Michael Julian Stangarone

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Dianne Pearl Douglas from a final order in a family law proceeding concerning parental decision-making, parenting time, and child support.

The appellant argued that the motion judge erred in finding a material change in circumstances and in determining that the respondent’s parenting time met the 40% threshold under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The Court found no error in the motion judge’s findings or application of the law, upholding the retroactive adjustment to child support and awarding costs to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of A.A. regarding the return of her child to Bangladesh under the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA) while refugee applications were pending.

The court found that the motion judge erred by failing to consider the impact of the outstanding refugee claims, the allegations of domestic violence, and the potential for serious harm to the child if returned.

The decision clarifies that the existence of a refugee claim does not automatically stay CLRA proceedings but is a significant factor in the analysis.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Terrence Chapman, who sought a 50% share in real estate and corporate assets held with Sandra Ing, his former partner in both business and personal life.

The trial judge found that the parties were not involved in a joint family venture and that Chapman would be unjustly enriched by an equal division, given Ing’s substantial contributions to the value of the property in question.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision, finding no juristic reason for Chapman’s enrichment under the Ontario Business Corporations Act and confirming the appropriateness of a proprietary remedy in favour of Ing.

Raha Mehralian brought a constitutional motion challenging section 29 of the Ontario Family Law Act and the judicial interpretation of section 4 of the federal Divorce Act under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

She argued that the exclusion of individuals subject to valid foreign divorces from seeking spousal support in Ontario constitutes discrimination based on marital status, sex, and religion.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding it to be an impermissible collateral attack on prior court rulings that recognized her Omani divorce and stayed her temporary support order.

The court also noted that the applicant's arguments went beyond her Notice of Constitutional Question and lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $3,620 all inclusive.

This is a panel review of a single judge's order dismissing a motion to stay a return order for an infant child to Bangladesh, pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal majority granted the review, set aside the stay dismissal, and granted a stay of the return order.

The majority found that the single judge erred in principle by giving insufficient weight to the serious issue of the relationship between the Children's Law Reform Act and pending refugee claims, and by misapplying the irreparable harm and balance of convenience tests, particularly regarding the child's best interests and the potential loss of refugee status.

The dissenting judge argued that the majority conducted a de novo review rather than applying deference to the single judge's discretionary order.

The applicant father sought the return of his son to Mexico under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, alleging wrongful retention by the respondent mother in Ontario.

The respondent opposed, claiming a grave risk of harm under Article 13(b) due to the applicant's alleged abusive conduct and the inadequacy of the Mexican justice system.

The court found that the Article 13(b) exception did not apply, as the alleged domestic violence was dated and not severe enough to meet the high threshold, and the Mexican legal system was deemed capable of protecting the child and mother.

The father's application was granted, ordering the child's return to Mexico with specified undertakings.

The Applicant sought the return of the children to Singapore pursuant to the Hague Convention, arguing Singapore was their habitual residence.

The Respondent contended the children's habitual residence was Ontario, asserting the move to Singapore was temporary for family support during pregnancy.

The court applied the hybrid approach to habitual residence, considering all circumstances including parental intentions and the children's connections.

The court found that the parties' intention was always to return to Canada, supported by evidence such as storage of belongings and daycare registrations.

The Hague application was dismissed, and the Ontario court was found to have jurisdiction over custody and access, as the children were habitually resident in Canada.

The Court of Appeal heard cross-motions within an appeal concerning a child's return to Bangladesh.

The mother (appellant) sought to stay a lower court order for the child's return, arguing a pending refugee claim should preclude the order, and also requested initials and a publication ban.

The father (respondent) sought security for costs for the appeal.

The court dismissed the mother's stay motion, finding no evidence of merit to the refugee claim or irreparable harm, and that the child's best interests favored return to Bangladesh.

The court granted the mother's request for initials and a limited publication ban.

The father's motion for security for costs was dismissed, as it would impede access to justice.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

On consent of the parties, the motion for leave to appeal was withdrawn without costs.

The applicant mother sought the return of her two children to the Dominican Republic under the Hague Convention after the respondent father retained them in Ontario following a summer visit.

The father opposed the return, citing exceptions under Article 13(b) (grave risk of harm) and Article 13(2) (child's objection).

The court found that the children had suffered severe physical and psychological abuse while in the mother's care, establishing a grave risk of harm if returned.

The 14-year-old child strongly objected to returning, and separating the 8-year-old from his sister would create an intolerable situation.

The court also admitted fresh evidence showing the mother attempted to abduct the younger child during the proceedings.

The application was dismissed, and Ontario assumed jurisdiction over parenting.

This is a costs judgment following a 19-day family law trial.

The court addressed outstanding issues of costs and the division of religious holidays.

The applicant mother was found to be substantially successful on all parenting and financial issues, while the respondent father was "unquestionably unsuccessful." The court found the father engaged in pervasive bad faith conduct, including disparaging the mother, interfering with her relationship with the child, misusing her private journals, spreading misinformation about her health, engaging in family violence, and making unfounded allegations against professionals.

Despite the bad faith finding, the court reduced the mother's requested costs for proportionality, awarding $240,000.

The court also ordered a specific division of religious holidays based on the mother's proposal, with minor adjustments to exchange times.

The parties separated after a short, traditional marriage.

The father assumed primary care of their young child and engaged in a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, including restricting the mother's parenting time, making unfounded allegations about her mental health, and psychologically abusing the child by involving him in the litigation.

The mother sought sole decision-making responsibility, primary parenting time, spousal support, and equalization.

The court found the father to be an 'unfriendly parent' who engaged in family violence and could not be trusted with decision-making.

The court awarded the mother residual decision-making responsibility and ordered a transition to a shared parenting schedule, ultimately culminating in a 2-2-5 schedule.

The court also imputed income to the father, ordering him to pay retroactive and prospective child and spousal support, as well as an equalization payment of $124,542.43.

The applicant father sought increased parenting time for their child, proposing a 2-2-3 schedule, following his relocation to Windsor to be closer to the child.

The respondent mother opposed this, seeking less parenting time for the father and a Section 30 assessment under the Children's Law Reform Act, citing concerns about the father's conduct and alleged physical discipline.

The court dismissed the mother's request for a Section 30 assessment, finding it unnecessary, and granted the father's request for a 2-2-3 parenting schedule, emphasizing the child's best interests, including the child's expressed wish for equal time with both parents and the need to reduce parental conflict.

The Respondent Mother, entirely successful in a prior Hague Application, sought costs from the Applicant Father.

The Mother requested $50,714.80, arguing for substantial recovery up to her offer to settle and full recovery thereafter, citing the Father's alleged bad faith.

The Father disputed the amount and denied bad faith, arguing the offer did not meet Family Law Rules requirements for full indemnity.

The court, applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, found the Mother presumptively entitled to costs.

While acknowledging the Father's unacceptable conduct, the court determined it did not meet the high threshold for bad faith warranting full recovery costs.

The Father's claims of inability to pay were not substantiated due to a lack of financial disclosure.

The court ultimately awarded the Mother $37,500.00 in all-inclusive costs, representing a slightly higher award than on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant father appealed a final parenting order, an order imputing income for child support, a dismissal of his request to change the child's name, and a substantial indemnity costs award of $161,606.69.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in determining the child's best interests, imputing income based on the father's failure to seek employment, or awarding costs based on findings of bad faith and domestic violence.

The parties separated and continued to reside in the matrimonial home until a domestic incident resulted in both being charged with assault.

The applicant father moved out, while the respondent mother remained in the home with their five-year-old child.

Both parties brought motions for interim parenting time.

The court ordered a shared parenting schedule that slightly favoured the mother, recognizing the matrimonial home as the child's primary residence and minimizing travel time to the father's new residence.

The appellant father appealed a finding of contempt and the resulting sanctions for breaching parenting terms in a final consent order.

The motion judge had suspended the respondent mother's child support obligations and barred the father from bringing further proceedings until he complied.

The Divisional Court upheld the contempt finding, noting the father's deliberate and financially motivated breaches.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the sanctions, finding that suspending ongoing child support and imposing an unbounded penalty were errors in principle.

The court substituted a fixed penalty of $36,000 against the father, stayed pending his commencement of a motion to change support.

The applicant sought costs of $302,215.33 following successful interim and final preservation motions in a complex family law dispute involving a multi-million-dollar real estate empire.

The court found the respondents' conduct, particularly their failure to comply with disclosure orders and late delivery of materials, to be unreasonable and warranting sanction.

The court rejected the respondents' arguments of divided success and their reliance on offers to settle.

The court declined to pierce the corporate veil to make the individual respondent personally liable for the corporate respondents' costs.

The applicant was awarded total costs of $200,000 on a substantial recovery basis.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the order of Lemon J., which incorporated the orders set out in the endorsement of Fowler Byrne J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.