OCA 2007

The appellant appealed a judgment finding her liable for the outstanding balance of her former law firm's accounts for services rendered in matrimonial litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the accounts.

The trial judge properly considered relevant factors, including the nature of the services, time expended, and the appellant's ability to pay, and correctly noted that the appellant had acquiesced to the fees by making partial payments without complaint for many months.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding liability for a fire, arguing the trial judge erred in qualifying the respondent's causation expert, apportioning liability, and denying an adjournment request on the first day of trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert's practical experience sufficient for admissibility, upholding the contributory negligence apportionment, and finding no error in the discretionary refusal of the adjournment given the history of prior indulgences granted to the appellant.

The respondent applied to enforce an arbitrator's award, which the appellant did not oppose.

Instead, the appellant brought a counter-application seeking to remit the matter to the arbitrator to deal with alleged contempt of a confidentiality order and for mandatory injunctive relief.

The application judge allowed the application and dismissed the counter-application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly address collusion among similar act and confirmatory witnesses, and inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge expressly ruled there was no collusion sufficient to exclude the evidence, and the inconsistencies were minor.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the custodial sentence was deemed entirely fit.

The plaintiff was injured when a rental truck in which he was a passenger crashed.

The truck had been rented for the plaintiff's use, but was driven by an intoxicated, unlicensed acquaintance who had taken the keys.

The plaintiff had jumped into the passenger seat to try to stop him.

The plaintiff sued the driver, the rental company, and his own insurer.

The rental company moved for summary judgment, arguing it was not vicariously liable under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act because the vehicle was operated without its consent.

The motion judge dismissed the rental company's motion and granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, finding the rental company liable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the rental company's appeal, holding that while the rental company was not entitled to summary judgment because an owner can be liable if the person with consent remains in possession as a passenger, the plaintiff was also not entitled to summary judgment because whether he was actually in possession of the vehicle at the time of the crash was a genuine issue for trial.

The appellant life insurance company appealed a trial judgment awarding its former agent damages for breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages, and vested renewal commissions following his termination.

The trial judge found the appellant breached its fiduciary duty by freezing the agent's vested commission account and acted in bad faith in its post-termination conduct.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on the vested commissions, the breach of fiduciary duty, the punitive damages award, and the dismissal of the appellant's counterclaim.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding the trial judge's award of a risk premium on costs, holding that the amended Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not permit a risk premium to be awarded against an unsuccessful party.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal declined to award substantial indemnity costs and instead ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal fixed at $15,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, challenging the trial judge's finding regarding his criminal responsibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's determination that the appellant was not criminally responsible.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasons of the trial judge.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing an application under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The parties agreed that the matter needed to be remitted to a trial judge for a proper hearing under section 20(4) of the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The court reviewed the submissions of counsel and awarded the respondent costs fixed in the amount of $20,000, all inclusive.

The appellant appealed an order striking her statement of claim against the university and its officials for negligent advice.

The motion judge found the claim was in pith and substance an academic dispute.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the negligence claim regarding advice on deregistration was part and parcel of the academic dispute.

The court declined to transfer the proceeding to the Divisional Court for judicial review.

The respondents' cross-appeal was allowed to amend the motion judge's order, which had inappropriately fettered the Divisional Court's discretion to consider the defence of delay.

The plaintiff, a member of the OMERS pension plan, brought an action on behalf of plan members against the OMERS Board, two corporations, and three former OMERS employees, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, knowing receipt of trust property, knowing assistance, and unjust enrichment arising from the outsourcing of real estate management.

The defendants successfully moved to strike several claims under Rule 21.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while some breach of fiduciary duty claims were properly struck, the claims for knowing receipt, knowing assistance, and unjust enrichment should be allowed to proceed against all defendants.

The Court also held that the plaintiff was entitled to costs from the pension fund on a full indemnity basis, as the action was brought to ensure the due administration of the fund and for the benefit of all beneficiaries.

The Crown appealed a decision granting certiorari and prohibition to quash summonses issued under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The application judge held that jurisdiction was lost when nothing was done on the original return date and that the one-year limitation period had expired before new summonses were issued.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 31 of the Provincial Offences Act preserves jurisdiction over the offence and permits the issuance of new summonses.

The Court also held that a prosecution is instituted when an information is laid, not when process is issued, meaning the charges were laid within the limitation period.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against his stepson, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her findings of guilt and in rejecting expert psychiatric evidence that suggested his risk could be managed in the community under a long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly assessed the risk management evidence and was entitled to conclude that the community supervision plan, including the Circles of Support and Accountability program, lacked the necessary resources to safely manage the appellant's risk.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with a 14-year parole ineligibility period.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on intoxication, capacity to form intent, after-the-fact conduct, and provocation.

The Court of Appeal found the jury instructions were adequate and that the trial judge properly related the evidence to the issues of intent and foreseeability.

The court also upheld the 14-year parole ineligibility period as not clearly unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, varied the sentence to time served, and vacated the restitution order.

The probation order was extended to two years with an added condition prohibiting the appellant from attending specific locations.

The appellant, a lawyer who had power of attorney over a deceased client's affairs, was convicted of theft over $1,000 for failing to notify an insurance company of the client's death and continuing to collect annuity payments.

He appealed the conviction and the dismissal of his pre-trial motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that while the application judge erred in attributing certain periods of delay, the total institutional and Crown delay of ten months fell within acceptable limits.

The court also found sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had the requisite mens rea.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's findings that the respondent was constructively dismissed and that the appellants were motivated by malice when they initiated criminal proceedings against her.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's factual findings were amply supported by the record, including evidence of unilateral changes to employment terms and the appellant's failure to disclose exculpatory information to the police.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) to answer questions of law and dismiss the appellant's counterclaim regarding an option agreement.

The motion judge answered the questions and dismissed the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by concluding no material facts were in issue.

The appellant had pleaded fundamental breach and bad faith, which were disputed by the Crown.

The Court held that it was not open to the motion judge to adjudicate disputed facts or questions of mixed law and fact without a proper evidentiary foundation.