Michael Julian Stangarone

The mother appealed an order returning her three-year-old child to Pakistan and recognizing a foreign divorce.

The motion judge had summarily determined, based solely on conflicting affidavit evidence, that the child was habitually resident in Pakistan and faced no serious risk of harm if returned.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the mother was denied procedural fairness because the conflicting evidence regarding parental intention and domestic violence required a more robust evidentiary hearing.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a proper evidentiary hearing.

The applicant mother sought to recognize and enforce an Italian court order granting her sole decision-making authority over her child, and also sought a declaration of non-parentage regarding the respondent father.

The respondent did not participate in the proceedings.

The court recognized the Italian decision-making order under s. 41(1) of the Children's Law Reform Act.

However, the court dismissed the request for a declaration of non-parentage, finding it irreconcilable with the existing Italian order that required the respondent to pay child support, which the mother had previously sought and obtained.

The applicant father brought an application under the Hague Convention seeking the return of his two-year-old child from Ontario to Australia.

The respondent mother opposed the application, arguing the child's habitual residence was in Ontario and raising exceptions under Articles 13(a) and 13(b).

The court found that the child's habitual residence had become Ontario prior to the alleged wrongful retention, largely due to the parties' relocation plans and the father's abusive conduct and withdrawal of financial support.

Alternatively, the court found the father had acquiesced to the child remaining in Ontario.

The application was dismissed.

This appeal involved cross-appeals concerning the recognition of an Omani foreign divorce and the Superior Court's jurisdiction over parenting issues for the parties' child.

The Court of Appeal upheld the recognition of the Omani divorce, finding that the applicant had attorned to the Omani court's jurisdiction by voluntarily participating in the proceedings on the merits.

The court also upheld the Superior Court's finding that Ontario had jurisdiction over parenting matters, determining that the child was habitually resident in Ontario at the relevant time, and that the Omani divorce order did not oust this jurisdiction.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal an order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

However, because the motion judge delayed releasing reasons for three and a half months, which justified bringing the motion, the court made no order as to costs.

The court also noted that the best interests of the child would be served by proceeding to trial as quickly as possible.

The mother brought a motion for an interim order permitting her to relocate to London, England with the parties' two-year-old child to accept a lucrative job offer and be closer to her family support network.

The father brought a cross-motion for a graduated parenting plan in Ontario.

The court granted the mother's motion to relocate, finding that she was the primary caregiver and that the father failed to meet the burden of proving the relocation was not in the child's best interests.

The court also addressed several evidentiary objections, striking surreptitious recordings and certain reply evidence, while allowing the evidence of a treating doctor as a participant expert.

The father's cross-motion was dismissed, and he was ordered to pay costs of $23,640.

The Respondent mother and the Children's Lawyer brought a summary judgment motion against the Applicant father seeking sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence of the children, child support, contribution towards s.7 expenses, no equalization payment, and dismissal of the father's spousal support claim.

The father, who is self-represented and suffers from significant disabilities, opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that a fair and just determination could not be made due to insufficient evidence, particularly regarding the father's medical condition and financial disclosure, and the rushed scheduling of the motion.

However, the court issued interim parenting orders granting the mother sole decision-making and primary residence, with the father's parenting time to be in accordance with the children's wishes, including supervised contact for the younger child.

The court also ordered further disclosure and a settlement conference, declining to award costs to any party due to mixed conduct.

The appellant mother appealed the dismissal of her application for parenting orders, retroactive and ongoing child support, and s. 7 expenses under the Family Law Act.

The motion judge had dismissed the application due to an existing divorce judgment from Michigan that already contained parenting and child support orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of legal principles or exercise of discretion, noting that there was little else in dispute beyond child support.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

This appeal concerned a family law application for child support and related relief.

The appellant mother challenged three aspects of the lower court's decision: the dismissal of her claim for retroactive child support from 2006-2013, the calculation of her share of s. 7 expenses based on household income, and the termination of child support at age 25.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower court's findings that the parties' property agreement constituted special provisions offsetting retroactive child support, that apportioning s. 7 expenses based on household income was reasonable given the circumstances, and that the discretionary determination of child support termination at age 25 was not arbitrary.

The court emphasized the deferential standard of review for financial disputes in family law.

Paula Bateman, former counsel for the Applicant, brought a motion for leave to make costs submissions for the period she represented the Applicant.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Ms. Bateman, as neither a party nor current counsel, lacked standing to bring such a motion under the Family Law Rules.

The court also noted the motion was unnecessary as her bills were included in the Applicant's costs submissions.

The court ordered Ms. Bateman to pay costs of $1,000 to the Respondent.

The applicant Father sought costs on a full indemnity basis after successfully obtaining an order for the return of the children from Lebanon.

The respondent Mother opposed, arguing for no costs or a reduced amount.

The court found the Mother acted in bad faith by activating Lebanese court proceedings and obtaining a travel ban without notice to the Father, justifying substantial indemnity costs.

However, the Father's claimed costs of $62,661.31 were deemed unreasonable due to overstaffing, excessive hours, and insufficient detail for foreign counsel fees.

The court awarded the Father $25,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated January 16, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $2,000 all inclusive.

The appellant, a third-party creditor (2401242 Ontario Inc.), appealed an order releasing the wife's share of matrimonial home sale proceeds.

The appellant had obtained a default judgment and filed a writ against the husband, arguing priority over the wife's interest in the jointly held matrimonial home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a creditor cannot seize the interest of a non-debtor joint tenant.

The court clarified that under Ontario's Execution Act, a writ only binds the debtor's exigible interest in jointly held land, not the entire property, and therefore the wife was entitled to her half-share of the proceeds.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Steele J. dated September 27, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent fixed in the amount of $3,500.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion seeking the return of the parties' two children from Lebanon to Ontario.

The respondent mother had travelled to Lebanon with the children for a planned vacation but subsequently refused to return, commencing annulment and custody proceedings in a Lebanese religious court and obtaining a travel ban.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that Ontario was the children's habitual residence and assumed jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court declined to defer to the Lebanese court orders, finding that the father had not been given reasonable notice or an opportunity to be heard in those proceedings.

The mother was ordered to return the children to Ontario immediately.

The applicant mother sought a declaratory order that the child, Vivian Wu, was wrongfully retained by the father in Mexico City since August 14, 2022, and an order for her immediate return to Ontario under the Hague Convention and the Children's Law Reform Act.

The father failed to participate in the proceedings despite notice.

The court found that Ontario was the child's habitual residence and declared the retention wrongful, ordering the child's forthwith return to Markham, Ontario.

The court also granted the mother's request for letters rogatory to ensure proper service on the father in Mexico.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated November 22, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal with costs fixed at $3,000, payable in the discretion of the appeal panel.

The court ordered the appeal to be heard on an expedited basis and scheduled a case management teleconference to set a schedule.

This appeal addresses whether Canadian law recognizes an Islamic bare talaq divorce, performed in Ontario and subsequently registered with Egyptian governmental agencies.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in recognizing the divorce under s. 22(3) of the Divorce Act.

The Court clarified that administrative registration of a divorce does not equate to the "granting" of a divorce by a competent authority, as required by the Act.

Furthermore, the Court held that the parties lacked a real and substantial connection to Egypt at the time of the divorce, and that recognizing such a divorce would be contrary to Canadian public policy, particularly due to its unilateral nature and the potential for forum shopping.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower court's order and allowing the appellant's spousal support claim to proceed.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking to have the parties' child returned to Oman.

The court previously directed a trial of the jurisdictional issue and requested submissions on whether the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) should be appointed.

The applicant mother requested the OCL's appointment, which the father opposed due to urgency and the impending trial date.

The court found that the father had not proceeded with urgency and that the complexity of the materials warranted a trial rather than a motion.

The court ordered the appointment of the OCL to ensure the child's best interests were advanced and adjourned the scheduled trial pending the OCL's decision.

Following a trial where the applicant mother was entirely successful on issues of parenting time and child support, she sought costs of $161,606.69.

The court found the respondent father acted in bad faith by misrepresenting evidence regarding a replica gun strapped to the child's crib and by shaving the child's head in retaliation for a failed mediation.

Due to the finding of bad faith under Rule 24(8) of the Family Law Rules, and considering the applicant's reasonable offers to settle, the court awarded the applicant her full costs of $161,606.69, payable forthwith, with one-third enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as child support.