Peter Boushy

The Crown applied to have the respondent designated a dangerous offender following his convictions for serious personal injury offences against an intimate partner.

The respondent had a history of horrific violence against intimate partners, including a prior conviction for attempted murder where he bound, gagged, and locked a former partner in the trunk of her car.

A forensic psychiatrist assessed the respondent as having an anti-social personality disorder and being at a high risk for violent re-offence against intimate partners.

The court found that the respondent's actions constituted a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour showing a failure to restrain himself and a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences.

The court concluded there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public, designated the respondent a dangerous offender, and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

In a post-verdict sentencing ruling in a sexual assault prosecution, the accused sought a stay of one count and orders for a psychiatric assessment and sexual behaviour testing.

The court held that the impugned count, as presented to the jury on consent, fell within the statutory authorization for adding a charge with the accused's consent and refused the stay.

The court further found there was an adequate basis to order a psychiatric report concerning the accused's mental health and to direct sexual behaviour testing, including phallometric testing, as relevant to the determination of a fit sentence and appropriate ancillary orders.

The stay request was dismissed, and both assessment requests were granted.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings after conviction for internet luring, alleging police entrapment arising from an undercover officer posing online as a 14‑year‑old.

The court considered the entrapment framework set out in R. v. Mack, including whether police provided an opportunity to commit an offence without reasonable suspicion, whether the investigation was conducted pursuant to a bona fide inquiry, and whether police induced the offence.

Although the court found that the undercover communications constituted an opportunity to commit the offence, reasonable suspicion arose shortly after the exchanges began when the accused continued sexually explicit communication after being told the persona was 14 years old.

The court further held the investigation was a bona fide inquiry and that the police conduct did not amount to inducement.

The application for a stay based on entrapment was therefore dismissed.

The accused was charged with two counts of attempted murder and one count of robbery arising from a late‑night stabbing outside a convenience store.

During closing submissions, the Crown sought convictions for aggravated assault as included offences.

The Crown relied primarily on in‑dock identifications by two victims and an eyewitness, along with a co‑accused’s video statement and circumstantial evidence allegedly linking the accused to the driver.

The court found significant discrepancies in the eyewitness descriptions and emphasized the well‑recognized frailties of first‑time in‑court identification, particularly where prior photo line‑ups failed to produce identifications.

Finding the identification evidence unreliable and the remaining evidence insufficient to establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt, the court acquitted the accused.

During a trial for attempted murder and robbery, the Crown applied to admit two prior statements of a recanting co-accused for the truth of their contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The first statement was an Agreed Statement of Facts from the co-accused's guilty plea, and the second was a video-taped police interview.

The court dismissed the application regarding the Agreed Statement of Facts, finding it lacked threshold reliability as the co-accused had not personally assented to it and pleaded guilty solely to be released.

However, the court granted the application to admit the video-taped interview, finding that the ability to observe demeanour, the availability of cross-examination, and corroborating evidence established threshold reliability.

The appellant appealed a custodial sentence imposed following convictions for mischief and two counts of breach of probation arising from conduct at a medical clinic.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission of time served and instead imposed an additional custodial sentence resulting in an effective six‑month term of imprisonment.

The appellate court held that joint submissions on sentence are entitled to significant deference and should only be rejected where the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court found the sentencing judge erred in principle by rejecting the joint submission without adequate justification and by imposing a sentence that was demonstrably unfit and disproportionate to the gravity of the offences.

The appeal was allowed and the custodial sentence was reduced to time served, with the probation order remaining in force.

The appellants sought leave to appeal their sentences for failing to provide the necessaries of life, arguing that previous case law established a sentencing range of four to eight months for first offenders.

The Court of Appeal disagreed that the cited case established such a range.

Finding no error of law, the court refused leave to appeal.

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender under s. 753 of the Criminal Code following convictions for aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, threatening death, obstruction of justice, weapons offences, and multiple breaches of probation.

The court reviewed the offender’s history of violent assaults and expert psychiatric and psychological evidence assessing the risk of violent recidivism.

Although the offender demonstrated anti‑social personality traits and a moderate risk of violent reoffending, the court found the offences did not establish the level of intractable pattern of behaviour required for a dangerous offender designation.

Applying conventional sentencing principles including denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and the totality principle, the court imposed a determinate penitentiary sentence.

Credit for pre‑sentence custody was reduced from the usual 2:1 given the offender’s risk profile and incarceration history.

The appellant appealed her sentence of 90 days intermittent, probation, and a five-year driving prohibition for an impaired driving offence.

The trial judge had imposed the 90-day sentence under the mistaken belief that the appellant had two prior qualifying convictions, making 90 days the mandatory minimum.

The Crown acknowledged that the actual mandatory minimum was 14 days but argued the 90-day sentence should be sustained.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting the appellant's compliance with strict bail conditions for four years, and reduced the custodial sentence to 20 days intermittent.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for certiorari regarding a preliminary hearing judge's evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the preliminary hearing judge's rulings on the relevance of evidence were within his jurisdiction, and certiorari is strictly a jurisdictional remedy.

The Court also noted that certiorari applications should rarely, if ever, be brought before a decision on committal for trial is made.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Attorney General and a Crown Attorney.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the pleadings were inadequate, as the appellant failed to plead the material facts necessary to support allegations of the absence of reasonable and probable grounds or malice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants were charged with trafficking marijuana.

The information failed to specify the quantity of drugs, which affected whether the provincial court had absolute jurisdiction or if the appellants had an election.

The trial judge initially proceeded with a trial but later ruled he had exceeded his jurisdiction and converted the proceeding into a preliminary inquiry under s. 555(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants applied for certiorari to quash the order, arguing the proceedings were a nullity.

The Superior Court dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the trial judge had jurisdiction to convert the trial into a preliminary inquiry and that the defective information did not render the proceedings void ab initio.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice, seeking to have charges quashed or a new preliminary inquiry ordered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the provincial court judge had already decided to convert the proceedings into a preliminary inquiry, a decision not subject to the current appeal.

The appellants appealed a decision of a single judge of the Court of Appeal refusing to delay their trial pending the hearing of an unperfected appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the administration of justice would not be served by further delay.

The Court noted the Crown's undertaking to consent to the continuation of bail on the same terms if the appellants are convicted and appeal, which mitigated the prejudice argument.