Morris Manning

The moving party brought a motion to quash two notices of appeal filed by the responding parties.

The responding parties sought to appeal a decision dismissing their application for an order that the moving party breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The court held that the Act is a complete code and only provides a right of appeal for orders made under section 10.

Since no section 10 order was made, there was no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The motion to quash was granted and the notices of appeal were quashed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding damages against them for failing to pay amounts owed under agreements for the purchase of an operating gravel pit.

The appellants argued they were induced to enter the agreements by oral warranties and promises made by the respondents, which were breached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, deferring to the trial judge's factual findings that no such oral undertakings or warranties were made, noting the appellants were represented by experienced counsel and the alleged warranties were not included in the written documents.

The appellants, owners and patrons of adult entertainment parlours, challenged the constitutional validity of the Smoke-Free Ontario Act and sought damages under private law causes of action.

The motion judge struck most of the claims but allowed the division of powers claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the private law and Charter claims.

On cross-appeal, the Court held that the division of powers claim should also have been struck, as it is plain and obvious that the pith and substance of the Act is to promote health, which falls within provincial jurisdiction.

The young person appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the resulting sentence of one year in secure custody.

The trial judge had rejected the young person's exculpatory evidence based on an alleged lack of detail during examination-in-chief.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's credibility assessment was flawed and unsupported by the record, as the young person had simply answered the questions put to him by his counsel.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, a lawyer and his professional corporation, appealed an order striking their 120-page statement of claim and expunging it from the record.

The claim alleged multiple causes of action arising from the termination of their retainer by the City of Waterloo.

The motion judge found the pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action, contained irrelevant allegations, and improperly disclosed privileged and confidential information.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the pleading was prolix, lacked material facts, and improperly placed arguably privileged information in the public domain.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed as it would not affect the outcome.

The appellants, owners and operators of adult entertainment parlours, appealed the dismissal of their application to quash a City of Ottawa by-law regulating their establishments.

The by-law prohibited touching between dancers and customers and required live entertainment to be performed in open designated areas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the City had the authority to enact the by-law under the Municipal Act, 2001, for health, safety, and consumer protection purposes.

The Court rejected arguments that the by-law was ultra vires, void for vagueness, or a colourable attempt to prohibit the businesses.

Charter challenges under s. 2(b) regarding signage and mandatory notices were either rejected or saved under s. 1, and claims under ss. 7 and 8 lacked a sufficient evidentiary record.

The respondent College sought costs following its successful defence of an appeal upholding the revocation of the appellant's dental license.

The appellant argued that the costs claimed were excessive and that the appeal raised novel issues of jurisdiction and natural justice.

The Divisional Court awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondent, fixing the amount at $26,000 plus disbursements, noting that costs should reflect a fair and reasonable amount rather than an exact measure of actual costs.

The appellant, a dental surgeon, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of professional misconduct, revoking his licence, and ordering him to pay $250,000 in costs.

He argued there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, a denial of natural justice due to refused adjournments, and that the penalty and costs were excessive.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding the findings of misconduct and the licence revocation, finding no apprehension of bias or denial of natural justice, and agreeing that the appellant was ungovernable.

However, the court found the costs award unduly high and reduced it to $200,000.

The appellant, a city councilor, appealed his convictions and sentence for accepting bribes to facilitate zoning by-law changes.

He raised issues regarding the joinder of counts, the constitutionality and validity of wiretap authorizations, voice identification by the trial judge, and the admission of similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the offences required a penitentiary sentence, making a conditional sentence unavailable.

The appellant, a public school teacher, was convicted of sexual assault, sexual exploitation, sexual assault with a weapon, and uttering death threats against a former student.

He appealed his convictions, alleging errors in the jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, the Vetrovec warning, and his failure to testify, as well as the admission of the complainant's videotaped statement.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer allegedly prevented him from testifying.

The Crown appealed the four-year sentence as manifestly unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions, rejecting the fresh evidence and ineffective assistance claims, and deferring to the trial judge's sentence.

The appellant moved to reinstate his appeal from the respondent's decision to revoke his professional licence.

The respondent opposed the reinstatement and, in the alternative, sought security for costs and the lifting of an automatic stay on a costs order.

The Divisional Court granted the extension of time to perfect the appeal, finding that the appeal was not entirely without merit due to a potential reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the respondent's use of a former appellate judge as independent counsel.

The court also ordered the appellant to pay $50,000 in security for costs due to his conduct throughout the proceedings, but refused to lift the automatic stay on the costs order.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that their solicitor was not negligent for failing to warn of the risks of proceeding as a minority shareholder without a unanimous shareholders agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the solicitor breached his duty, the appellants failed to prove causation and damages.

The appellant had already received the fair value of his shares and his shareholder's loan in separate oppression proceedings, and there was no evidence he would have obtained a better result had a warning been given.

The applicants sought judicial review to avoid testifying before the Toronto Computer Leasing Inquiry, which was dismissed.

The respondent Commissioner and intervenor City of Toronto sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicants argued no costs should be awarded as the litigation raised an important constitutional question of public interest.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding the applications were brought to avoid testifying, not in the public interest.

The Court awarded fixed costs of $25,000 to the Commissioner and $10,000 to the City of Toronto, payable jointly and severally by the applicants.

The applicants sought judicial review to quash summonses issued by the Commissioner of the Toronto Computer Leasing Inquiry, arguing the inquiry had unconstitutionally evolved into a criminal investigation into specific individuals.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the inquiry's dominant purpose was to investigate municipal good government under section 100 of the Municipal Act.

The court held that the Commissioner was acting within her mandate by investigating potential misconduct as part of a broader fact-finding process, and that the incidental overlap with potential criminal matters did not render the inquiry ultra vires.

The accused was charged with possession of child pornography based on files extracted from his computer hard drives using specialized software.

The trial judge ordered the Crown to disclose copies of the hard drives, the software programs, and pay for training, and subsequently stayed the charges when the Crown refused.

On appeal, the Crown conceded its initial refusal to provide access to the hard drives was erroneous, while the accused conceded that supervised access to the software at police premises was sufficient.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge's disclosure order went too far, the stay of proceedings should be upheld because the Crown's pursuit of an appeal while maintaining a constitutionally inadequate disclosure position for two years constituted an abuse of process.

The appellant was arrested for sexual assault during an undercover police operation targeting public sex in a park.

After the criminal charge was withdrawn, the appellant sued the police for negligence, malicious prosecution, and Charter breaches.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in rejecting proposed expert evidence, failing to consider his section 15(1) Charter discrimination claim, and dismissing the malicious prosecution claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert evidence was unnecessary, the trial judge properly considered and rejected the Charter claim, and there was no evidence of malice to support malicious prosecution.

The respondents, operators of adult entertainment parlours, were charged with keeping a common bawdy-house contrary to s. 210 of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the charges were stayed on the basis that the terms 'acts of indecency' and 'prostitution' were unconstitutionally vague under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that it was bound by stare decisis, as previous Supreme Court of Canada and Court of Appeal decisions had already established that the community standard of tolerance test provides an intelligible standard and that the terms are not impermissibly vague.

The stays were set aside and the matters remitted for trial.

The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right after the Court of Appeal set aside a trial judge's order quashing their indictment.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judgment quashing the indictment was not tantamount to an acquittal.

Consequently, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant, a lawyer, initiated a fee-for-referral scheme with police officers.

When the Law Society investigated the allegations, the appellant submitted false statutory declarations from the officers and clients to conceal the scheme.

He was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice.

On appeal, he argued that a Law Society investigation does not constitute the 'course of justice' under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code, and challenged the admission of wiretap evidence and the statutory declarations.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'course of justice' includes investigations by statutory disciplinary tribunals, the wiretap evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the false declarations were not protected by solicitor-client privilege as they were created to further a crime.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal allowing the Crown's appeal from an acquittal on charges under the Export and Import Permits Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the legislation was properly construed as creating a strict liability offence.

Applying R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., the Court held that the restriction on the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the Charter was justifiable under s. 1.