Rafal Szymanski

The appellants were passengers injured when another passenger, who was experiencing delusions, grabbed the steering wheel of a Greyhound bus, causing it to crash.

The appellants sued the bus company, the driver, and police officers who had interacted with the passenger before he boarded.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of the standard of care by any of the respondents.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred by excluding expert evidence on police crisis management and bus safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function in excluding the expert evidence because it was not necessary to assist the trier of fact in determining the applicable standards of care.

The appellant challenged an order requiring him to execute transfers of certificates of possession over reserve parcels to satisfy a judgment debt owed to the respondent band.

The appeal turned on whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction to make that order and whether certificates of possession were immune from seizure under s. 29 of the Indian Act.

The court held that a certificate of possession merely evidences an Indian's right of possession, while underlying title to reserve land remains with the Crown.

Reading ss. 29 and 89(1) harmoniously and in light of the statutory scheme and legislative history, the court held that the possessory interest is real or personal property of an Indian that may be seized or executed upon in favour of an Indian or a band.

The appeal was dismissed and appeal costs were added to the debt.

Police officer defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss an action alleging trespass, unlawful arrest, and breaches of Charter rights as statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued that common law rights could not be limited by statute and that the limitation period should run from a later arrest that allegedly “consummated” the earlier wrongs.

The court rejected both arguments, holding that legislation may override the common law and that the causes of action were discovered on the date of the original arrest.

Because the plaintiff admitted he knew of the alleged wrongs when they occurred and commenced the action more than two years later, the limitation period had expired.

The claim was therefore plainly statute‑barred and could not be cured through discoverability or amendment.

Following a lengthy civil trial involving multiple plaintiffs arising from a motor vehicle incident, the plaintiffs’ claims against several defendants—including a transportation company, police officers, and the provincial Crown—were dismissed.

The successful defendants sought substantial costs after a 56‑day trial and extensive pre‑trial litigation.

The court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 49 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing fairness and reasonableness in fixing costs rather than a strict accounting exercise.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis up to the defendants’ settlement offers and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter, with adjustments made for excessive claims and unnecessary attendance of junior counsel.

The court also held the plaintiffs jointly and severally liable for the liability portion of the defendants’ costs, while allocating damages‑related costs severally among individual plaintiffs.

Requests for a Sanderson order and third‑party costs were denied.

The plaintiff band sought to enforce a judgment debt against the defendant band member by seizing his certificates of possession for lands situated on the reserve.

The defendant argued that section 29 of the Indian Act prohibits the seizure of reserve lands under legal process.

The court held that while section 29 protects the underlying Crown title to reserve lands from seizure by non-Indians, section 89(1) expressly permits an Indian or a band to seize the real or personal property of an Indian situated on a reserve.

The court ordered the defendant to transfer his certificates of possession to the band to satisfy the debt.

A costs decision arising from a multi‑plaintiff bus accident action where one plaintiff settled prior to trial.

The settling plaintiff sought costs based on a proportional share of a collective liability account and individual damages account maintained for all plaintiffs.

The defendants disputed various docketed entries, including costs relating to unrelated proceedings, unsuccessful motions, and non‑taxable disbursements.

Applying the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized proportionality between the settlement value and the requested costs.

The court rejected the full amount sought and instead fixed a global costs award considered fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

The appellant filed a police misconduct complaint under the Police Services Act and commenced a parallel civil action for damages arising from the same arrest.

After the disciplinary hearing officer found the officers not guilty, the respondents successfully moved to strike the civil claims on the basis of issue estoppel.

The Supreme Court of Canada, in a 4-3 decision, allowed the appeal, holding that while no public policy rule should categorically exclude police disciplinary hearings from issue estoppel, the Court of Appeal erred in its discretionary analysis by failing to consider the significant differences in purpose, scope, and stakes between the two proceedings, the parties' reasonable expectations, and the unfairness of permitting the Chief of Police's designate's decision to exonerate the Chief from civil liability.

The plaintiffs were passengers on a Greyhound bus who were injured when another passenger, Davis, suddenly grabbed the steering wheel, causing the bus to crash.

Prior to boarding, Davis had exhibited signs of mild paranoia and had interacted with OPP officers, who concluded he was not a danger to himself or others.

The plaintiffs sued the OPP, the officers, Greyhound, and the bus driver for negligence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action against all defendants except Davis, finding that the police officers acted reasonably and had no legal grounds to apprehend or detain Davis under the Mental Health Act or common law.

The court also found that the bus driver and Greyhound met the high standard of care expected of a common carrier, as the sudden attack was not reasonably foreseeable and the driver's actions were reasonable in the circumstances.

The court proceeded to assess the hypothetical damages for each plaintiff.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a noting in default and striking his amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the pleading failed to accord with the rules, failed to plead essential elements, and had no possible chance of success.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.