Divisional Court

The applicant, an Official Veterinarian, sought judicial review of a decision by the Horse Racing Appeal Panel which found it lacked jurisdiction to hear her appeal of the Registrar's decision to rescind her approval.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding the Panel's decision unreasonable because it failed to consider Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Standardbred Racing, which explicitly provides a right of appeal to the Panel for any person aggrieved by a decision of the Registrar.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted panel.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles regarding a boundary dispute between neighbouring lakefront properties.

The issue was whether the metes and bounds description in the registered deed and plan of subdivision, which contained a mathematical error, or an original wooden surveyor's stake should govern the boundary line.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while a registered description generally governs, where it demonstrably fails to express the grantor's true intention, original surveyors' monuments take precedence.

The court affirmed the application of the hierarchy of boundary evidence and section 9 of the Surveys Act.

The appellant appealed from interim and final orders of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying his request for compensation for an alleged assault and criminal conspiracy.

The appellant argued the Board breached procedural fairness by refusing to issue summonses to three police officers and erred in assessing a police report.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no breach of procedural fairness as the appellant failed to show the officers had relevant or necessary evidence, and holding that the Board's assessment of the police report involved findings of fact outside the court's jurisdiction.

A preliminary request for a publication ban was also denied.

The appellant appealed an order of the Master that refused to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his action for delay.

The appellant also brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence on the appeal, detailing severe medical and financial challenges that prevented him from advancing the litigation or retaining counsel earlier.

The Divisional Court granted leave to admit the fresh evidence, finding it credible, relevant, and excusably delayed due to the appellant's circumstances.

Based on the fresh evidence, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal order, concluding that the appellant's interest in pursuing his substantial claims outweighed the respondent's interest in having the claims dismissed, especially given the lack of actual prejudice to the respondent.

Following the dismissal of the respondent's motion for security for costs of a pending appeal, the successful appellant sought costs of $12,255.13 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent argued the amount was excessive and sought to have costs fixed at $6,506.26, payable in any event of the cause.

The court found the appellant's claimed hours excessive given the lack of complexity and brevity of the materials, fixing costs at $7,500 inclusive.

The court declined to order costs payable in any event of the cause, applying the presumptive rule that interlocutory costs are payable within 30 days.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court order dismissing her motion to set aside a default judgment.

The underlying claim alleged she used her position at a bank to induce the plaintiff into a $30,000 fraudulent investment.

The Divisional Court upheld the Deputy Judge's finding that the appellant failed to present a meritorious defence, as her evidence merely asserted the transaction was with her husband and did not address the specific allegations of inducement pleaded against her.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating her tenancy and evicting her for unreasonably refusing the landlord entry to her unit.

The tenant argued the Board Member was biased, failed to provide adequate reasons, and made unreasonable findings of fact, particularly regarding allegations of racism against the landlord's superintendent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, that the reasons were adequate, and that the Member's factual findings were supported by the evidence.

The appellant tenant brought a motion for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal from a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order based on rent arrears.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the appellant was aware of the hearing date but chose not to attend, and that the proposed appeal raised a question of fact rather than a question of law as required by section 210(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court varied the eviction date to provide the appellant additional time to vacate the premises.

The appellant architect appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of professional misconduct for failing to notify a prior architect on three projects and for providing architectural services through an unlicensed entity.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings regarding the failure to notify, concluding the Committee reasonably interpreted the regulation.

However, the Court set aside the finding regarding unlicensed practice, holding the Committee failed to determine whether the drawings at issue constituted a 'design' under the Architects Act.

The matter was remitted to the Committee on that issue.

The appellant was injured on a GO Bus and awarded $35,000 in non-pecuniary damages by a jury.

The trial judge reduced the award to zero by applying the statutory deductible under the Insurance Act, finding that while the respondent employer was vicariously liable, its liability could not exceed that of its protected employee driver pursuant to s. 267.5(10.1).

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, confirming that an employer's vicarious liability is capped at the amount for which the protected defendant employee is liable.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board ordering him to pay damages to the respondent tenant for a bed bug infestation.

The landlord argued the Board lacked jurisdiction because the property was exempt as shared accommodation.

The Board found as a fact that the tenant was not required to share a kitchen or bathroom with the landlord.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal was restricted to questions of law under section 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, and the landlord was improperly challenging findings of fact.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision ordering no costs payable by either party following a successful Motion to Change.

The appellant argued he was entitled to costs based on his success and two offers to settle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly determined that the presumption of costs was outweighed by the undue hardship an adverse costs award would cause the respondent and the child in her care.

The court held the trial judge's exercise of discretion was entitled to deference.

The appellant nurse appealed a Discipline Committee decision finding her guilty of professional misconduct for failing to comply with an order to complete a remediation program.

She argued she was denied natural justice because she could not challenge the underlying allegations.

The College cross-appealed, arguing the conduct should have been found 'dishonourable' and a longer suspension imposed.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, holding that the appellant could not collaterally attack the underlying order, and that the Discipline Committee's findings on misconduct and the two-month suspension were reasonable.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal from an order liquidating the corporate defendant, the respondent sought costs of the appeal and a prior stay motion.

The Divisional Court fixed costs at $25,000 on a partial indemnity basis, payable solely by the personal appellants to prevent the respondent from effectively paying half of his own costs through the corporation.

The court also ordered the personal appellants to fully indemnify the respondent and the corporation for the fees of a monitor appointed during the stay, as the monitor was necessitated by the personal appellants' oppressive conduct.

The appellant, who had de facto custody of the child, appealed a summary judgment finding that the child was in need of protection and an order denying her access.

The child had complex medical needs, and the medical evidence indicated the appellant was providing inadequate care, leading to the child's declining health.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's reliance on the medical evidence, the finding that the child was in need of protection, or the determination that it was in the child's best interests to deny the appellant access.

The appeal was dismissed.

The tenant appealed an eviction order made by the Landlord and Tenant Board, arguing a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Board Member who ordered the eviction had previously acted as legal counsel against the tenant on behalf of the building's former property manager in prior eviction proceedings.

The Divisional Court found that an objective observer could reasonably assume the Member's prior knowledge of the tenant's history with the landlord might unconsciously influence her decision, particularly when making credibility findings and exercising discretion under section 83 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a hearing de novo.