OCA 2007

The appellant appealed a jury's damages award in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

She argued that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the meaning of 'material' contribution regarding causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge was not deficient when read as a whole.

The court noted that the jury was entitled to accept the defence theory, supported by the appellant's own medical expert, that her condition could have been caused by factors other than the accident.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal action against his former employer.

At trial, the parties relied on entirely different documents containing starkly different terms to support their conflicting versions of the employment contract.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's version of events and preferred the employer's documentary evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments were amply supported by the evidence and attracted considerable deference, with no palpable and overriding error demonstrated.

The appellants appealed from orders of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the claim in the underlying collection action was not a liquidated claim.

Consequently, the appellant was not a creditor within the meaning of the Bulk Sales Act.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's two-year delay in rendering a decision, followed by an additional five-month delay to release brief reasons, constituted an unreasonable delay.

The appeal was allowed, the finding of guilt was set aside, and the proceedings were stayed.

The appellant appealed his sentence for offences including being a party to pointing a loaded shotgun in a public place and possessing the weapon while subject to three firearms prohibitions and probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly distinguished between the appellant and his brother when imposing sentence.

Given the gravity of the offences, the appellant's record, and other aggravating circumstances, the sentence was deemed fit and the appeal was dismissed.

Costs endorsement following the release of a family law appeal decision.

The applicant was awarded $3,000 in partial indemnity costs against the respondent for the appeals he brought against her.

A third party, Ms. Fisher, was awarded $1,500 in partial indemnity costs against the applicant for the appeal she brought against the applicant and for an appearance before the lower court.

Four physicians appealed the dismissal of their action against a hospital regarding a reduction in their operating room allocation.

The motion judge had dismissed the action against the hospital, finding the court lacked jurisdiction as the matter fell under the statutory review regime of the Public Hospitals Act, but allowed the action to continue against the hospital's CEO.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the physicians' appeal and allowed the CEO's cross-appeal, concluding that the dispute over operating room access was a matter of hospital privileges governed by the Act, and that the pleadings failed to allege any personal wrongdoing by the CEO.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine and importing 270 kilograms of cocaine, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

He appealed both the conviction and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that despite the trial judge's problematic 'pit of the stomach' instruction on reasonable doubt, the jury charge as a whole was adequate.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The Court found that a life sentence was manifestly unfit for a youthful first offender, especially given that a more culpable co-accused received a 19-year sentence.

The sentence was reduced to 19 years' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed the global sentence of twelve years imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge's decision to be thorough and well-reasoned, and the sentence entirely fit.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the judge failed to apply the test in s. 490.012(4) of the Criminal Code regarding a Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no basis to refuse the order.

The appeal was allowed, and an order was issued requiring the respondent to register under SOIRA.

The appellants appealed an order annulling their assignments into bankruptcy under s. 181 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion judge had found that the assignments were filed without obtaining leave as required by a prior receivership order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that an assignment in bankruptcy constitutes a 'proceeding' under the prior order and that the leave requirement did not offend the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent regarding a debt.

The motion judge had relied on a partial transcript from a related proceeding where the appellant seemingly admitted the debt.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence, including the full transcript which showed the admission was qualified by a claim that the parties had settled for half the amount.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding exceptional circumstances due to a communication breakdown between counsel and the inadvertently misleading nature of the partial transcript.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment set aside, but the respondent was awarded costs for both the motion and the appeal due to the appellant's failure to adduce the evidence originally.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to stay Ontario proceedings against them based on an exclusive jurisdiction clause favouring British Columbia.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the respondents had shown a 'strong case' not to enforce the clause.

The court deferred to the motion judge's weighing of factors, including that the claims were part of a larger multi-party action in Ontario, the respondents were unsophisticated, the clause was in a pre-printed contract, and the appellants showed no juridical advantage to a trial in British Columbia.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision to exclude breathalyser results under s. 24(2) of the Charter and overturn the accused's conviction for driving over 80.

The summary conviction appeal judge had found a serious breach of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that any breach was minor, the officer acted in good faith, and the accused suffered no prejudice as he spoke with duty counsel and was satisfied with the advice.

The Court concluded that excluding the reliable breathalyser evidence would do more harm than good to the administration of justice, and restored the conviction.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of s. 435.01(1) of the Canada Elections Act, which restricts direct public financing to political parties that obtain at least 2% of the national vote or 5% of the vote in constituencies where they run candidates.

The application judge found the thresholds violated ss. 3 and 15 of the Charter and could not be saved under s. 1.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the thresholds violate s. 3 by exacerbating disparities in the capacity of smaller parties to communicate, the infringement is justified under s. 1 as a measure to preserve the integrity of the electoral process and prevent the misuse of public funds.

The Court also found no violation of ss. 15, 2(b), or 2(d), and held that political parties lack standing to sue in their own names outside of proceedings under the Act.

The appellant appealed a 22-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's breach of a bail condition as an aggravating factor to increase the length of the sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced to 15 months.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order regarding child support, specifically challenging the amount of income imputed to the respondent, the credit given for retroactive support, and the allocation of the child's university expenses.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's findings of fact were supported by the record and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that two search warrants authorizing the seizure of his hospital treatment records and blood samples were invalid.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge correctly applied the Garofoli test and found there was reliable evidence before the issuing justice to support the warrants.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence of 15 years and 3 months' imprisonment followed by a 10-year supervision order for severe, long-term domestic abuse.

The amicus curiae conceded there were no arguable grounds for the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the amicus argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's age and progressive dementia.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting expert evidence that the appellant posed a moderate to high risk to re-offend and that his dementia might stabilize with treatment.

The court agreed with the trial judge's characterization of the offences as the worst case of domestic abuse short of murder, concluding the sentence was fit.

The insured claimed the full value of an OPCF-19A endorsement after his vehicle was damaged.

The insurer suspected the initial appraisal was fraudulent and required the insured to attend an examination under oath pursuant to Statutory Condition 6(4).

The insured refused to answer questions about the appraisal and commenced an action.

The insurer counterclaimed for misrepresentation.

The motion judge held the insurer lost the right to the statutory examination once litigation commenced and granted summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory examination can co-exist with discovery, its scope includes matters material to liability such as suspected fraud, and the summary judgment was improperly granted as the moving parties failed to adduce evidence.