Paul Zambonini

The defendant, Faisal Fareed, brought an application to exclude a loaded handgun from evidence, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that while the initial detention and seizure of the gun were lawful, there were breaches related to the delay in informing Fareed of the grounds for detention (s. 10(a)), and significant delays in implementing his right to counsel of choice (s. 10(b)).

Additionally, the police failed to file a report to a justice of the peace regarding the seized items, constituting a breach of section 8.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court determined that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, particularly as the breaches occurred after the lawful seizure and did not impact the reliability of the evidence.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The applicant applied for certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first degree murder and substitute a charge of second degree murder.

He argued there was no evidence of forcible confinement or that he was a party to it.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge made no jurisdictional error.

There was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could find that the victim was forcibly confined by an unidentified man acting in concert with the applicant during the shooting.

Kevin George was charged with 14 criminal offences following a shootout at his child's birthday party.

The court found him guilty of discharging a firearm with intent at Demar Cadogan and Tianna Green, aggravated assault on Demar Cadogan and Tianna Green, and failing to comply with a release order.

He was found not guilty of attempted murder, other discharge firearm/aggravated assault counts, and firearm possession charges due to insufficient evidence regarding party liability, specific intent to kill, or proof of firearm type/licensing.

The court extensively analyzed circumstantial evidence for identity and the principles of party liability.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter following a jury trial for his role in a fatal shooting.

The court found that the offender was aware of the presence of a firearm and was a party to the offence under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

After weighing aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, against mitigating factors, such as harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and rehabilitative potential, the court determined an appropriate sentence of 113.5 months.

After applying credit for pre-sentence custody, the offender was sentenced to 58 months' imprisonment.

Sentencing of two co-accused following a judge-alone trial.

The first accused, a repeat offender with a lengthy record, was convicted of multiple firearms offences, assault with a weapon, drug trafficking, and driving offences.

After applying the Kienapple rule to stay several duplicative counts, the court sentenced him to a total of 10 years in custody.

The second accused, who had a limited record and demonstrated significant rehabilitation, was convicted of being an occupant in a vehicle with a firearm and possession of cocaine.

The court sentenced the second accused to an 18-month conditional sentence.

During a trial for first degree murder, the accused applied for directed verdicts of acquittal at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including cell tower data and security video, to place the accused at the scene of the shooting or assisting the shooters.

The court dismissed the directed verdict applications, finding sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict.

The court also ruled on several jury charge issues, declining to instruct the jury on co-principal liability, abetting, or the common unlawful purpose doctrine for second degree murder, and opting to provide an expanded instruction on circumstantial evidence.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during their trial.

The Crown opposed the motion, arguing for the traditional placement in the dock due to security concerns and to allow the jury a better view for identification purposes.

The court reviewed the conflicting jurisprudence on the issue and concluded that there is no presumption regarding an accused's placement.

Applying a case-by-case analysis based on fair trial interests and courtroom security, the court found that sitting at counsel table enhances communication with counsel and avoids the risk of prejudice associated with the dock.

Given the accused's good behaviour during prior court appearances and the lack of specific security risks, the motion was granted.

The accused faced multiple firearms, driving, and drug charges arising from two incidents in August 2019.

In the first incident, one accused threatened his ex-girlfriend with a handgun.

In the second, both accused were found in a vehicle and residence where a loaded handgun and cocaine were seized.

At trial, two key Crown witnesses recanted their prior statements to police, prompting the Crown to successfully apply under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine them.

The court found the first accused guilty of multiple firearms offences, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, driving while prohibited, and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The second accused was found guilty of occupying a motor vehicle knowing there was a firearm and simple possession of cocaine.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the respondents on charges of attempted murder following a gunfight outside a convenience store.

The preliminary inquiry judge had found insufficient evidence of intent to kill.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by impermissibly weighing circumstantial evidence, failing to prefer the inference most favourable to the Crown, and failing to consider the evidence as a whole.

The application was allowed, the discharge order was quashed, and mandamus was granted directing the committal of both respondents to stand trial for attempted murder.

The accused, charged with armed robbery and related offences, brought a second application to review his detention order, alleging material changes in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic and potential unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the detention centre had effectively managed the virus and the accused failed to show an increased risk of contracting COVID-19.

Furthermore, the court held that the potential delay was largely attributable to the defence and did not constitute a material change that would have affected the initial bail decision.

The application was dismissed, and the accused remained detained on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision committing the accused to stand trial for second-degree murder rather than first-degree murder.

The Crown argued that the act of pointing a gun at the victim's head during an attempted robbery constituted unlawful confinement, thereby elevating the offence to first-degree murder.

The reviewing court agreed, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by misunderstanding the elements of unlawful confinement and failing to consider the inference most favourable to the Crown.

The application was granted, the discharge was quashed, and the matter was remitted with a direction to commit the accused for first-degree murder.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, applied for bail under s. 469 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed release on the secondary and tertiary grounds, citing the applicant's serious criminal record and the gravity of the offence.

The court found that the Crown's case was weak, relying entirely on recanted statements from an unsavoury witness obtained during a 'Mr. Big' operation, which contradicted objective evidence.

The court concluded the applicant met his onus on both grounds and granted release on strict house arrest conditions with sureties.

The accused applied to revisit a pre-trial ruling that admitted expert police evidence regarding street gangs.

The defence argued that their willingness to make factual admissions about gang membership and the existence of the gang constituted a material change in circumstances, rendering the expert evidence unnecessary and overly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed factual admissions lacked the necessary context that the expert evidence was meant to provide to the jury.

Furthermore, the Crown did not agree to the admissions, and the court could not compel such an agreement.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown brought an application to admit expert evidence regarding street gangs, specifically the rivalry between 'C3' and the 'Scarlettwood Crips'.

The Crown sought to qualify a police detective as an expert to provide context and establish motive for the seemingly random shooting of an unarmed man.

The defence opposed the application, arguing the evidence was highly prejudicial and the officer was not properly qualified.

The court allowed the application, finding the evidence was logically relevant to motive, necessary to assist the jury in understanding the context of the shooting, and that the officer was qualified.

The court ruled that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to specific exclusions of certain highly prejudicial videos and appropriate jury instructions.

Akwasi Edusei and Tavoy Brown were sentenced for convenience store robberies.

Edusei was convicted of two robberies, disguise with intent, and possession of stolen property.

Brown was convicted of possession of stolen property and breach of court orders.

The court considered Edusei's extensive criminal record, the vulnerability of convenience store victims, and masked robberies as aggravating factors, with youth as the sole mitigating factor.

Brown's sentence was based on a joint submission.

Edusei received a global sentence of four years, with credit for pretrial custody including enhanced credit for lockdown conditions.

Brown received a 90-day concurrent sentence, largely covered by pretrial custody.

S.A., charged with second-degree murder, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found a substantial likelihood that S.A. would commit further offences if released, citing strong evidence of involvement in the murder, a prior bail breach, and other outstanding charges.

The proposed release plan, including electronic monitoring and sureties, was deemed insufficient given S.A.'s apparent disregard for consequences.

The COVID-19 pandemic's relevance to the secondary ground was considered but not found to be a significant deterrent for the applicant.

The application for release was dismissed.

The accused sought a bail review after a detention order was cancelled by consent.

The application was heard via teleconference during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered new evidence, including proposed sureties and electronic monitoring, as material changes in circumstances, allowing for a de novo hearing.

The court found no primary ground concerns (flight risk).

However, on secondary grounds, the court found a substantial likelihood that the accused would commit further offences or interfere with justice, given an extensive criminal record, history of non-compliance with court orders, and the serious nature of the current drug and firearm charges.

On tertiary grounds, considering the strength of the prosecution's case, the objective gravity of the offences, and the accused's personal circumstances, the court concluded that continued detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The impact of the pandemic on correctional facilities and trial delays was considered but not found to be a sufficient basis for release in this specific case.

The application for bail review was denied.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought release on bail.

The court considered the strength of the Crown's case, the applicant's background (including a new drug trafficking charge while in custody), the reliability of the proposed surety (the applicant's father, who was untruthful in testimony), the release plan, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found the applicant failed to satisfy the onus on the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, concluding that detention was necessary for public safety and to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The Crown applied for an order of certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the accused on firearm possession charges.

The Crown argued the judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence and by drawing an inference favourable to the accused.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that while the preliminary inquiry judge made an error of law regarding the need for 'exclusive possession', it was not a jurisdictional error.

The judge's conclusion on the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence was within his jurisdiction and not reviewable by certiorari.

The offender was convicted of 17 offences, including criminal harassment, uttering death threats, and extortion against his former common-law partner's family.

The Crown applied to have him designated a Dangerous Offender.

The court found that the predicate offences were serious personal injury offences and that the offender's conduct demonstrated a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour, showing a failure to restrain himself and a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences.

The court designated the offender a Dangerous Offender and, finding that a lesser sentence would not adequately protect the public due to his high risk of reoffending and poor treatability for Delusional Disorder and Antisocial Personality Disorder, imposed an indeterminate sentence.