charged with multiple sexual offences.

The accused challenged the voluntariness of the statement, arguing that his English comprehension was insufficient and that the police caution regarding his right to silence was inadequate.

The court found that the accused's English skills were reasonably sophisticated and that the police officer went to great lengths to ensure the accused understood his right to silence.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, applied to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pre-trial publicity and the #MeToo movement, specifically the #IBelieveHer hashtag.

The court permitted modified questions regarding pre-trial publicity but dismissed the request to ask questions about the #MeToo movement and the hashtag.

The court held there was an insufficient evidentiary basis to take judicial notice of widespread bias or that jurors would be incapable of setting aside such bias despite trial safeguards.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, sought an order permitting the admission of evidence of extrinsic sexual abuse of the complainant.

The applicant challenged the constitutional validity of sections 278.93 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the statutory procedure for determining admissibility of extrinsic sexual history and private records compels disclosure of defence evidence and strategy in advance of trial, breaching sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The applicant also contended that granting the complainant standing on the admissibility voir dire creates an appearance of unfairness.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory provisions can be applied in a manner consistent with the principle against self-incrimination, the right to a fair trial, and the complainant's rights to privacy and equality, provided that applications under section 278.93 are brought during cross-examination of the complainant rather than as pre-trial motions.

The accused was convicted of sexual interference with a 14-year-old victim.

The Crown sought a mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days in jail.

The defence challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it would be grossly disproportionate.

The court found that while 90 days was not grossly disproportionate for the particular offender, the mandatory minimum violated section 12 as applied to reasonably foreseeable hypothetical offenders.

The violation could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of 45 days to be served in the community, followed by 3 years of probation, along with DNA and SOIRA orders.

The accused, O.K., was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, S.H., testified that the sexual contact (oral sex and vaginal penetration) occurred without her consent while she was heavily intoxicated.

The accused claimed consensual activity and honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court disbelieved the accused's testimony, finding his claims of consent and lack of awareness of intoxication to be untrue and lacking an air of reality.

The court accepted the complainant's account, finding her memory issues due to intoxication did not undermine her credibility regarding the assault itself.

The accused was found guilty.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving based on “care or control” of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge found the accused intoxicated in the driver’s seat attempting to start a damaged vehicle but concluded there was no realistic risk of danger because the vehicle was inoperable.

On appeal, the court held the trial judge misapplied the presumption in s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Where the accused occupies the driver’s seat and fails to rebut the presumption by proving no intention to set the vehicle in motion, the elements of care or control are deemed established without additional proof of a realistic risk of danger.

The appeal was allowed and a conviction entered.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg under the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had excluded the breathalyzer evidence after finding the Crown failed to prove the samples were taken “as soon as practicable” under s. 258(1)(c)(ii), because police facilitated a 30‑minute telephone call between the accused and his mother before testing.

On appeal, the Crown argued the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard and effectively required testing “as soon as possible.” The Superior Court held the trial judge applied the correct legal test and that the determination regarding the reasonableness of the delay was a factual finding entitled to deference.

As there was evidence supporting the finding that the delay rendered the samples not taken as soon as practicable, no palpable and overriding error was established.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for prowl by night and assaulting a peace officer.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant’s evidence as not credible and accepted the arresting officer’s testimony despite minor inconsistencies.

On appeal, the appellant raised arguments concerning credibility assessment, alleged failure to consider motive, the absence of a witness connected to a 911 call, and alleged procedural irregularities.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the principles in R. v. W.(D.) and that appellate courts owe deference to findings of fact and credibility.

No errors of law or findings unsupported by the evidence were demonstrated, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for sexual assault against an adult complainant and simple assault against a child arising from an incident in an apartment elevator.

The appellant argued that the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge improperly rejected his evidence.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge correctly applied the credibility framework from R. v. W.(D.) and was entitled to accept the complainant’s testimony while rejecting the appellant’s inconsistent and contradictory evidence.

The appellate court emphasized the high degree of deference owed to credibility findings made at trial.

Finding no legal or factual error and concluding that the verdicts were reasonable on the evidence, the court dismissed the appeal.