Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appellants brought actions in Ontario against Barrick Gold Corporation for alleged human rights abuses committed by Tanzanian police at a mine in Tanzania.

The motion judge dismissed the actions for lack of jurisdiction and alternatively stayed them on the basis of forum non conveniens, finding Tanzania to be the clearly more appropriate forum.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in his forum non conveniens analysis by misapprehending the location of Barrick's head office, applying the wrong evidentiary standard, and failing to properly assess the risk of unfairness in Tanzania.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's discretionary weighing of factors, particularly given that the vast majority of witnesses and evidence were located in Tanzania.

On a motion panel review, the moving party sought to overturn a single-judge order dismissing his stay and ancillary requests.

The court held the moving party failed to show any error in the finding that the appeal lacked merit and therefore failed to establish entitlement to a stay.

The court also rejected additional relief requested before the panel for lack of legal entitlement and admissible supporting evidence.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $1,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellants appealed an order striking most of their tort, constitutional, and human rights claims arising from accident benefits assessments, surveillance, and the administration of statutory accident benefits after a motor vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal held that the battery, intrusion upon seclusion, abuse of process, and vicarious liability claims were properly struck, and that the challenges to ss. 55 and 19(3) of the SABS were properly treated as an abuse of process because the matters had been or could have been pursued before the LAT.

However, the court found the motion judge erred in concluding that no breach of contract had been pleaded against the insurer and in treating the SABS as outside the insurance contract.

The appeal was allowed only to permit the insured appellant to amend and properly plead breach of contract and breach of good faith claims against the insurer.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action.

The motion judge had dismissed the action because the appellants were attempting to re-litigate issues that had previously been litigated or could have been litigated in a prior proceeding against the respondent bank.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the action was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant law firm previously represented the plaintiffs in a personal injury action and obtained a judgment for $206,000 in unpaid legal fees.

A subsequent settlement approval judge, reviewing the settlement for a plaintiff under disability, reduced the appellant's fees to $102,500 in a partial judgment.

The appellant moved under Rule 59.06(2)(c) to vary the partial judgment to accord with the earlier $206,000 judgment.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding Rule 59.06(2)(c) does not authorize a judge to choose between conflicting Superior Court orders.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal and declined to allow the appellant to amend its motion to seek relief under Rule 37.14 due to unexplained delay and an inadequate evidentiary record.

The appellant cashed a bank draft for a mortgagor who turned out to be a fraudster.

The appellant sued the mortgagee and the solicitor who drew the draft.

The trial judge dismissed the claims.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in refusing to allow an amendment to the pleadings after closing arguments, and in failing to recognize a new duty of care owed by the solicitor to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the discretionary refusal to amend pleadings and affirming that no new duty of care should be recognized in the context of bills of exchange.

The appellant appealed an order staying his action pending the payment of outstanding costs orders.

The respondents argued the order was interlocutory and the appeal route was to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the order did not determine any substantive matter in the action.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent, a 38-year employee of the Danbury group of companies, was terminated without cause at age 73 and denied compensation or pension payments.

The trial judge found the various appellant companies jointly and severally liable for wrongful dismissal and pension obligations under the common employer doctrine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employers' appeal, affirming the trial judge's factual findings that the companies were sufficiently interconnected to be considered a common employer, including a newly formed entity that the respondent helped establish prior to his termination.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for relief under ss. 134 and 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge's reasons were inadequate.

The application judge failed to appreciate the issues, did not set out the correct legal test for oppression, provided no basis for concluding there were no breaches of the Act, and failed to explain the exercise of his discretion.

The matter was remitted for a fresh hearing.

The appellant orthopedic surgeon appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for medical malpractice after the respondent developed compartment syndrome following the application of a full circumferential cast.

The trial judge had strongly criticized the appellant's counsel for reviewing and discussing draft reports with their expert witnesses, ruling that such practices were improper under the 2010 amendments to Rule 53.03.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, confirming that consultation between counsel and expert witnesses is essential and protected by litigation privilege absent a factual foundation of improper influence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred by using expert reports not in evidence to contradict viva voce testimony.

However, the Court concluded these errors did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, as the respondent's expert evidence was overwhelmingly stronger.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment that found her liable on promissory notes and for fraudulent misrepresentation, which included an award for punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, noting that the statement of claim and initial affidavit did not allege fraud or that the appellant signed the notes, and a second affidavit was never served.

The findings of fraud, liability on the notes, and punitive damages were set aside, and the costs award below was reduced.

The appellant estate trustee appealed a motion judge's order requiring the estate to pay damages to the respondent, who was the deceased's common law spouse.

The properties in question had been sold under power of sale after the respondent failed to make mortgage payments.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment, finding that the motion judge provided insufficient reasons for ordering the estate to pay damages that were previously ordered to be paid by the appellant personally, and for awarding damages for lost income after the properties were sold due to the respondent's default.

The appellant sold land to the City with an agreement that the City would build a road extension to the appellant's remaining lands along a specific route.

The City later discovered it could not build the road as agreed due to environmental assessment requirements for a rail spur, and admitted breach of contract.

The appellant sought a permanent injunction to compel the agreed route and prevent the rail spur.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding damages were an adequate remedy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting the appellant failed to plead damages in the alternative.

The appellant appealed a decision recognizing and enforcing two judgments from the High Court of Singapore: an equitable order regarding shares and a subsequent monetary order.

The appellant argued the monetary order superseded the equitable order, the equitable order was ambiguous, and the application judge erred in awarding postjudgment interest and continuing an interlocutory injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the equitable order was final and enforceable, and that postjudgment interest was properly awarded under the Courts of Justice Act based on the foreign jurisdiction's rate.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondent for an allegedly unfair tender process relating to a commercial lease.

The motion judge had found that all four bids in the first tender process were non-compliant and that the respondent was justified in ordering a second round, which the appellant chose not to participate in.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, applying the palpable and overriding error standard to the motion judge's fact-finding under Rule 20, and found no error in the fairness and good faith analysis.

The appellants appealed an order appointing a Receiver Manager over several corporations, arguing that secured creditors should have received notice and that the application judge improperly exercised his discretion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had not requested notice for secured creditors at the original hearing and that the application judge's findings of oppression and misappropriation of funds justified the extreme remedy of appointing a Receiver Manager.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent law firm and lawyer for allegedly failing to complete settlement documents by a specific date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that while a plaintiff need not quantify their loss to avoid summary judgment, they must demonstrate some evidence in the record that a loss occurred.

The appellants failed to provide such evidence.

The appellants' solicitor was removed from the record, and the individual behind the appellant corporation failed to appear for the hearing despite being aware of the date.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs of $8,641 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the record fully supported the lower court's conclusion that the appellant is a vexatious litigant, noting the Federal Court had reached the same conclusion in 2006.

Costs of $6,100 were awarded to the respondent.

The respondent was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $5,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.