Michael K. Wendl

The accused, Jason Kovacevic, charged with operating a conveyance while impaired by a drug, was self-represented.

During the trial, the court initiated a voir dire regarding a potential breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The arresting officer could not recall if he offered counsel of choice or if the accused requested a specific lawyer, and appeared to lack understanding of his informational and implementational duties regarding the right to counsel.

The court found that the officer failed to comply with his Charter obligations, resulting in a breach of the accused's right to counsel.

The court deferred the s. 24(2) analysis regarding the exclusion of evidence until all evidence was heard.

Cara Mortensen was found guilty of impaired driving and driving while prohibited, her second impaired driving offence within five months, which involved an accident and an attempt to flee the scene.

The Crown sought a 90-day sentence, while the defence proposed 30-45 days intermittently.

The court imposed a 75-day concurrent sentence, a 3-year driving prohibition, and 18 months' probation.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles and rejected the intermittent sentence request, citing the lack of appropriate accommodation (Temporary Absence Passes not constituting actual imprisonment) and the need to uphold Parliament's intent for custodial sentences in such cases.

The accused, R.H., was charged with sexual interference, sexual assault, and invitation to sexual touching involving his step-granddaughter, M.C. The core allegation was that R.H. made M.C. touch his penis over his clothes.

The Crown presented evidence including M.C.'s spontaneous utterances, a 715 statement, and R.H.'s out-of-court admissions via text message.

R.H. testified, denying the allegations and explaining his admissions as panic-induced.

The court rejected R.H.'s in-court testimony, finding it inconsistent with the evidence, particularly M.C.'s unprompted utterances and R.H.'s own inculpatory text.

The court accepted M.C.'s statements and R.H.'s admissions as reliable.

Consequently, the court found R.H. guilty on all three charges.

Sarah Davison pleaded guilty to multiple drug trafficking and possession charges, including fentanyl and cocaine, and several Criminal Code offences.

The Crown sought a 6-year sentence, while the defence sought 4 years.

The court found Davison to be a mid-level dealer, distinguishing her from an "addict dealer" as characterized in prior case law.

Applying principles of denunciation and deterrence, while also considering rehabilitation, the court imposed a 6-year concurrent sentence for the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) trafficking and possession for purpose offences, 5 months concurrent for simple possession, and 30 days concurrent for the Criminal Code charges.

The accused, a paraplegic, was charged with sexual assault against his Personal Support Worker (PSW).

The complainant alleged the accused groped and kissed her during a routine morning visit, which the accused denied.

Applying the W.D. credibility analysis, the court found the accused not credible due to evasive testimony regarding his physical capabilities.

The complainant was found credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies, with the court noting her demeanor, lack of exaggeration, and absence of a financial motive to fabricate.

The court emphasized the cautious use of demeanor and post-offence conduct as credibility factors.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

Wilfred Kwok was found guilty after trial of possession of child pornography and making child pornography available.

The court imposed a concurrent sentence of 33 months for both charges.

The decision emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles, noting the large collection of child pornography (5652 pictures and 65 videos) and the offender's lack of insight into his behaviour as aggravating factors.

While the efficient and focused conduct of the trial was a mitigating factor, it did not outweigh the need for specific deterrence given the absence of remorse or rehabilitation efforts.

The court also imposed a 10-year prohibition order under section 161 of the Criminal Code, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a DNA order.

Thomas Stephens was found guilty of multiple offences including possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a loaded antique firearm, and possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and methamphetamine.

The court considered the Crown's request for a 12-year sentence and the defence's request for 5 years.

The court also addressed the application of Gladue factors, finding insufficient information to link the offender's asserted Indigenous heritage to his moral culpability or appropriate sentencing procedures.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of 10 years, reduced to 9.5 years with pre-sentence COVID credit, with specific sentences for each offence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for firearms and drug trafficking offences.

This is a sentencing decision for a second impaired driving conviction.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence under section 12 of the Charter and sought the judge's recusal due to alleged bias.

The court dismissed both the recusal motion, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias from prior proceedings or alleged trial errors, and the Charter challenge, determining that the appropriate sentence was equal to or greater than the minimum.

The court imposed a 30-day sentence, a 3-year driving prohibition, and 2 years of probation.

This decision addresses a Crown application to admit hearsay statements of a child complainant (M.C.) in a criminal trial where the accused, R.H., is charged with sexual interference, sexual assault, and invitation to sexual touching.

The complainant, aged 6 at the time of the application and 4 at the time of the alleged incidents, had no recollection of the events and would not testify.

The court applied the twin criteria of necessity and reliability for hearsay admissibility.

It found necessity met due to the complainant's young age and inability to recall.

For reliability, the court assessed both procedural and substantive aspects, including corroborative evidence from the accused's admissions.

The court admitted two spontaneous utterances and a video-recorded statement, finding them sufficiently reliable and distinct, but dismissed a third utterance as redundant.

This criminal trial concerns a sexual assault charge against J.G. involving the complainant, B.B., a nurse.

B.B. alleged J.G. intentionally touched her breast multiple times during a medical examination, while J.G. claimed a single inadvertent touch and suggested B.B. was flirtatious.

The court applied the R. v. W.(D.) credibility analysis, emphasizing that rejecting the accused's evidence does not automatically lead to conviction.

The judge found J.G.'s testimony manipulative and not credible, accepting B.B.'s consistent and reliable account.

The court concluded that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that J.G. intentionally touched B.B.'s breast, constituting sexual assault.

J.G. was convicted.

The Corporation of the Town of Erin appealed a sentence imposed on Patricia Kentner for an illegal dumping/landfill by-law offence.

The original court imposed a $5,000 fine but declined a discretionary special fine, citing Kentner's diminished moral blameworthiness (her son was the operating mind), the principle of totality (remediation costs for GRCA charges), and crucially, the lack of accurate estimates for the landfill volume.

The appeal focused on whether the Justice of the Peace erred in declining the special fine, particularly regarding the application of the totality principle and the reliance on inaccurate estimates.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, upholding the original decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Justice of the Peace's finding that accurate estimates were lacking, which was the paramount reason for not imposing the special fine.