Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The accused, Waisuddin Akbari, was charged with threatening to damage synagogues and threatening death against Jewish people following an interaction at a car dealership.

The Crown alleged that the accused made explicit threats to plant bombs in Toronto synagogues to kill Jews, which the accused denied, claiming he joked about bombing a casino due to gambling debts and was ignorant of Jewish terms.

The trial focused on the credibility of the complainant and the accused.

The court applied the R. v. W.D. framework, finding the accused's testimony vague, inconsistent, and evasive, while the complainant's evidence was direct and credible.

The court concluded that the accused's threats met the legal definition of unlawful threats and found him guilty on both counts.

The defendant, Robert Sharp, was tried for sexual assault and three breaches of release orders.

The court found him guilty of sexual assault and two breaches.

The case involved assessing the reliability of identification evidence, particularly given the complainant's impaired vision and intoxication, and the absence of consent where the complainant was asleep.

The court also addressed the admissibility of the accused's post-act utterances and the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The offender, Timothy Godin, pleaded guilty to numerous offences including personation, dangerous operation of a vehicle causing bodily harm, failure to stop at an accident scene, breach of undertaking, various Highway Traffic Act offences, impaired driving, and arson causing damage to a vehicle and dwelling house.

The offences occurred over two years, linked to the offender's alcoholism and cocaine use.

The Crown sought five years incarceration or two years imprisonment followed by three years probation, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the seriousness of the arson and dangerous driving.

The defence sought a conditional sentence of 18 months to two years less a day, highlighting the offender's rehabilitation efforts.

The court found denunciation and deterrence paramount, particularly for serious arson, and determined that a conditional sentence was inappropriate.

Tristan Piper pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the death of his four-month-old son, Liam, who died from blunt force head trauma and other injuries inflicted by Piper.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the breach of trust by a parent, the vulnerability of the child, and Piper's failure to seek medical attention or disclose the true cause of injuries.

Mitigating factors included his guilty plea, remorse, and lack of prior criminal record.

The court imposed a nine-year penitentiary sentence, reduced by pre-sentence custody credit.

The accused, Luz Adriana Gonzalez-Valbuena, pleaded guilty to ten counts of human trafficking, one global count of receiving material benefit from human trafficking, and eight counts of withholding travel documents for the purpose of human trafficking.

The court considered the sophisticated and industrial-scale nature of the labour trafficking scheme, which exploited vulnerable Mexican foreign nationals over four years, involving threats, illegal deductions, and substandard living conditions.

Aggravating factors included the duration, number of victims (21), severe victim impact, and the accused's prior criminal record.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea, the accused's own history as a victim of sexual trafficking, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Crown sought 11 years custody, while the defence sought 6-7 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 8 years custody, minus presentence custody credit.

The defendant, S.K., was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada, involving non-consensual vaginal intercourse with the complainant, J.F., who was 15 years old at the time.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and reliable, establishing the actus reus of sexual assault.

Regarding mens rea, the court determined that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that S.K. did not take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and knew of, was wilfully blind to, or was reckless about the absence of consent.

The defendant was found guilty.

The Applicants sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was 30 months and 30 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The court found that significant disclosure delays and the Crown's failure to manage the co-accused's matter contributed to the delay.

While a period of 41 days was attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on initial court appearances, the Crown failed to demonstrate that the pandemic caused the overall protracted delay or that they took reasonable steps to mitigate it.

The court also deducted 52 days for defence-caused delay related to date setting.

Ultimately, the remaining delay of 27 months and 19 days was found to be presumptively unreasonable, and the Applicants' s. 11(b) rights were breached, leading to a stay of all charges.

The accused, Malik Ahmad, was charged with manslaughter following a physical altercation at a mall that resulted in the death of Mr. Baig due to a catastrophic head injury.

The Crown alleged a consent fight where Ahmad pushed Baig, causing him to fall and hit his head.

The defence argued insufficient evidence of an unlawful act or intent to cause serious bodily harm.

The court found that while an altercation occurred and Baig's death was caused by hitting his head, there was no conclusive evidence to determine what precipitated the fall (e.g., push, punch, slip).

The court also gave less weight to the expert medical testimony regarding certain facial injuries due to a lack of information on medical intervention at the scene.

Ultimately, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused caused the death unlawfully and acquitted him.

Jake Grant, a Niagara Regional Police Service sergeant, pleaded guilty to threatening Bruce Love, a mentally ill individual, in a Subway restaurant.

The incident occurred in 2017, and the case had a protracted procedural history, including an overturned stay of proceedings.

The Crown sought a conviction and fine, while the defence requested an absolute discharge, citing Mr. Grant's exemplary service record and collateral consequences related to travel.

The court found Mr. Grant's conduct inexcusable, particularly given his position and the victim's vulnerability.

The judge rejected an absolute discharge as contrary to public interest and found the collateral consequences argument speculative.

A conditional discharge with two years probation and 120 hours of community service focused on services for mentally challenged individuals was imposed, balancing denunciation and deterrence with Mr. Grant's otherwise exceptional character.

The defendant, charged with aggravated assault, sought a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance, justifying the subtraction of a period of delay.

However, the court found that the primary cause of the delay was the state's failure to provide timely and complete disclosure, not the pandemic.

Following the principles from R. v. Silva and R. v. Ravikumaran, the court determined that the Crown failed to demonstrate that the delay was caused by COVID-19 or that it took reasonable steps to mitigate the disclosure issues.

Consequently, the court refused to subtract the pandemic period from the delay calculation and stayed the proceedings.

The defendant brought a Charter motion to stay proceedings or exclude evidence, alleging excessive force by police (ss. 7, 12) and violations of his rights to be informed of charges and to counsel (ss. 10(a), 10(b)).

The court found that the police use of force, including pepper spray, was reasonable and proportionate given the defendant's non-compliance and aggressive resistance.

The court also found that the defendant was informed of the reasons for his arrest in a timely manner and that any delay in advising him of his right to counsel was justified by the dynamic and volatile situation, and that he ultimately exercised his right to counsel.

The motion for Charter relief was dismissed.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving following a motor vehicle accident on Highway 401.

At the police station, during the booking process, a police officer directed the accused to remove the drawstring from his pants as a safety concern.

When the drawstring could not be removed without damaging the pants, the accused's pants were removed, leaving him in his undergarments.

The accused remained in this state of undress throughout his time at the police station, including during the breath testing procedure, where he subsequently refused to provide a breath sample.

The court found that the removal of the accused's pants constituted an illegal strip search conducted without reasonable and probable grounds, in a public area, in the presence of multiple officers, and while being videotaped.

The court granted a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy, finding that proceeding with the trial would be harmful to the integrity of the justice system.

The offender was convicted after trial of possessing a weapon (knife) for the purpose of committing a criminal offence and knowingly uttering a threat to cause bodily harm.

He subsequently pled guilty to failing to appear in court and breaching a recognizance condition.

The central sentencing issue was whether to impose a conditional discharge or a suspended sentence, given the offender's status as a permanent resident and the potential immigration consequences of a conviction.

The court considered the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Pham regarding the relevance of collateral immigration consequences to sentencing decisions and concluded that while such consequences may be considered, they cannot dominate the sentencing process or result in inappropriate sentences.

The court imposed suspended sentences with probation rather than a discharge, finding that the serious nature of the offences and the offender's disregard for the justice system precluded a discharge despite significant personal mitigating circumstances.

Two sentencing proceedings heard together concerning the availability of intermittent sentences in the Southwest Region.

The first accused pleaded guilty to simple possession of 16 fentanyl patches contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The second accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving, a second offence.

Both accused sought intermittent sentences to maintain employment.

The court learned of the Intermittent Community Work Program, which would allow offenders to serve their entire custodial sentences in the community through temporary absence permits.

The court found that this program rendered the sentences non-custodial in nature and therefore incompatible with the statutory requirement for "appropriate accommodation to ensure compliance" under section 732(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court declined to impose intermittent sentences and remanded both offenders into custody.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs following a traffic stop where officers observed excessive speeding and unusual behavior.

A certified drug recognition evaluator conducted roadside and station-based evaluations and concluded the accused was impaired by drugs.

A urinalysis confirmed the presence of multiple substances including cocaine, opioids, and psychiatric medications.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by the drugs in his system.

The charge was dismissed.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation for the accused following his conviction for armed robbery with a knife, assault with a knife, and breach of probation.

The accused had an extensive criminal history spanning nearly three decades, including multiple violent offences, sexual assaults with weapons, robberies, and breaches of court orders.

The court found the accused met the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation under section 753 of the Criminal Code, establishing a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour showing failure to restrain conduct and likelihood of causing death or injury.

The court rejected the defence argument that cognitive behavioural therapy could adequately manage the accused's risk in the community and imposed an indeterminate sentence of detention in a penitentiary.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

He was found in the early morning hours sitting in a car on the side of the road with all four tires flat, waiting for his father to pick him up.

The Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on observations of slurred speech, disorientation, bloodshot eyes, odour of alcohol, and breath test results exceeding the legal limit.

However, the court found that the presumption of care and control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was rebutted because the vehicle was inoperable and could not be driven.

The Crown failed to establish de facto care and control by proving a realistic risk of danger, as the vehicle was in a well-lit area, the road was not busy, and the vehicle's lights were on.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with speeding (76 km/h in a posted 50 km/h community safety zone) contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant brought a Charter application under section 7 and subsection 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the prosecution failed to provide adequate disclosure.

Specifically, the defendant contended that the investigating officer's notes, prepared on a pre-typed template containing pre-written assertions about the radar device functioning properly and the vehicle appearing to exceed the speed limit, constituted "canned evidence" and inadequate disclosure.

The defendant sought a stay of proceedings.

The court found that the defendant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that his section 7 Charter rights had been violated.

The court concluded that the template notes, including pre-printed portions, constituted adequate disclosure of the officer's anticipated evidence, particularly given the officer's testimony about his standard practices and the reliability of the pre-determined statements.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a motor vehicle accident on Mississauga Road in Caledon.

The Crown relied on observations by civilian witnesses and a police officer, as well as toxicology evidence showing blood alcohol concentration well over the legal limit.

The defendant testified that she consumed alcohol after the accident while waiting for help.

The court found that while the defendant's version of events was barely believable, the investigating officer's evidence was completely unreliable due to inexperience, poor note-taking, and inconsistencies between his observations and those of civilian witnesses.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the necessary elements of both charges beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly regarding care or control of the vehicle, and acquitted the defendant on both counts.

The defendant was charged with failing to surrender evidence of insurance for an off-road vehicle within seventy-two hours of a peace officer's request, contrary to section 15(4) of the Off-Road Vehicle Act.

The defendant claimed he was an occupier of Crown land under a 21-day free use permit and therefore exempt from the requirement.

He also raised Charter issues regarding unlawful detention, breach of the right to remain silent, and unlawful search.

The court found that the defendant was not a legal occupier of the Crown land, that his arrest was lawful, and that while a search of his saddle-bag breached his Charter rights, no evidence was seized.

The court found the defendant guilty of the included offence under section 15(3) of the Off-Road Vehicle Act as the element of ownership could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.