Orie Hertzog Niedzviecki

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment dismissing her claim for professional negligence and breach of contract against real estate agents on the basis that the action was statute barred under section 5(1)(b) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The underlying dispute arose from the sale of a property in 2008-2009, with the appellant alleging that the real estate agents improperly induced her to sign a counter-offer and presented it against her instructions.

The appellant commenced the action in 2015, claiming she only discovered her claim during an examination for discovery in March 2015.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant should have known of her claim well before commencing the action, particularly after obtaining a real estate licence and taking real estate courses that would have put her on notice to make further inquiries.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligence and breach of contract, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The plaintiff alleged negligence by real estate agents regarding a right of first refusal in a 2008 property sale.

The court applied the discoverability principle under the Limitations Act, 2002, and found that the plaintiff, a licensed real estate agent, ought to have known of her claim against the real estate agents before June 12, 2013, more than two years before commencing the action in June 2015.

Consequently, the action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The franchisor defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a franchisee action and judgment on a counterclaim following termination of four franchise agreements without notice.

The franchisees alleged breaches including failure to provide notice and violation of the duty of fair dealing under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The court held the terminations were justified due to substantial defaults amounting to acts of bankruptcy and rejected arguments based on estoppel and statutory good faith.

The plaintiffs also failed to produce basic financial documentation capable of proving lost profits, rendering their damages claim unsustainable.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action, while the counterclaim was left for trial due to disputed facts.

The applicants sought oppression relief arising from a 2005 plan of arrangement converting a corporation into an income trust structure and a 2009 restructuring of participating notes that later impeded redemption of preference shares.

The respondents raised a preliminary limitations defence under ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the alleged damage occurred when the impugned corporate steps were taken, and that the applicants knew or ought to have known the material facts underlying the oppression claim well before the two-year period preceding commencement of the application.

The application was therefore dismissed as statute-barred.

The appellant appealed a decision recognizing and enforcing two judgments from the High Court of Singapore: an equitable order regarding shares and a subsequent monetary order.

The appellant argued the monetary order superseded the equitable order, the equitable order was ambiguous, and the application judge erred in awarding postjudgment interest and continuing an interlocutory injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the equitable order was final and enforceable, and that postjudgment interest was properly awarded under the Courts of Justice Act based on the foreign jurisdiction's rate.

Following an earlier order recognizing two Singapore judgments in Ontario with costs to the applicant, the court considered cost submissions from the parties.

The court found the submissions unsatisfactory because they did not provide sufficient detail to assess the reasonableness of the time spent on specific tasks.

The applicant was directed to file a revised cost outline itemizing time spent on each task and on court attendances.

The court also required removal of time related to a prior motion where costs had already been ordered and demanded further particulars for certain disbursements.

The applicant sought to register and enforce two Singapore judgments against the respondent Hopaco, and moved for summary judgment against the respondent DEAR for a declaration of trust over shares.

DEAR brought cross-motions to dismiss the claim as statute-barred, stay it for forum non conveniens, or obtain security for costs.

The court allowed the registration of the foreign judgments against Hopaco.

However, the court dismissed both summary judgment motions regarding DEAR, finding that whether the foreign judgment was an in rem judgment binding on DEAR required a full factual record.

The court also held the action was not statute-barred, declined to stay the action, and ordered the applicant to post security for costs.

The appellant employee appealed a trial judge's finding that his employer had just cause to dismiss him.

The employee had consumed four beers, driven a company vehicle without authorization, crashed it, and subsequently pled guilty to driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 milligrams.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that this constituted serious misconduct warranting dismissal despite a previously unblemished employment record.

The defendants brought a motion seeking removal of the plaintiffs’ law firm on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest arising from a lawyer who previously acted for some defendants sharing office space with the plaintiffs’ counsel and being described as “of counsel.” The moving parties argued that the physical proximity and prior involvement in related matters created a risk of confidential information being shared.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada test from MacDonald Estate v. Martin, the court considered whether a reasonably informed person would conclude that confidential information would be used.

The court found the evidence showed separate practices, systems, and files, and that the lawyer’s involvement in the present matter had ended well before the office‑sharing arrangement.

The motion to remove the plaintiffs’ counsel was therefore dismissed.

A defendant brought a motion for security for costs under r. 56.01(1)(a), (d), and (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure in an action by an estate seeking recovery of funds secured by a mortgage.

The moving party argued that the estate trustee ordinarily resided outside Ontario, that the trustee was a nominal plaintiff without assets in Ontario, and that the action was frivolous because it was statute-barred.

The court held that an executor cannot be personally ordered to post security for costs and that the estate possessed an asset in Ontario in the form of the mortgage.

The court further found that a payment toward the principal restarted the limitation period under s. 23(1) of the Real Property Limitations Act.

The motion for security for costs was therefore dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision declining to enforce a mediated settlement under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial judge had found that the respondent was stressed and emotional during the brief mediation, and that enforcing the settlement would result in a real injustice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual findings were supported by evidence and her discretionary decision not to enforce the settlement was entitled to deference.

The court noted that the appellants suffered no financial prejudice from the partial implementation of the settlement.

A long‑serving employee brought an action for wrongful dismissal and oppression after being terminated for cause following a drunk driving accident involving the employer’s vehicle.

The employee had consumed alcohol during a lunch break, drove the employer’s truck without authorization, and caused a serious rollover collision resulting in severe injuries and a criminal conviction.

The court conducted a contextual analysis of just cause, considering the employee’s 23 years of service and clean disciplinary record against the seriousness of the misconduct.

The court held that drunk driving while operating the employer’s vehicle during the course of employment constituted serious misconduct that fundamentally undermined the employment relationship.

The wrongful dismissal claim was dismissed and the court declined to address mitigation or the oppression claim.

A contractor sued a homeowner for unpaid renovation invoices totalling approximately $40,996.60 after deducting payments already received.

The homeowner counterclaimed alleging defective workmanship and sought the cost of demolishing and redoing the work.

The court found that the renovation contract lacked clarity regarding the scope of work, that the parties ignored key contractual procedures such as written change orders, and that the invoices did not reliably establish the work performed.

Evidence showed deficiencies in tile installation, but the homeowner failed to prove the cost of remediation with admissible or reliable evidence.

Because neither party established their claims on the balance of probabilities, both the action and the counterclaim were dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his Small Claims Court action against his real estate lawyer for professional negligence and breach of contract arising from a four-day delay in closing a home purchase.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the delay was caused by the appellant's failure to obtain fire insurance, which prevented the tendering of mortgage funds.

The court also rejected the appellant's claim of a denial of due process, finding the trial judge's interventions during the hearing were appropriate and did not demonstrate bias.

The tenant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the landlord $10,000 for water damage to an adjoining unit, repair costs, and bailiff fees for distraining the tenant's truck.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors by ignoring key evidence, including the landlord's refusal to allow the tenant's expert to inspect the damaged unit and the lack of evidence regarding the unit's condition at the start of the lease.

The Court also found the distraint of the tenant's truck parked in a common area was illegal under the Commercial Tenancies Act.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a judgment, arguing issues with service and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the motion for fresh evidence, finding there was an ample basis for the motion judge to conclude the appellants were properly served and noting they had not requested an adjournment.

Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application regarding his mother's estate, raising issues about the passing of accounts, ownership of joint bank accounts, release of personal goods, an expired PPSA registration, and costs.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's exercise of discretion or findings, noting the lack of independent corroboration for the appellant's claim to the joint accounts under s. 13 of the Evidence Act.

The appeal was dismissed, save for a minor amendment to the order regarding personal goods to allow the appellant to seek further direction if necessary.

The appellant appealed from a Master's order dismissing a motion to set aside a default judgment.

The Master found the appellant moved in a reasonable time and had a potential defence, but lacked a plausible explanation for the default and that it was equitable to let the judgment stand.

The Divisional Court held that reasonable notice was required before default judgment was signed, given the overall settlement was a fresh step.

The appeal was allowed and the default judgment set aside, conditional on the appellant paying $3,000 in costs thrown away and paying $15,000 into court.

On an appeal from an order refusing to add investor creditors as plaintiffs by counter-claim, the court held that a bank owed no fiduciary duty to unsecured creditors of its corporate customers merely because they shared a common debtor.

Applying the Anns/Kamloops framework, the court found no pleaded facts establishing proximity or reasonable reliance sufficient to create a prima facie duty of care in negligent misrepresentation.

The alleged statements to one guarantor did not support a relationship of reliance by a wider class of investors.

In any event, policy considerations barred recovery because recognizing such a duty would create indeterminate liability to an unlimited class.

The appeal was dismissed.