Peter R. Jervis

The appellants sought costs of the appeal and trial on a partial indemnity basis following their success.

The respondent argued for no costs, asserting the class proceeding raised a novel point of law and involved a matter of public interest.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding the litigation was a commercial dispute between sophisticated actors involving established principles.

The court awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $100,000 plus GST to both the individual and corporate appellants, along with disbursements, and ordered trial costs to be assessed on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for prospectus misrepresentation under s. 130(1) of the Securities Act.

The trial judge had held that the appellants had a continuing obligation to disclose poor intra-quarterly financial results before the closing of their initial public offering, and that their failure to do so rendered an implied representation of objective reasonableness in their financial forecast false.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act distinguishes between material facts and material changes, and imposes no continuing obligation to disclose material facts after a prospectus receipt is issued.

The Court further held that the trial judge erred in implying a representation of objective reasonableness and in failing to apply the business judgment rule to management's assessment of the forecast.

The plaintiff appealed a costs award following a nine-day trial regarding a broker's failure to carry out trading instructions.

The trial judge had awarded the plaintiff solicitor-client costs from the date of an offer to settle, but reduced the claimed amount of $182,183 to $50,000, finding it excessive.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by effectively applying party and party principles to a solicitor-client costs award without analyzing what conduct by the plaintiff contributed to the trial's length.

The Court fixed the trial costs at $155,000.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal involving stock broker liability.

The court applied the test for intervention and found that the proposed intervention would not make a useful contribution to the resolution of the appeal, as the issues in the main appeal were essentially fact-driven and the intervention was not supported by any of the parties.

The motion for intervenor status was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order of the motions judge, which was based on the finding that the underlying action had been lying dormant since 1996.

The Court of Appeal reviewed new court material not available to the motions judge, which demonstrated the action was not dormant.

The Court set aside the order in the interests of justice, allowing the respondent to renew its motion with full consideration of the delay.

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The appellant was awarded $20,000 in costs, subject to a reduction for an unsuccessful appeal regarding two U.S. companies and the unsatisfactory nature of the statement of claim.

The two U.S. respondents were awarded costs of $5,856.53 and $500, respectively.

The appellant, who had been discharged from bankruptcy, was denied credit because the respondent credit reporting agencies allegedly included statute-barred debts in his credit report contrary to the Consumer Reporting Act.

The appellant brought a proposed class action in negligence.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding policy reasons against recognizing a duty of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against the Canadian respondents, holding that a prima facie duty of care exists based on proximity and foreseeability, analogous to negligent misrepresentation, and that policy considerations do not make it plain and obvious that the claim should be struck at this stage.

The claims against the American parent companies were struck for failing to plead sufficient material facts.

The appellants, a privately appointed receiver and his company, appealed a trial judgment ordering an accounting and denying receiver's fees due to egregious breaches of fiduciary duty and self-dealing in the receivership of a horse farming operation.

The respondents cross-appealed, seeking the equitable remedy of tracing regarding a specific farm property improperly acquired by the receiver's nephew.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding overwhelming evidence of the receiver's complete failure to appreciate his duties, including acting in conflict of interest.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal in part, granting the respondents the right to trace the proceeds realized from the farm property and ordering the receiver to disgorge any profits.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum on costs following an appeal.

The court noted that the increase in the monetary award authorized by the court placed the judgment significantly above the appellant's Rule 49 offer to settle.

Consequently, the court varied the trial costs disposition to award the appellant party-and-party costs up to the date of the offer and solicitor-and-client costs thereafter.

The appellant was also awarded the costs of the appeal on a party-and-party basis.

The appellant suffered significant losses in his commodities trading account and successfully sued his brokerage firm for negligent supervision.

The trial judge awarded damages but deducted profits the appellant had made in previous years.

The appellant appealed the quantum of damages and the dismissal of his breach of fiduciary duty claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that no fiduciary duty existed, as the appellant was an experienced trader who directed his own account.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on damages, holding that the trial judge erred in deducting past profits, as each trade was a separate transaction and the earlier profitable trades did not constitute an actionable tort.

Damages were increased to $405,741.

The appellant was convicted of wilfully promoting hatred against Muslims through pamphlets and a recorded telephone message.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that wilful blindness satisfied the mens rea requirement for the offence under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code, and that the defence of good faith expression of religious opinion under s. 319(3)(b) was improperly rejected.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that wilful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge and satisfies the stringent mens rea requirement for wilfully promoting hatred, and that the appellant's statements went beyond the good faith expression of religious belief.