Lorne Gershuny

The respondent brought a motion to set aside a final default order in a family law proceeding.

The default order required the respondent to pay significant retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support, as well as an equalization payment.

The respondent argued his failure to respond was due to depression and anxiety resulting from the marriage breakdown.

The court applied the test for setting aside a default judgment and found that while the respondent's excuse was thin, he had an arguable defence on the merits regarding income and child dependency.

The motion was granted, conditional upon the respondent paying $22,000 in costs thrown away and a $5,000 lump sum for support.

The responding party sought costs following the dismissal of the moving party's motion for leave to appeal.

The responding party claimed full indemnity costs of $6,927.75, noting an unaccepted offer to settle the motion on a without-costs basis.

The court considered the principle of proportionality and the straightforward nature of the written motion, awarding the responding party costs fixed at $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes, to be enforced as child support.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring him to pay temporary child support.

The motion judge had imputed his income at $40,000 and dismissed his cross-motion for spousal support because he failed to comply with court directions regarding filing materials.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions or good reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and concluding that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of such importance to warrant granting leave.

The Children's Aid Society of the Region of Peel brought motions pursuant to section 74 of the Child and Family Services Act seeking orders for the production of records from ten third parties and institutions regarding two children and their mother.

The children had been apprehended and were in the temporary care of the Society.

The mother opposed the production of records, arguing they were not relevant to the issues of harm and that disclosure would cause emotional harm to the children.

The court granted the Society's motions, finding that the records were relevant and necessary to determine whether the children were in need of protection and to assess appropriate disposition.

The court found that the children's consent to disclosure, the lack of opposition from third parties, and the mother's prior consent to some records outweighed privacy concerns.

The accused applied to quash an indictment charging two counts of disobeying a court order under s. 127(1) of the Criminal Code for allegedly breaching an interim publication ban relating to undercover police officers at a preliminary inquiry.

The defence argued that the Crown lacked jurisdiction to prosecute under s. 127 because breaches of publication bans under s. 486.5 must be prosecuted under the specific enforcement provision in s. 486.6 by summary conviction.

The court held that although the order referenced multiple sources of authority, the conduct alleged — publication of identifying information — fell squarely within the specific statutory scheme governing publication bans.

Applying principles of statutory interpretation that specific provisions prevail over general ones, the court concluded that the alleged conduct could only be prosecuted under s. 486.6 and not by indictment under s. 127.

The indictment was therefore quashed.

This is a costs decision following a three-day trial regarding custody of a nine-year-old child.

The father was successful in obtaining sole custody with specified access to the mother.

The father claimed costs of $36,389.06 on a full recovery basis, arguing the mother acted unreasonably and in bad faith by proceeding to trial despite overwhelming evidence against her position.

The mother opposed the costs award and argued inability to pay.

The court awarded costs to the father on a full recovery basis in the amount of $30,000, finding the mother's conduct was unreasonable and that ability to pay does not shield a party from liability for costs when they have acted unreasonably.

A motion to change custody and access arrangements for a nine-year-old child.

The father sought sole custody, citing material changes in circumstances and the child's best interests.

The mother sought to maintain sole custody with open access to the father.

The court found that the child was exhibiting serious behavioral issues, including sexualized behaviors, aggression, and academic difficulties.

The mother had failed to follow professional recommendations for treatment and was unable to manage the child's complex needs.

The father maintained a stable home and demonstrated commitment to the child's relationship with the mother.

The court granted sole custody to the father, finding that the current arrangement was not in the child's best interests and that the child was suffering in the mother's care.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering her to pay her proportionate share of post-secondary tuition fees for her adult son under section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines.

The appellant argued the son had withdrawn from parental control and was no longer a dependent child.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual determination that the son remained a child of the marriage under the Divorce Act while pursuing his education.