Family and Matrimonial Law - ODC

The appellant, a high-profile public figure, appealed a motion judge's dismissal of his request for a sealing order and publication ban in a family law proceeding.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider alternative protective measures such as anonymization and partial sealing.

The court also found a palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was no evidence of harm to the child, noting the child's need for security guards and signs of distress.

A partial sealing order and publication ban were granted to protect the child's privacy.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by a children's aid society and the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The applicant had alleged that the child was physically abused by school staff.

The society conducted a community caregiver investigation and concluded the allegations were not verified.

The Board reviewed the society's handling of the complaint and ordered the society to provide better written reasons, but otherwise dismissed the applicant's procedural complaints.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that both the society and the Board afforded the applicant procedural fairness and that their decisions were reasonable.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and reserved costs to the appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order committing a youth to a secure treatment program for 180 days under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The trial judge found that the youth had attempted to cause serious bodily harm within the preceding 45 days based on a threat to jump off a bridge, ingestion of an unidentified quantity of methamphetamine, and an involuntary hospital admission for suicidal ideation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law because the incidents amounted to mere threats or lacked evidence of actual harm or risk of serious bodily harm.

The secure treatment order was set aside.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated November 29, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the fixed amount of $2,500.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The court had previously raised a preliminary issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Internal Complaints Review Committee and the Child and Family Services Review Board.

After reviewing additional materials filed by the parties, the court concluded the matter should proceed to a hearing on the merits.

The court also granted the applicant leave to file an amended factum over the respondent's objection, and set a schedule for further filings.

The appellant father appealed a case conference judge's order dismissing his Superior Court application to change a prior Ontario Court of Justice order regarding child support and custody.

The case conference judge had found that the Ontario Court of Justice was the more appropriate forum, as it had already been involved and the prior judge was best positioned to determine the issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to the father's claim that the case conference judge exceeded his jurisdiction or failed to observe procedural fairness.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal an order for the sale of the matrimonial home under the Partition Act, as well as a stay of the sale.

The moving party had initially filed an appeal in the Court of Appeal, which was dismissed for delay, before commencing proceedings in the Divisional Court.

The court applied the test for extending time to appeal and found that while the moving party had a bona fide intention to appeal, the delay and the significant prejudice to a third-party purchaser with a binding agreement of purchase and sale weighed against granting the extension.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order finding her child in need of protection and placing the child in extended society care without access.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in concluding there were no material facts in dispute regarding the mother's parenting capabilities and exposure to domestic violence.

The Court also noted that the motion judge applied an outdated test for access, which was subsequently overturned by the Court of Appeal.

The judgment was set aside and the matter remitted for an expedited trial.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order requiring him to pay spousal support of $1,000 per month.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the nature of their relationship, their finances, and the respondent's income.

The Divisional Court found that while the trial judge made a factual error regarding whether the respondent's children lived with the parties, this did not constitute a palpable and overriding error affecting the non-compensatory support award.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to pay interim spousal support.

The original motion was brought solely to seek the sale of the matrimonial home, and neither party had requested interim spousal support in their motion materials.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge committed an error of law by ordering interim spousal support without providing the parties notice or an opportunity to make submissions on the issue.

The provision ordering spousal support was struck.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that granted his request to amend his application but vacated the scheduled trial date and awarded $10,000 in costs thrown away to the respondent.

The Divisional Court applied the strict test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4).

Finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, the court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his application under the Hague Convention for the return of his child to Colorado.

The application judge had found that while the respondent mother wrongfully retained the child in Ontario, the appellant subsequently acquiesced to the retention through his prolonged silence and lack of contact.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant's conduct demonstrated acquiescence and that his actions did not constitute bona fide attempts at reconciliation.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring him to pay security for costs.

The court denied the extension, noting the litigation had been ongoing for 15 years and the applicant was pursuing a meritless property claim.

The court further held that even if the motion was timely, leave to appeal would be denied because the proposed appeal did not involve matters of importance beyond the interests of the parties.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a $30,000 costs order made against him following a family law motion regarding child custody.

The applicant argued there was conflicting case law on awarding costs in child-related issues and that the motions judge erred by not considering the respondent's offer to settle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions on principle and no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, as the respondent was clearly successful on the main issue of custody.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a costs order requiring him to pay $32,500, representing 50% of the responding party's partial indemnity costs.

He argued the trial judge erred in determining the responding party was the more successful party despite divided success.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the determination of relative success is a discretionary matter and the trial judge made no error in principle or misapprehension of significant facts.

The Director of the Family Responsibility Office brought a motion to transfer the appellant's appeal from the Divisional Court to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant had appealed an order dismissing his motion for a refraining order.

The court held that the dismissal of a refraining order is a final order, and under the Courts of Justice Act, the appeal properly lies to the Court of Appeal.

The motion was granted and the appeal was transferred.

The applicant mother sought leave to appeal a temporary order for child and spousal support.

She argued the motions judge erred in finding their 18-year-old daughter was not a 'child of the marriage' and failed to properly apply the Contino analysis for shared custody child support.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decision and concluding that while there might be reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's brief reasons regarding the Contino analysis, the matter was not of general public importance and should proceed to trial rather than appeal.

The appellant appealed a Social Benefits Tribunal decision that directed his retroactive disability benefits be paid to his ex-wife, who was the head of their 'benefit unit' prior to their separation.

The Divisional Court agreed with the Tribunal's interpretation that the benefits were for the benefit unit as a whole while the parties cohabited.

However, the Court found that the Director should have exercised administrative powers to ensure both parties received an equal share, given they were separated when entitlement was determined.

The Director was ordered to pay the appellant one half of the retroactive benefits.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting Crown wardship leading to adoption with no access.

The appellants conceded that summary judgment was appropriate but argued it was unfair to proceed while the mother was unrepresented.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that wardship leading to adoption with access was not possible under the legislation and not in the child's best interests.