Peter R. Jervis

The appellant appealed an order of the motions judge, which was based on the finding that the underlying action had been lying dormant since 1996.

The Court of Appeal reviewed new court material not available to the motions judge, which demonstrated the action was not dormant.

The Court set aside the order in the interests of justice, allowing the respondent to renew its motion with full consideration of the delay.

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The appellant was awarded $20,000 in costs, subject to a reduction for an unsuccessful appeal regarding two U.S. companies and the unsatisfactory nature of the statement of claim.

The two U.S. respondents were awarded costs of $5,856.53 and $500, respectively.

The appellant, who had been discharged from bankruptcy, was denied credit because the respondent credit reporting agencies allegedly included statute-barred debts in his credit report contrary to the Consumer Reporting Act.

The appellant brought a proposed class action in negligence.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding policy reasons against recognizing a duty of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against the Canadian respondents, holding that a prima facie duty of care exists based on proximity and foreseeability, analogous to negligent misrepresentation, and that policy considerations do not make it plain and obvious that the claim should be struck at this stage.

The claims against the American parent companies were struck for failing to plead sufficient material facts.

The appellants, a privately appointed receiver and his company, appealed a trial judgment ordering an accounting and denying receiver's fees due to egregious breaches of fiduciary duty and self-dealing in the receivership of a horse farming operation.

The respondents cross-appealed, seeking the equitable remedy of tracing regarding a specific farm property improperly acquired by the receiver's nephew.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding overwhelming evidence of the receiver's complete failure to appreciate his duties, including acting in conflict of interest.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal in part, granting the respondents the right to trace the proceeds realized from the farm property and ordering the receiver to disgorge any profits.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum on costs following an appeal.

The court noted that the increase in the monetary award authorized by the court placed the judgment significantly above the appellant's Rule 49 offer to settle.

Consequently, the court varied the trial costs disposition to award the appellant party-and-party costs up to the date of the offer and solicitor-and-client costs thereafter.

The appellant was also awarded the costs of the appeal on a party-and-party basis.

The appellant suffered significant losses in his commodities trading account and successfully sued his brokerage firm for negligent supervision.

The trial judge awarded damages but deducted profits the appellant had made in previous years.

The appellant appealed the quantum of damages and the dismissal of his breach of fiduciary duty claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that no fiduciary duty existed, as the appellant was an experienced trader who directed his own account.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on damages, holding that the trial judge erred in deducting past profits, as each trade was a separate transaction and the earlier profitable trades did not constitute an actionable tort.

Damages were increased to $405,741.

The appellant was convicted of wilfully promoting hatred against Muslims through pamphlets and a recorded telephone message.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that wilful blindness satisfied the mens rea requirement for the offence under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code, and that the defence of good faith expression of religious opinion under s. 319(3)(b) was improperly rejected.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that wilful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge and satisfies the stringent mens rea requirement for wilfully promoting hatred, and that the appellant's statements went beyond the good faith expression of religious belief.