Paul M. DeMelo

The plaintiff developer and the municipality sought a permanent injunction against protesters occupying a residential development site and blocking public roads.

The court found the leader of the protesters in contempt for refusing to obey interlocutory injunctions and struck his pleadings, denying him further participation.

The court granted the permanent injunctions, finding the developer had good title, the protesters' self-help remedies and blockades were unlawful, and there was a serious risk of ongoing harm and violence.

The plaintiff developer sought a permanent injunction against protestors who occupied its lands and halted construction.

The self-proclaimed leader of the protestors, who was added as a defendant, openly defied previous interlocutory injunctions and stated his intention to continue doing so.

The court held that it was an abuse of process for a party to participate in proceedings while in flagrant contempt of court orders.

The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to prohibit the defendant from further participation until he and his followers vacate the lands and comply with the court's orders.

The plaintiff developer and the municipality brought motions for interlocutory injunctions to remove protesters who had occupied a residential development site and blockaded public roads.

The protesters, asserting an indigenous land claim outside of the court process, did not participate in the proceedings.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and granted the injunctions, finding serious issues to be tried, irreparable harm to the developer and the community, and that the balance of convenience favoured upholding the rule of law.

The Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) brought a stated case to the Divisional Court asking whether parties to a first-level appeal under s. 38(1) of the Local Planning Appeal Act, 2017 have the right to cross-examine witnesses.

The majority of the Divisional Court held that the term 'examine' in s. 42(3)(b) of the Act and s. 3 of O. Reg. 102/18 includes cross-examination.

Therefore, parties are precluded from cross-examining witnesses at an oral hearing or cross-examining affiants prior to a hearing.

The Court found that the legislature intended to create an expeditious, investigative process where the Tribunal controls the evidence, expressly overriding the common law right to cross-examination.

The City of Hamilton sought judicial review of a decision by the Mining and Lands Commissioner dismissing its appeal of a conservation authority levy apportioned by the Niagara Peninsula Conservation Authority.

Hamilton argued that the levy should only be calculated using the assessed value of lands within the conservation authority's jurisdiction, rather than the entire municipality's assessment base.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Commissioner's interpretation of the Conservation Authorities Act and Regulation 670, finding that the entire assessment base of the municipality is to be used in the calculation.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Six proposed intervenors brought motions for leave to intervene in a stated case before the Divisional Court regarding the interpretation of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal Act, 2017.

The stated case concerns the Tribunal's power to call evidence and permit cross-examination in planning appeals.

The applicants and respondents generally did not oppose the interventions, provided they did not delay the proceedings.

One proposed intervenor, the Toronto Port Authority, also sought to be added as a party to obtain independent appeal rights.

The court granted intervenor status to all six proposed intervenors, finding they had a real interest and could make useful and distinct contributions.

However, the court denied the Toronto Port Authority's request for party status, concluding that granting it would unduly delay the determination of the main parties' rights.

The defendant published a report criticizing the governance and contracting practices of the Niagara Peninsula Conservation Authority.

The Authority, its former CAO, and a contractor sued the defendant for defamation.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the actions under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act (s. 137.1).

The court dismissed the Authority's action, holding that a government entity cannot sue an individual for defamation.

The court dismissed the remaining plaintiffs' actions because they failed to show the defendant had no valid defence, as the expressions were made on occasions of qualified privilege without malice.

The appellant electrical contractor appealed the dismissal of its action against the respondent regional municipality.

The appellant alleged the municipality breached its procurement bylaws by engaging in contract-splitting to award work to a competitor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the municipality's task-oriented approach did not violate the bylaws and that there was no evidence of unfair treatment or contract-splitting.

Furthermore, the appellant failed to prove any damages.

The appeal was dismissed.

The claimant sought a ruling that costs incurred in Superior Court proceedings, which were ultimately found to be without jurisdiction for assessment by a judge, should be included as part of the expropriation costs to be assessed by an assessment officer.

The respondent argued that these costs should not be awarded as the court lacked jurisdiction and the respondent was not at fault.

The court declined to make a determination on the Superior Court costs, instead referring the question of entitlement and quantum to the assessment officer conducting the expropriation costs assessment, noting that both parties shared the misapprehension of the court's jurisdiction.

A subcontractor sued a municipality after being required to remove and replace unapproved streetlight poles installed on a municipal highway project.

The court held there was no contract between the municipality and the subcontractor, no duty of good faith or honest performance owed by the municipality, and no basis to recognize a new duty of care in tort in the tendering context.

Applying the unlawful means tort framework, the court found the municipality merely insisted that its general contractor comply with the tender specifications and did not use unlawful means or intend to cause economic harm.

The action was dismissed, and the court further found the alleged damages were unsupported by reliable evidence.

The moving party, Men's Fire, sought to be added as a party and to vary an interlocutory injunction that prevented interference with the plaintiff's archaeological assessments on its property.

The court added Men's Fire as a party on consent but dismissed the motion to vary the injunction.

The court found no evidence of an active land claim against the property, no failure by the plaintiff to comply with legislation, and no duty on the private landowner or the municipality to consult with the moving party under the circumstances.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim at trial, the successful defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale, relying on an offer to settle for a dismissal without costs.

The court held that the offer amounted to an offer to capitulate and did not engage Rule 49.10.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $35,873.11, taking into account the modest complexity of the claim and the plaintiff's late abandonment of an intentional interference with economic relations claim.

Following the dismissal of an action on summary judgment concerning alleged nondisclosure in a land sale, the successful defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs had alleged that the vendor Crown breached duties of good faith and honesty by failing to disclose Indigenous land-related claims affecting the property.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs under Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act and rejected the argument that the Crown’s costs should be discounted because government counsel are salaried.

The court held the defendants’ claimed fees and disbursements were reasonable given the complexity of responding to allegations of bad faith and the extensive factual investigation required.

Costs of $383,745.81 on a partial indemnity basis were awarded to the defendants.

Addendum to previously released reasons for judgment correcting an administrative error concerning the identification of counsel.

After the original decision was released, the court was advised that the names of counsel for the parties had been reversed.

The court issued an addendum to accurately reflect counsel for the plaintiff and defendant.

The addendum does not alter the substance of the earlier reasons or the disposition of the case.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action arising from a real estate transaction.

The plaintiffs, real estate developers, purchased surplus government land and later faced blockades by aboriginal protesters.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants breached a duty of good faith and failed to disclose latent defects by not informing them of prior monetary claims and a lawsuit by the Six Nations regarding the land.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding no duty to disclose the claims under the contract, no evidence of dishonesty to trigger a breach of good faith, and that the claims did not constitute a latent defect as they did not render the land uninhabitable or dangerous.

The applicant developer sought a provisional building permit for a townhouse development, which the City refused, demanding an off-site parkland dedication instead of cash in lieu of land.

The applicant appealed the refusal and applied for a declaration interpreting the municipal bylaw.

The court dismissed the appeal as premature because the applicant lacked final planning approval.

However, the court granted the application for a declaration, finding that under the plain language of the bylaw, the City cannot require an off-site parkland dedication without the developer's agreement.

The applicant, an absentee landlord living in Qatar, sought to reverse clean-up costs assessed against his property by the respondent municipality after a clandestine drug lab operated by his tenants caused a fire.

The municipality relied on a by-law prohibiting the use of property for the manufacture of controlled substances.

The court held that the by-law is a strict liability public welfare provision that does not require the owner to have actual knowledge of the prohibited activity.

The court found the municipality's decision to assess costs against the applicant was reasonable and that failing to do so would result in the applicant's unjust enrichment.

The application was dismissed.

The appellants' farm property was expropriated by the respondent, and the parties settled compensation at $1.3 million, with costs to be assessed under s. 32 of the Expropriations Act.

An assessment officer awarded costs, but a Superior Court Justice reduced the amounts on appeal, finding them unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court Justice erred by conducting a rehearing and substituting her own view of what was reasonable instead of applying the proper deferential standard of review.

The assessment officer's awards were reinstated.

The applicants sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision that set aside official plan amendments intended to permit estate residential development in rural areas.

The Board found the amendments did not conform to the provincial Growth Plan, which directs new multiple lots to settlement areas.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's interpretation that the policy limits residential development in rural areas to three or fewer units.

The appellant sought to quash a municipal by-law renaming a public square, arguing that the city council held closed meetings in violation of the Municipal Act.

The Court of Appeal found that while the council failed to pass a sufficient resolution before going into closed session and conducted an unauthorized vote, these were procedural irregularities.

Because the final decision to pass the by-law was made after lengthy debate at an open public meeting, the by-law was not tainted by illegality.

The appeal was dismissed.