Paul Zambonini

The offender was convicted of second degree murder after brutally stabbing the victim following a day of drinking.

The Crown sought 15 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the mandatory minimum of 10 years.

The court weighed the offender's difficult background as a refugee and his efforts at self-improvement against the brutal nature of the prolonged attack and his failure to seek medical help for the victim.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 13 years, along with DNA and firearms prohibition orders.

The defendant brought an application under s. 24(1) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings, alleging that police used excessive force during his arrest in violation of ss. 7 and 12.

The defendant sustained a laceration to his head and bruising during a struggle after attempting to flee in his vehicle.

The court found that the defendant violently resisted arrest and weaponized his vehicle, and that the force used by the officers to subdue him was not unnecessary or excessive.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, Abdirisaq Yabarow, facing a charge of second-degree murder, brought a motion seeking to admit an exculpatory statement he made to an acquaintance, Mohamed Khalinle, or to compel the Crown to lead this statement as part of its case.

The statement included a claim of self-defence.

The court considered the established exceptions to the rule against self-serving statements, including mixed statements and spontaneous statements.

The court found that the Khalinle statement did not qualify as a mixed statement because it was separate from other inculpatory statements adduced by the Crown, lacking a sufficient nexus.

It also did not meet the criteria for a spontaneous statement, as it was made after ample time for consideration and not upon confrontation with an accusation.

Consequently, the court ruled the exculpatory statement inadmissible at the instance of the accused and refused to compel the Crown to lead it, affirming the Crown's discretion in calling witnesses and the principle against self-serving evidence.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to quash a search warrant and production order related to his electronic devices (cell phone and tablet) and to exclude evidence under s. 24(1) and (2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application challenged the facial and subfacial validity of the orders, alleging a lack of reasonable grounds, overbreadth, material non-disclosure in the supporting information, and improper execution of the warrant outside the authorized time period.

The court dismissed the application, finding that reasonable grounds for the orders existed, there was no material non-disclosure that vitiated the authorizations, and the forensic examination of the devices was not required to be completed within the search and seizure period stipulated in the warrant, but rather was governed by the Criminal Code's detention regime.

The accused, Abdirizaq Yabarow, was charged with second-degree murder.

The Crown brought an application to determine the voluntariness and admissibility of two statements made by the accused.

The first statement was made to paramedics and police on October 4, 2017, when the accused was perceived as a victim seeking help for injuries.

The second statement was made to homicide detectives on October 6, 2017, following his arrest for murder.

The court found that the paramedics were not persons in authority and that the first statement was voluntary and admissible.

Regarding the second statement, the court determined it was voluntary and admissible up to the point where the accused expressed confusion and requested a rest, but any statements made thereafter were inadmissible as police questioning should have ceased at that juncture.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to exclude the voluntary portions of either statement.

In a second-degree murder trial, the Crown applied to admit three graphic autopsy photographs of the deceased.

The defence opposed, citing prejudicial effect and proposing alternatives such as limiting the number of photographs or presenting them in black and white.

The court applied the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect, finding the photographs highly relevant to central issues including intent, self-defence, and a potential third-party suspect theory.

The court emphasized that modern juries are capable of dispassionate evaluation and concluded that the significant probative value of the photographs strongly outweighed any potential prejudicial effect.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to limit the photographs, as doing so would undermine their evidentiary purpose.

The Crown's application was granted, allowing the introduction of all three full-colour autopsy photographs.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to adduce evidence of a third-party suspect.

The defence sought to call witnesses and introduce video surveillance to establish that another resident of the victim's building had animus, motive, and opportunity to commit the murder.

The court applied the McMillan test and found that the proposed evidence established a sufficient connection between the third party and the crime.

The application was granted, as the probative value of the evidence outweighed its slight prejudicial effect.

The Crown sought to admit utterances made by the accused, Najib Amin, during an undercover police operation in his first-degree murder trial.

The defence opposed admission, citing principles from R. v. Hart.

The court, applying the Hart factors as a framework, found the utterances admissible, concluding that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and that police conduct did not constitute an abuse of process.

The ruling specifically addressed four categories of utterances, finding them all admissible with one requiring a specific instruction to mitigate prejudice.

The Crown sought certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the accused on firearm possession charges and to compel committal for trial.

The preliminary inquiry judge found no evidence of possession, disregarding circumstantial evidence that the accused reached into the area where the firearm was found.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider all the evidence and by improperly weighing it, thereby exceeding the limited role of a preliminary inquiry judge.

The application was allowed, the discharge quashed, and the matter remitted with a direction to commit the accused for trial.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial for first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on motive, opportunity, and after-the-fact conduct.

The reviewing court applied the test for committal, assessing whether there was any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict.

The court found that the combined evidence of the accused's motive, presence in the building, and attempts to conceal his identity was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

Three offenders were convicted by a jury of kidnapping, extortion, and related offences committed with a firearm for the benefit of a street gang.

The victim, a fellow gang member, was kidnapped and threatened over a stolen gun.

The court sentenced the lead offender to 11 years, the secondary offender with a lengthy record to 9 years, and the third offender with better rehabilitation prospects to 6 years, all subject to half-time parole eligibility and credit for pre-sentence custody including lockdown time.

The accused, Derek Oppong, brought a Corbett application to prohibit the Crown from cross-examining him on his criminal record if he testified.

The Crown sought to introduce the full record for credibility.

The court applied the Corbett factors, balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, considering the nature and remoteness of convictions, similarity to current charges, and the defense's attack on the Crown witness's character.

The court ultimately edited the record, prohibiting cross-examination on assault and robbery convictions, but permitting it on theft under, fail to comply, and threatening death convictions, to avoid an unbalanced portrayal of the accused's character to the jury.

The accused, B.M., pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault against two vulnerable women who sought his "spiritual services." The court considered aggravating factors, including the abuse of a position of trust and the public advertisement of deceitful services, and mitigating factors such as the guilty plea and lack of prior criminal record.

The court imposed a global sentence of 18 months' imprisonment, less 4 months' pre-trial custody credit, resulting in a 14-month total sentence, followed by two years' probation and various ancillary orders.

The Crown applied for two orders regarding witness D.H. in a criminal trial: to permit D.H. to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code, and to admit D.H.'s video statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court granted both applications, finding that CCTV testimony was necessary due to an attempt by gang members to intimidate D.H. in the courtroom, which interfered with the proper administration of justice.

The court also found that admitting D.H.'s video statement was appropriate given D.H.'s age at the time of the offence and the short timeframe between the incident and the statement.

Fernando Correia was found guilty by a jury of dangerous driving, but acquitted of aggravated assault and mischief to property.

The sentencing judge denied the defence's application for a judicial stay based on alleged inconsistent verdicts, affirming the finality of jury verdicts subject to appeal.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the intentional nature of the dangerous driving causing serious bodily harm, and mitigating factors such as the offender's age, lack of criminal record, strong work ethic, and family ties.

The judge imposed a 12-month custodial sentence, a one-year driving prohibition, and a no-contact order, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

The offenders, both youthful members of a street gang, were convicted of second-degree murder following a planned, gang-related shooting that resulted in the death of an unarmed victim.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period near the 25-year maximum, while the defence sought 12 to 15 years, arguing systemic discrimination should mitigate the sentence.

The court rejected the systemic discrimination argument, finding the gravity of the offence eclipsed such factors.

Weighing the egregious nature of the planned shooting against the offenders' youth, the court sentenced both offenders to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 15 years.

This pre-trial application addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on urban street gangs, evidence of prior violent incidents, and YouTube videos in a murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce this evidence to establish motive related to inter-gang rivalry.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and a cost/benefit analysis, ruling that expert evidence on general gang phenomena and specific incidents was admissible, but with limitations on ultimate issues and hearsay.

Initially, some videos were admitted, but this ruling was reversed after the accused made admissions regarding gang existence and membership, as the videos' probative value was then outweighed by their prejudice.

A subsequent application by the Crown to re-admit videos during cross-examination of an accused was also refused, upholding the principle against compelling an accused to put character in issue.

The Crown sought to admit expert testimony on urban street gang slang to interpret intercepted communications in a murder trial.

While the defence conceded the general admissibility criteria, the judge raised concerns about the expert opining on the precise meaning of communications, which could trench on the ultimate issue.

Despite conflicting authorities, the judge permitted the expert to interpret the communications directly, as all counsel uniformly preferred this approach over hypotheticals.

The Crown applied to have the respondent designated a dangerous offender following convictions for multiple offences, including sexual assault with a weapon, forcible confinement, and criminal harassment against an intimate partner.

The court found that the respondent's history of escalating domestic violence established a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a likelihood of causing severe injury or psychological damage in the future.

The court concluded that there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public, designated the respondent a dangerous offender, and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

Leighton Bonnick was charged with firearms offences following a shooting incident at a barbeque.

The Crown alleged Bonnick returned to the party with a gun after being assaulted, leading to a gunfight where Donahue Bernard was shot.

The defence argued Bonnick did not possess a gun and that the Crown's witnesses were unreliable and inconsistent.

The court found the evidence of Crown witnesses to be inconsistent, unreliable, and lacking credibility, particularly regarding whether Bonnick had a gun.

Applying the third branch of R. v. W.(D.), the court was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Bonnick possessed a gun and acquitted him of all charges.