Monique Métivier

The defendant commercial tenant brought a Rule 21 motion to determine a question of law, arguing that the commercial lease agreement allocated the risk of loss from an oil spill to the plaintiff landlord, thereby barring claims in negligence and contract.

The court reviewed the lease provisions and the Supreme Court of Canada trilogy on the allocation of risk in commercial leases.

The court found no clear language in the lease absolving the tenant of liability for its own negligence, nor any evidence the tenant paid increased insurance premiums.

The motion was dismissed, with the court also declining to dismiss the motion solely on the basis of the defendant's delay in bringing it.

A corporate shareholder and director sought leave to be added as a party to litigation involving a company and its bank concerning enforcement of a banking resolution adopted at an annual general meeting.

The court considered Rule 13.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found the proposed party had a direct personal and corporate interest in the proceeding and could be adversely affected by the outcome.

The court determined that the annual meeting lacked quorum and that the resulting corporate resolutions, including a banking resolution altering signing authority, were invalid.

The court dismissed the company’s injunction motion seeking to enforce the resolution and granted relief requiring disclosure of financial information to the added party under oppression principles in the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The defendant, Robert Grenier, sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order setting aside a default judgment but imposing strict conditions and awarding costs to the insurer, Aviva.

The default judgment was entered after Grenier failed to defend an action arising from a 2001 motor vehicle accident.

The motion judge set aside the default judgment but imposed conditions restricting Grenier's ability to deal with his assets in Quebec and ordered him to pay costs thrown away.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary decision.

The appellant dentist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario finding him guilty of professional misconduct regarding his orthodontic practice.

The appellant raised several procedural and substantive grounds of appeal, including a reasonable apprehension of bias, issue estoppel arising from a prior undertaking, inappropriate use of expert evidence, non-disclosure, and the severity of the penalty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal in its entirety, finding no procedural unfairness, no error in the committee's evidentiary rulings, and that the remedial penalty was reasonable and necessary to protect the public.

The appellants, members of a housing co-operative, appealed a judgment terminating their occupancy rights and ordering payment of post-bankruptcy arrears.

They argued the judgment violated the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act by identifying pre-bankruptcy arrears, and that they were denied procedural fairness when the application judge refused an adjournment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the judgment did not violate the BIA as it explicitly stayed collection of pre-bankruptcy arrears, and the application judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing the adjournment given the mounting arrears and prejudice to the co-operative.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitration award that reinstated an employee who had been discharged for misconduct.

The employee was subject to a Last Chance Agreement requiring immediate discharge for any further misconduct.

The arbitrator found the employee committed misconduct but ruled the discharge void because the employer took several days to investigate and obtain legal advice before formally terminating him.

The Divisional Court held that the arbitrator's interpretation of 'immediately discharged' was patently unreasonable, as it failed to allow the employer a reasonable time to investigate and resulted in an absurd outcome without any prejudice to the employee.

The application was granted, the award quashed, and the grievance denied.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Inquiry Officer's report under the Expropriations Act, alleging breaches of procedural fairness including the denial of an adjournment request.

The respondent challenged the Court's jurisdiction to hear the application.

The Divisional Court held it had jurisdiction because the Inquiry Officer's report is an important step affecting the property owner's interests.

However, the Court dismissed the application, finding the Inquiry Officer provided detailed reasons for denying the adjournment and did not breach the duty of procedural fairness during the hearing.

The appellant appealed a trial decision finding it suffered no damages after its loader was damaged by the defendant.

The trial judge had characterized the appellant's payments for the damaged machine as lease costs rather than contributions toward a purchase under a conditional sales contract.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the appellant was forced to incur the expense of renting an alternative loader while waiting for the insurance company to write off the original machine, and awarded damages for the rental costs.

The City of Ottawa appealed a decision dismissing its appeal of the Chief Building Official's issuance of a building permit for a proposed intensive hog farm operation.

The Intervenor cross-appealed the application judge's finding that it did not have a legal non-conforming use to operate the hog farm.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal.

The Court held that the environmental statutes (OWRA, Fisheries Act, EPA) were not 'other applicable law' under s. 8(2) of the Building Code Act because they lacked a real and logical nexus to the construction and demolition of buildings.

Furthermore, the Court upheld the application judge's finding that the proposed hog farm was a change in use from the pre-existing dairy farm, meaning the Intervenor did not have a legal non-conforming use right under the Planning Act.