Morris Manning

The appellant, an Ontario lawyer, sought a declaration that certain Rules of Civil Procedure permitting the assessment of costs against solicitors personally were unconstitutional.

The application was brought without any supporting affidavit or factual allegations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a Charter challenge based on the alleged unconstitutional effects of legislation cannot proceed in a factual vacuum.

The appeal was dismissed because the application lacked the necessary adjudicative and legislative facts to support the constitutional challenge.

The appellant was stopped by police during a random routine traffic check without any suspicion of unlawful activity.

He admitted his driver's licence was suspended and was convicted of driving while suspended.

He appealed, arguing the random stop violated his Charter rights against arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the random stop constituted an arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter, it was a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under section 1 due to the pressing and substantial concern of highway safety.

In a criminal appeal following acquittals on conspiracy charges arising from the operation of an abortion clinic, the Court held that the abortion regime in s. 251 of the Criminal Code violated s. 7 of the Charter.

A majority concluded that the therapeutic abortion committee scheme interfered with liberty and security of the person by removing decision-making from pregnant women and by imposing unfair, delay-producing procedural barriers that increased physical and psychological risk.

The Court further held that the infringement was not justified under s. 1 because the legislative means were arbitrary, overbroad, and not proportionate to the objective of protecting the foetus.

The acquittals were restored and s. 251 was struck down.

The Crown appealed an order granting a new trial after a sexual assault conviction.

The court held that an instruction on honest but mistaken belief in consent is not mandatory in every sexual assault case; it is only required where there is sufficient evidence giving that issue an air of reality under s. 244(4) of the Criminal Code.

On the record, the accused's theory of consent or mistaken belief lacked an evidentiary foundation.

The court also held that evidence from the complainant's roommate about a prior sexual proposition was admissible because its probative value outweighed its minimal prejudicial effect, and in any event any error would have been cured by the proviso.

The applicant referred a grievance to arbitration under section 124 of the Labour Relations Act.

The respondent raised preliminary objections, arguing that the grievance was not delivered prior to the referral and that the applicant failed to follow the grievance procedure in the collective agreement.

The Board dismissed both objections, finding that the grievance was presumed delivered by mail under section 113(1) of the Act and that section 124 creates a distinct dispute resolution process separate from the collective agreement.

The appellant was randomly stopped by police as part of the R.I.D.E. program.

The officer smelled alcohol and demanded a breath sample, which the appellant failed to provide.

The appellant argued the random stop was unlawful, providing a reasonable excuse for his failure.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while there was no statutory authority for the random stop, it was authorized at common law as a justifiable use of police powers associated with their general duties to prevent crime and protect life and property.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of the Heroin Treatment Act, a British Columbia statute providing for the compulsory treatment and detention of heroin users.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Act was intra vires the provincial legislature.

The Court found that the pith and substance of the legislation was the medical treatment of heroin addicts, which falls within the province's general jurisdiction over health matters under section 92(16) of the British North America Act, 1867.

The compulsory aspects of the treatment were deemed incidental to its effectiveness and not a colourable attempt to enact criminal law.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 213(d) of the Criminal Code, where the underlying offence was indecent assault.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the defence of drunkenness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding drunkenness and the mental elements of constructive murder, the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice because the jury's verdict indicated they were satisfied the appellant had the capacity to commit the indecent assault.

The appeal was dismissed.