Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario following an appeal that proceeded in writing.

The court awarded costs of $6,500, including disbursements and taxes, to the respondent, The University of Toronto.

The court noted that the appeal issues were not complex and largely replicated submissions made at first instance.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a Mareva injunction and receivership order.

They argued that because the underlying trial judgment was stayed pending appeal, only the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to grant such relief under Rule 63.03(1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the injunction and receivership were granted in a separate, new action to preserve assets, and did not constitute steps to enforce the stayed trial judgment.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for breach of fiduciary duty and dismissing his counterclaim.

The appellant argued he was not a fiduciary, that any such relationship had terminated, that the respondent had unclean hands, and that his counterclaim should have succeeded because no defence was filed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that a trust relationship existed and continued, that the unclean hands doctrine did not apply, and that the appellant still bore the burden of proving his counterclaim despite the lack of a defence.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal on the basis that the order appealed from was interlocutory.

The motion judge had ordered the self-represented plaintiff to appoint a litigation guardian and counsel, failing which the defendants could move ex parte to strike her pleadings.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was procedural and did not finally resolve the substantive issues in the litigation.

The motion to quash was granted, as the order was interlocutory, without prejudice to the appellant's ability to seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim against his employer and five co-workers for defamation and other torts arising from workplace disputes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's claims were governed by the Public Service Labour Relations Act, which requires such disputes to be addressed through the grievance procedure in lieu of any right of action.

The court also declined to address Charter allegations not included in the statement of claim.

The appellant was ordered to undergo a psychiatric assessment under s. 672.11 of the Criminal Code and was held in a detention centre for 15 days before a hospital bed became available.

She brought a proposed class action alleging Charter violations, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence by the Crown for failing to immediately transfer her to a hospital.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the action, finding that the Criminal Code permits detention in a jail pending transfer to a hospital, the detention was lawful, and the Crown owed no fiduciary duty to the appellant that would override its public interest obligations.

The appellant commenced an action to enforce Minutes of Settlement regarding the termination of his employment.

He then commenced a second action against his employer and its principal based on the underlying conduct.

The motion judge dismissed the second action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the Minutes of Settlement and final release governed the parties' relationship and the underlying conduct was no longer relevant.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision that Ontario lacked jurisdiction over a contract dispute with a British Columbia respondent.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in fact by concluding the contracts were made in British Columbia.

Instead, the appellant had made counter-offers that were accepted by the respondent's delivery of goods in Ontario.

Consequently, the contracts were made in Ontario, triggering the presumption of a real and substantial connection under Rule 17.02(f).

The Court also found Ontario to be the convenient forum and allowed the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement to discontinue his action against the respondent.

The appellant argued the offer to settle had expired and the release was not an agreed-upon part of the settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent's counsel had expressly extended the time for acceptance, and the appellant's counsel accepted the offer with the draft release in hand.

The motion judge's discretion to enforce the settlement was upheld.

The appellants appealed a decision staying their action against the respondents on the basis that the dispute was subject to an arbitration clause in a franchise agreement.

The appellants argued the franchise agreement was void ab initio, meaning the arbitration clause was not triggered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the argument was not raised before the motion judge and was undercut by the factual record.

The Court agreed with the motion judge that the arbitration agreement was broad enough to encompass disputes regarding the validity of the franchise agreement itself.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that the appellant driver was partially liable in negligence for a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge found that the appellant driver failed to slow his vehicle sufficiently after observing the respondents' vehicle enter his lane under icy conditions, which increased the speed of impact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding was supported by the evidence, as the appellant had put his foot back on the accelerator instead of continuing to slow down.

The appellant appealed a finding of civil contempt and a 75-day sentence for failing to deliver jewellery and artwork to the respondent pursuant to a court order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding, noting the motion judge implicitly rejected the appellant's claim that he did not possess the items.

However, the Court varied the sentence, setting aside the 30-day term for the jewellery due to lack of clarity on the extent of the breach, and reducing the 45-day term for the artwork to 15 days, adding a coercive clause allowing the appellant to avoid or shorten the sentence by delivering the specified items.

The appellant guarantor appealed a summary judgment enforcing a demand guarantee in favour of the respondent bank.

The appellant argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, asserting the limitation period began either when the principal debtor defaulted or when the bank sent an initial courtesy letter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a demand guarantee requires a clear and unequivocal demand before it is enforceable, and the limitation period does not commence until such demand is made.

The court found the bank's initial letter was not a demand, and the action was commenced within the two-year limitation period following the actual demand.

The respondents obtained an Anton Piller order and subsequent orders requiring the appellant to allow access to his premises to re-image computer hard drives.

The motion judge found the appellant in contempt for failing to comply with these orders and struck his statements of defence for failing to pay costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to properly apply the three-pronged test for civil contempt, including the requirement for clear and unequivocal orders and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court also set aside the order striking the defences, holding that the motion judge improperly reversed the onus and failed to give the appellant an opportunity to cure his default.

The respondent brought an oppression application alleging that the appellants engaged in self-dealing by causing a corporation to fund outside companies owned by them.

The appellants moved to stay the application in favour of arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause in a shareholders' agreement.

The motion judge dismissed the stay motion, finding the oppression claim did not rely on the shareholders' agreement and the alleged conduct related to the appellants' capacities as officers and directors, not shareholders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the dispute fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause.

The appellants appealed an order staying their action for non-payment of a previous costs award.

They argued the motion judge erred by failing to recuse himself for alleged bias and by staying the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of bias and noting the appellants' long history of failing to comply with costs orders.

The stay was a discretionary order permitted under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant insurers appealed a summary judgment finding them liable under a Commercial General Liability policy to indemnify condominium owners for extensive foundation damage caused by the insured general contractor's negligence.

The contractor had negligently installed a dewatering system that washed away the natural foundation beneath the building.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the damage to the natural foundation and structural columns constituted third-party property damage, not merely damage to the contractor's own work product.

Furthermore, the negligent installation that caused the damage was an 'accident' and therefore an 'occurrence' within the meaning of the policy.

The appellant subcontractor appealed a motion judge's decision to strike its statement of claim without leave to amend.

The appellant argued that the respondents' acceptance of a construction bond created a private law duty of care and a fiduciary duty to subcontractors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pleading failed to assert material facts establishing a fiduciary relationship, a voluntary assumption of duty, or any specific language in the bond creating such obligations.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment granting a non-suit.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred because there was probative evidence of the oral contract contended for by the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment was set aside, and judgment was ordered for the appellant with costs.

Class counsel brought a motion to quash appeals filed by the defendants and intervenors from an order approving class counsel fees under s. 32 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellants had no standing to appeal because they were not parties to the fee agreements, the settlement agreement did not reserve their rights to participate in fixing fees, and their rights were not affected by the fee approval order.

The appeals were quashed.