J. Paul R. Howard

The accused was charged with common assault, assault with a weapon, possession of stolen property, break and enter, and possession of break-in instruments following two incidents on the same morning.

The first incident involved a break and enter at a residence where property was stolen.

The second incident involved the accused breaking into a pickup truck, where he was confronted by the owner, leading to a physical altercation involving a knife.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as not credible, applied the doctrine of recent possession, and found the accused guilty on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless use of a firearm.

After experiencing multiple break-ins, the appellant armed himself with a loaded BB gun to confront suspected trespassers on his property.

He chased a suspect down a public alleyway and banged on a neighbour's door while holding the firearm.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's actions constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable person and that the defences of defence of property and citizen's arrest were not available because his actions were not reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant, having successfully dismissed the plaintiffs' action, sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing public interest litigation, novelty of issues, and impecuniosity, and challenged the quantum.

The court found the litigation was a private dispute, not public interest, and rejected the impecuniosity argument due to lack of evidence.

However, the court reduced the defendant's claimed costs, noting the defendant's conduct contributed to the litigation's length through "uneven enforcement measures" and finding several claimed amounts excessive or improper.

The court fixed costs at $30,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable by the plaintiffs to the defendant.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on liability following a motor vehicle accident.

The court found the defendant driver negligent for driving too fast for conditions, losing control, and crossing into oncoming traffic.

The registered owner and beneficial owner (parents of the driver) were found vicariously liable under the Highway Traffic Act.

Claims of contributory negligence against the plaintiff driver were dismissed due to lack of evidence.

The matter was ordered to proceed to trial for assessment of damages and the threshold issue under the Insurance Act.

The accused, Donald Wilhelm Parker, applied for a bail review to set aside a detention order, arguing that late disclosure of text messages constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court applied the Palmer criteria for material change and the St. Cloud standard of review.

It found that the text messages did not establish a material change and would not have altered the original detention decision, as they reinforced safety concerns for the complainant and her children.

The application for judicial interim release was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought damages for proprietary estoppel and/or negligent misrepresentation against the Town of LaSalle after the Town prohibited vehicular access to unopened road allowances, thereby restricting access to the plaintiffs' detached garage.

The plaintiffs alleged that the Town induced them to build the garage with implied permission for access via an unopened road allowance.

The court found that the Town was not aware of the plaintiffs' intention to use the unopened road allowance for vehicular access and that the plaintiffs' reliance was not reasonable.

The Town's actions were deemed a legitimate exercise of its powers to address legal, financial, and liability concerns.

The claims for proprietary estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, and punitive damages were dismissed.

The court also addressed the limitation period, finding the action was commenced within time.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against a urologist, alleging negligent performance of a trans-urethral resection of the prostate (TURP) that resulted in total and continuous urinary incontinence.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the urologist breached the standard of care or that the alleged breach caused the incontinence.

The court concluded that the incontinence was a known complication, likely attributable to pre-existing conditions of an overactive bladder and a weakened external sphincter, rather than surgical negligence.

The accused was arrested following a nightclub shooting and placed in a dry cell for approximately two hours before police collected gunshot residue samples from his hands.

He was not provided an opportunity to contact legal counsel until after the samples were taken.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing his s. 10(b) rights were violated.

The court found that the police failed to facilitate the accused's right to counsel at the earliest practicable opportunity and that the delay was unreasonable.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the gunshot residue evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The offender, an 18-year-old international university student, was convicted of sexually assaulting a 17-year-old highly intoxicated female student in a university residence.

The court considered the significant physical and psychological impact on the victim, the offender's lack of a prior criminal record, and the collateral immigration consequences of a custodial sentence.

The court determined that a sentence of 26 months' imprisonment was appropriate, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for a serious crime of violence against a vulnerable victim.

The applicant husband brought a motion under Rule 25(19)(b) of the Family Law Rules to change an interim consent order that required him to pay $800 per month in spousal support.

He argued the order contained a 'calculation mistake' because the amount fell outside the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) range based on his subsequent calculations.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no mutual mistake or misapprehension between the parties at the time of the consent order.

The court noted that the agreed-upon amount was within the SSAG range and that interim orders are meant to provide a reasonably acceptable temporary solution until trial.

The applicant mother sought to relocate with the children from Essex County to Thunder Bay for a new job opportunity, which would significantly improve her financial situation and the children's lives.

The respondent father opposed the move and brought a cross-motion for the children to remain in Essex County.

The court, applying the principles from Gordon v. Goertz and Plumley v. Plumley, found a material change in circumstances due to the mother's job loss.

It determined that the relocation was in the children's best interests, considering the mother's financial stability, the lack of alternative employment, and the proposed access schedule which maintained the father's overnight access.

The applicant's motion was allowed, and the respondent's cross-motion was dismissed.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for inordinate and inexcusable delay, spanning 22 years.

The litigation arose from a business partnership dissolution and minority shareholder dispute from 1993, involving allegations of oppression, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent manipulation of accounts.

The court applied the Langenecker v. Sauvé test under Rule 24.01, finding the delay inordinate and inexcusable, particularly due to the plaintiffs' failure to advance the case and the loss of their entire file, including critical financial documentation and the death of the primary plaintiff and key accountants.

The court concluded that a fair trial was no longer possible due to both presumed and actual prejudice to the defendants.

The plaintiffs' action was dismissed for delay.

The defendant, Plasponics Inc., brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from Brampton to Windsor, Ontario, pursuant to Rule 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, Concept Plastics Ltd., opposed the transfer.

The court applied a holistic approach to the enumerated factors, requiring the moving party to demonstrate that the proposed venue was "significantly better" than the plaintiff's chosen venue.

The court found that the defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence, particularly regarding judicial resource availability in the receiving region, to establish that a transfer was desirable in the interests of justice.

The motion to transfer was dismissed.

The parties separated and initially shared a nesting arrangement in the matrimonial home.

Following the sale of the home, both parties brought motions regarding the parenting schedule, schooling, and child support.

The mother sought primary residence and interim sole custody, while the father sought to continue an alternating week schedule.

The court excluded surreptitious surveillance evidence obtained by the mother against the father.

Finding that the father's demanding schedule as a medical resident made him largely unavailable to parent the children without delegating to his extended family, the court ordered primary residence to the mother with the father having alternate weekends and Wednesday overnights.

The court also ordered the children to attend the school proposed by the mother and ordered the father to pay table child support.