REASONS FOR DECISION

Emery J.

[1] The respondent mother, Beejal Patel, brought a motion for an interim Order permitting her to relocate to London, England with the child of the marriage, Shriya, currently two years of age. The applicant father, Sanjay Patel, brought a cross-motion for a graduated parenting plan for the parties to follow in Ontario.

[2] As so often happens on cross-motions, the applicant father also requested the dismissal of the respondent mother’s motion.

[3] I propose to refer to each of the parties by their first names for conciseness, with no disrespect or informality of tone intended.

[4] The motions were first scheduled for hearing on June 28, 2023. However, that day was taken up with submissions on three preliminary objections made by Sanjay’s counsel about certain materials filed by counsel for Beejal. Rulings on those preliminary objections were given orally and confirmed in an endorsement dated June 29, 2023. The parties were advised that reasons for these rulings would be given in a standalone set or as part of the larger decision.

[5] The motions were adjourned to July 5, 2023 to be heard for half a day, in person. Because Beejal’s new job in London was to commence on August 1, 2023, the court was advised that a decision was required on the relocation motion by July 21, 2023 if mother and child were to relocate to London to meet that date. Accordingly, I issued a bottom line ruling on July 20, 2023 granting the relocation Order requested by Beejal, and dismissing Sanjay’s motion with reasons to follow.

[6] This is the larger set of reasons for my rulings on the preliminary objections and the two motions.

Brief background

[7] The parties first met when both were students in England, where Beejal had grown up. They were married on February 14, 2013. Beejal moved to Canada later that August to be with Sanjay.

[8] Beejal has trained as an elementary school teacher and has been employed on a casual basis by the Peel District School Board (“PDSB”) since coming to Canada. Sanjay is qualified to practice law in Ontario, and focuses his practice on family law.

[9] The parties lived with Sanjay’s parents in Mississauga from 2013 to 2017. They eventually purchased the matrimonial home in Mississauga in December 2017.

[10] The child of the marriage, Shriya, was born on November 10, 2020. The parties and the child resided together until the parties separated on July 6, 2022 when Beejal left the matrimonial home with Shriya.

[11] After Shriya was born, Beejal took maternity leave from October 2020 to November 2021 when both parties were home during the first year of the COVID 19 pandemic. Sanjay’s employment as a lawyer entered a more structured phase when he entered into a legal practice arrangement with Ms. Fay Hassan. This arrangement would allow him to work remotely from home every other day.

[12] The parties had agreed that after Beejal’s maternity leave came to an end, she would return to work as an occasional teacher two days a week and that Sanjay would work at home those days she was at work. Beejal states that Sanjay told her in November 2021 that he planned to return to work at the office. Beejal could not return to work as a result as she would remain at home to care for Shriya, who was just one year old at the time.

[13] Beejal states that instead of returning to work as an occasional teacher, she was added to the casual supply list at the PDSB. She states that she has worked approximately 15 days since her return from maternity leave.

[14] Beejal states in her affidavit that she has been Shriya’s primary caregiver. She has given evidence that she took on the majority of the child raising responsibility for Shriya, from her morning and bedtime routines to everything in between, including the coordination of her medical care, meal preparation, bathing, and her social and learning activities.

[15] Sanjay has given evidence that he was an involved father and co-parented Shriya before Beejal left the matrimonial home with the child on July 6, 2022.

[16] After the parties separated, they attended several meetings mediated by a member of Sanjay’s family in July and August 2022. Discussions about parenting arrangements for Shriya extended in the fall of 2022. The parties reached an agreement where Shriya would reside primarily with her mother. Sanjay would have parenting time with her two or three times a week and daily virtual visits for two hours each day.

[17] Beejay states that Sanjay missed several of the virtual visits. She states that Sanjay was unable to care for Shriya alone, and often had his parents there to assist him. When he made requests for an alteration to the schedule, Beejal states that she would “almost always” accommodate him. She consented to an overnight visit for Shriya with her father on April 3, 2023.

[18] Sanjay has not paid any spousal support to Beejal since the date of separation, and has only paid a total of $1,664 for child support. Beejal states that he has failed to pay such support voluntarily even though he lived in the matrtimonial home from September 16, 2022 to May 21, 2023. This is all contested by Sanjay. During this time, Beejal resided with Shriya in a basement apartment elsewhere in Mississauga.

[19] Beejal had served her Notice of Relocation on March 10, 2023. Sanjay served his Notice of Objection on March 24, 2023.

[20] Beejal has several family members who reside in London. These include her parents, maternal grandparents, great grandmother, and uncles and aunts. She states that these family members will be available to help with Shriya’s care as and when necessary. Beejal’s strong network of family members are known to Shriya as she has already travelled to England three times and spent approximately five months in London, most recently for three weeks between October and November 2022.

[21] In her affidavit dated June 15, 2023 and undisturbed parts of her affidavit dated June 26, 2023, Beejal also deposes that she has carefully considered other supports that would benefit Shriya in London. She states she has found three programs Shriya might attend part-time as a child of her age. These programs are offered by London Acorn School, Little Forest Folk School and Grove Hall Nursery.

[22] Beejal states she understands how important it is that Sanjay have regular and meaningful parenting time with Shriya. She intends to support Sanjay’s efforts to develop and maintain a healthy relationship with their daughter and to ensure he remains actively involved with her after relocation.

[23] Sanjay submits that Beejal has created an artificial status quo for parenting Shriya and his parenting time with her. He submits that the motion to relocate is an attempt to further solidify that status quo.

Rulings on the objections

[24] As indicated above, I heard submissions on June 28, 2023 regarding five preliminary objections made by counsel for Sanjay to the motion materials filed by counsel for Beejal. Two of those objections were resolved on consent as set out in my endorsement dated June 29, 2023. I also delivered bottom line rulings to the remaining three objections. Those bottom line rulings were made so that counsel had them when making submissions on the main motions on July 5, 2023.

[25] These are my reasons for the rulings given on the three contested objections.

Proper scope of reply affidavits

[26] Sanjay objected to paragraphs 12, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 43 and 79-81 of Beejal’s affidavit in reply dated June 26, 2023 as he asserted the content of those paragraphs was not proper reply evidence. I made an Order striking paragraphs 12, 21 and 43. I further granted leave under FLR 14(20) permitting Sanjay to file an affidavit in sur-reply to the evidence contained in paragraphs 14-16, 20 and 79-81.

[27] The parties agree that the object of Family Law Rule 14(20) is to limit the evidence a party can file on a family law motion. The basis of the objections at issue arise from Sanjay’s challenge to the scope of evidence Beejal as the moving party can give in reply.

[28] Beejal stated in paragraph 2 of her affidavit dated June 26, 2023 that she was making it in reply to Sanjay’s affidavit sworn on June 20, and in support of her own motion. Sanjay objected to various paragraphs of that affidavit as follows:

a. Para. 12 – where Beejal comments on Sanjay’s attitude towards her education and intelligence, and her isolation from her own support network;

b. Para. 14 – comparing Beejal’s earning capability as an Occasional Elementary Teacher with the PDSB in Ontario, and her opportunity to make GBP 60,000 a year ($100,608 CDN) wih Krisku Investments in the UK;

c. Para. 15 – describing Beejal’s efforts to obtain long term teaching roles within the PDSB;

d. Para.16 – in which Beejal a) estimates the likelihood that she would obtain a long term occasional teaching position for September 2023, and b) explains that it woud take another five years of full time teaching to reach a maximum level within her pay band under the PDSB salary grid. This amount would still be less than her starting salary at Krisku Investments in the UK;

e. Para. 20 – Beejal’s description of how she would have access to the support of her family in the UK to help with Shriya, and the advantages of enrolling Shriya in nursery school for two days a week in London;

f. Para. 21 – setting out the general agreement between the parties during the marriage about sending Shriya to a school with an emphasis on outdoor learning when she turns five years of age. In this paragraph, Beejal states that both the London Acorn School and the Forest Folk School in London offers this form of education for young children;

g. Para.43 – making references to numerous counselling sessions that Beeja and Sanjay attended at Homewood Health regarding his drug addiction and various undisclosed issues they discussed during the marriage; and

h. Paras. 79-81 – setting out the expanded parenting time that Beejal is proposing for Sanjay if she is permitted to relocate with Shriya to the UK.

[29] In E.S. v. A.S., 2020 ONSC 824 at paras. 27 and 28, Tobin J. held that reply evidence may be given on a family law motion to respond to a new fact raised by a respondent to which the moving party had no opportunity to deal with, or could not have reasonably anticipated. Tobin J. further held that reply evidence is not available to confirm or amplify evidence already given or that could have been given at first instance. In that case, evidence containing conjecture, reference to events that had occurred before the original affidavit was filed, and paragraphs consisting of argument were not permitted. Rather than parsing a 13 page, 79 paragraph affidavit, Tobin J. dealt with improper content in the reply affidavit by relying only on evidence to the extent identified in his ruling.

[30] The court may allow a party to file additional affidavit materials outside the permitted boundaries of FLR 14(20) under the power to “order otherwise.” See Cavarra-Iatoro v. Iatoro, 2019 CarswellOnt 3310. In order to balance the rights of the parties to be heard, the court may grant the right of sur-reply to the responding party.

[31] There is also the prospect that a reply affidavit might raise fresh allegations: Nyari v. Belascho, 2008 ONCJ 272. In para. 11 of Nyari, Sherr J. recommends that other courts exercise caution when “ordering otherwise” as fresh allegations give rise to the adverse party’s insistence to respond in kind, leading to a spiralling of the litigation. Sherr J. struck offending paragraphs giving evidence that could have been covered by a previous affidavit filed on the motion, or that appeared to recycle evidence of questionable value.

[32] I ruled on the objection that the paras. 14-16, 20 and 79-81 could stand on the basis that these paragraphs constituted proper reply evidence under the guiding principles of evidence on family law motions. However, I made an Order striking paras. 12, 21 and 43 for these reasons:

a. para. 12 – This paragraph provides evidence that has been given, or embellishes what details could have been given in a previous affidavit on the relocation motion.

b. para.21 – this paragraph gives evidence on an agreement between the parties not raised by Sanjay in his responding affidavit. This is improper as Sanjay had no opportunity to respond under FLR 14(20).

c. para. 43 - the references to any or alleged drug counselling sessions attended by Sanjay could have and should have addressed in Beejal’s affidavit in support of the relocation motion. There was no reference to these counselling sessions in Sanjay’s responding affidavit to make this proper reply evidence.

Surreptitious recordings

[33] Sanjay objected to paragraphs 27, 28 and 29 of Beejal’s affidavit dated June 15, 2023, and paragraph 24 as well as exhibits G and H of her affidavit dated June 20, 2023 regarding “surreptitious recordings.” I made an Order striking the last sentence of para. 27 and all of para. 28 of the first mentioned affidavit, and paragraph 24 as well as exhibits G and H from the second affidavit.

[34] The traditional rule that tape recordings made surreptitiously are not admissible as evidence because their admission into evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute was discussed in Seddon v. Seddon, 1994 CarswellBC 1409. I would think that the general rule would also extend to digital recordings in the current electronic age.

[35] Justice Sherr cautioned against condoning the use of secret recordings as evidence in court in Hameed v. Hameed, 2006 ONCJ 274, Sherr J. explains at para. 11 that:

[11] I ruled that this evidence was inadmissible. Surreptitious recording of telephone calls by litigants in family law matters should be strongly discouraged. There is already enough conflict and mistrust in family law cases, without the parties’ worrying about whether the other is secretly taping them. In a constructive family law case, the professionals and the courts work with the family to rebuild trust so that the parties can learn to act together in the best interests of the child. Condoning the secret taping of the other would be destructive to this process.

[36] There is a strong public policy reason against the routine admission of surreptitiously made recordings into evidence. In Arbitman v. Lee, 2021 ONSC 315, Monahan J. (as he then was) explained at para. 18 that:

[18] I note that there are strong policy reasons discouraging the use of surreptitiously recorded interactions in family law litigation, except in cases where the probative value of the evidence is compelling. Courts have found that the admission of surreptitiously obtained evidence tends to undermine the goals and values of family law, since the violation of privacy inherent in these acts is more likely to increase conflict and to reduce the prospect that the parties will be able to work together in the future. Courts have also found that admitting evidence obtained through surreptitious practices sends the wrong message by appearing to reward the behavior, whereas such practices should be discouraged. Because the introduction of such material will generally be contested, it is likely to unnecessarily prolong the case, with added costs to the parties as well as to the administration of justice generally.

[37] Later that year, Kurz J. provides a fulsome survey of the law on the frailties of admitting surreptitious recordings into evidence in Van Ruyven v. Van Ruyven, 2021 ONSC 5963, at paras. 30-43. However, family courts across the country are divided about whether to allow such recordings as evidence on a discretionary basis when engaged on a “best interests” of the child analysis: U.(A.J.) v. U. (G.S.), 2015 ABQB 6, at paras. 153-154. This discretion is retained by the court to admit a recording into evidence where the probative value of the recording outweighs the public policy considerations that favour it’s exclusion: K.M. v. J.R., 2022 ONSC 111, at para. 198.

[38] There is an emerging trend in the authorities to allow a surreptitiously made recording into evidence where the recording is found to have strong probative value into the issues. The authorities in this line of cases have listed factors such as relevance, reliability, and probative value with respect to the best interests of the child as the most prominent consideration the court should find admissible: Reddick v. Reddick, 1997 CarswellOnt 3477 and Rapoport v. Rapopart, 2011 ONSC 4456, 2011 CarswellOnt 14814, at paras. 341 and 343. In such cases where a surreptitiously made recording is admissible, the court has found the probative value of the recordings outweighs the policy considerations against admitting those recordings into evidence: F(A) v. A.(B.J.), 2017 ) ONCJ 108.

[39] If the rule on the admissibility of recordings made surreptitiously is dependent on the probative value of the content on those recordings, the converse should be equally applicable. If the content on such recordings is prejudicial and either outweighs its probative value or is of questionable relevance, the inadmissibility of the recordings should be considered carefully. This is particularly important where the dangers of accepting such evidence discussed by Sherr J. in Hameed are present.

[40] On this motion, I struck those parts of Beejal’s affidavit where the prejudicial effect of the recordings outweighed their probative value. This balancing was measured against the relevance of the recordings, and if they were evidence that would assist the court to determine the parenting issues that would be in Shriya’s best interests.

Evidence from Dr. Manzoor

[41] The affidavit of Dr. Shaheen Manzoor dated June 20, 2023 was also the subject of an objection by Mr. Morrison. The affidavit was not struck as Dr. Manzoor can be considered a participant expert within the meaning of Westerhof v. Gee, 2015 ONCA 206 as discussed at paras. 60-64.

[42] Dr. Manzoor’s evidence is self contained as a treating doctor and any opinion is confined by her observation of, or participation in, the events in issue. See also Marchand (Litigation Guardian of) v. Public General Hospital Society of Chatham (2000), 2000 CanLII 16946 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 120 and Westerhof at paras. 66-70. However, the second to last paragraph of Dr. Manzoor’s letter “To: Whom It May Concern” attached as exhibit A to her affidavit that starts with the words “The wellbeing of…” strays outside the boundaries of evidence a participant expert is permitted to give. Instead, it fell into the realm of an opinion only a properly qualified litigation expert could give. Rather than strike this paragraph, I found that particular evidence from Dr. Manzoor to be inadmissible.

Relocation motion

[43] Beejal brings her motion on three grounds, all of which she links to the best interests of Shriya:

a. She has been offered a job with Krisku Investments in London, England where she will earn GBP 60,000 a year to start;

b. She and Shriya will have access to her family and support network in London; and

c. The same income opportunities and support network are not available in Ontario.

[44] Sanjay relies on a different set of considerations to oppose the relocation, and to support his motion for parenting time. He also links three considerations to the best interests of Shriya:

a. The parenting plan he proposes would be more in keeping with the status quo that currently exists;

b. The law favours a parenting plan that allows for a child to have maximum contact with each parent consistent with their ability to parent; and

c. Moving with Shriya to London would make the trial of the child focused issues in the case meaningless.

[45] I made the following order on July 20, 2023 on Beejal’s motion:

[1] Because of the time sensitive nature of the Respondent mother’s motion, I am making the following order, for reasons to follow:

A. This court finds that Shriya was habitually resident in Ontario as she last resided with both parents in Ontario. This court therefore has jurisdiction to make a parenting order with respect to Shriya.

B. This court orders that:

a. The Respondent mother is permitted to relocate the child, Shriya Patel, born November 10, 2020 to London, England;

b. The Respondent mother shall facilitate the parenting time set out in this order for the Applicant father with Shriya in Canada and the United Kingdom;

c. The Respondent mother shall pay for Shriya’s travel when they travel to Canada for parenting visits;

d. The Applicant father is entitled to parenting visits as follows (in chronological order of calendar dates):

i. One week within the Half Term Break in February, in the UK.

ii. One week over the Easter Break in April, in Canada. The Respondent mother shall travel with Shriya to Canada for this visit.

iii. One week over the Half Term Break in May, in the UK.

iv. Four weeks within the six weeks of the Summer Break during July and August, in Ontario starting in 2024. The Respondent mother shall travel with Shriya to Canada for this visit.

v. One week over the Half Term Break in October, in the UK.

vi. Three days on or near Shriya’s birthday in November. In alternate years, the Respondent mother shall travel with Shriya to Canada for this visit.

vii. One week over the Christmas Break in December. The Respondent mother shall travel with Shriya to Canada for this visit.

viii. The applicant father shall be entitled to four additional weeks of parenting time in the UK during the year, if and when his schedule allows.

ix. These parenting visits are non-cumulative.

x. The Applicant father shall have in person parenting time with Shriya during the Summer Break parenting visit in Canada as follows:

xi. Week 1: Tuesday 9-4 pm, Sunday 9-4 pm

xii. Week 2: Friday 4pm to Sunday 4pm.

e. The parent having Shriya overnight shall make her available for a virtual call by Zoom, FaceTime or Skype with the other party on a daily basis or as frequently as the parties may agree in writing, to take place before Shriya’s bedtime routine.

f. Each party shall provide their residential address to the other, as well as update the other party on any change to their personal contact information for cell phone or email communication. The Applicant father shall also provide the Respondent mother with any and all addresses where he will be exercising his parenting time with Shriya in the UK on any parenting visit under this order;

g. The Respondent mother shall retain possession of any passport issued to or for Shriya; and

h. This schedule may be reviewable by the court after February 28, 2024.

[2] The motion of each party was mutually exclusive as a successful result in one of them would defeat the other. As the motion of the respondent mother was granted, the motion of the applicant was dismissed.

Statutory framework for relocation

[46] In 2021, the Divorce Act, 2019 came into force. In s. 16.92(1), the court is required to consider the best interests of a child with reference to the prescribed factors relevant to the case when making a relocation decision: O’Brien v. Chuluunbaatar, 2021 ONCA 555, at paras. 39-43. These factors on a relocation motion are as follows:

16.92 (1) In deciding whether to authorize a relocation of a child of the marriage, the court shall, in order to determine what is in the best interests of the child, take into consideration, in addition to the factors referred to in section 16,

(a) the reasons for the relocation;

(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;

(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or a pending application for a parenting order and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;

(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 16.9, provincial family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement;

(e) the existence of an order, arbitral award, or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;

(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new place of residence and the travel expenses; and

(g) whether each person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility or a pending application for a parenting order has complied with their obligations under family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.

[47] When the court considers these factors having regard to the evidence, the burden of proof set out in s. 16.93 applies:

16.93 (1) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, arbitral award, or agreement that provides that a child of the marriage spend substantially equal time in the care of each party, the party who intends to relocate the child has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in the best interests of the child.

(2) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, arbitral award or agreement that provides that a child of the marriage spends the vast majority of their time in the care of the party who intends to relocate the child, the party opposing the relocation has the burden of proving that the relocation would not be in the best interests of the child.

(3) In any other case, the parties to the proceeding have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child.

Analysis

[48] The parties must keep in mind two things about the Order I have made. The first is that the Order is interim in nature and made with Shriya’s best interests at heart. It seeks to maintain the status quo wherever the child happens to reside with her mother while the parties go through the family law process. The Order contains features intended to preserve the relationship between Shriya and her father to the best extent possible while the case is before the court. The second is that the Order was decided on the evidence filed and the submissions made on the relocation motion. It is a temporary Order that provides a parenting plan for Shriya until trial, at which the terms of parenting for her can be determined on a full record.

[49] The first question for consideration is whether Shriya has spent equal time with each parent under an order or by agreement, or the vast majority of her time with only one parent. This will determine the burden of proof.

[50] Beejal takes the position that Shriya spends the vast majority of her time in her care. As a result , s. 16.93(2) should apply to place the onus on Sanjay as the parent opposing the motion to prove the proposed relocation would not be in the best interests of the child.

[51] In contrast, Sanjay states that he shared the parenting of Shriya prior to separation on a more or less equal basis. Sanjay submits that it would be in Shriya’s best interests to stay on Ontario, and that he should have as much parenting time as he proposes on his cross-motion. He states the onus is on Beejal under s. 16.93(1) to show that relocation would be in Shriya’s best interests.

[52] I have reviewed the affidavits filed by the parties. I am persuaded by the evidence that Beejal has been Shriya’s primary care-giver. This is particularly the case since the parties separated. Despite any agreement reached at family meetings and efforts to exercise parenting time under an agreement, the vast amount of the time raising Shriya has been provided by Beejal, and even more so since separation. Therefore, s. 16.93(2) applies to place the burden of proving that the relocation is not in Shriya’s best interests on Sanjay as the party opposing the move. See Tariq v. Khan, 2022 ONSC 1167, at para. 74.

[53] Beejal’s motion for permission to relocate to the United Kingdom with the child and Sanjay’s motion that she remain in Ontario along with the parenting schedule he proposes are mutually exclusive. I intend to focus on the relocation motion as Beejal’s success on that motion precluded the success of Sanjay’s motion for parenting time. That outcome included the parenting time Sanjay has been given with Shriya in the UK as well as in Canada on return visits.

[54] The ultimate question for the court to determine is whether it would be in the best interests of the child to relocate. The Supreme Court of Canada in Barendregt v. Grebiunas, 2022 SCC 22 confirmed that the amendments ot the Divorce Act effectively imports the foundational principles from the seminal case Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27 into the statutory regime. The maximum contact principle that the applicant father relies upon is not absolute and “is only significant to the extent that it is in the child’s best interest”: Barendregt, at paras. 115, 128 and 135.

[55] The motion to relocate is therefore based on the foundational principles of determining what parenting order would be in the best interests of a child to make. It also relies to a large degree on the policy behind the factors set out in s. 16.92 of the Divorce Act for making final orders when deciding relocation issues. From this well of authority has sprung a subset of factors that the courts have developed on a motion for a temporary relocation order pending trial. Those factors are set out in Plumley v. Plumley, 1999 CanLII 13990 (SCJ) and an expanded set can be found in Boudreault v. Charles, 2014 ONCJ 273.

[56] In Plumley, Marshman J. held that when determining relocation of a child on an interim basis, the court should consider the following factors:

a. A court will be more reluctant to upset the status quo on an interim basis and permit the move where there is a genuine issue for trial.

b. There can be compelling circumstances which might dictate that a justice ought to allow the move.

c. Although there may be a genuine issue for trial, the move may be permitted on an interim basis if there is a strong probability that the custodial parent’s position will prevail at trial.

[57] In Boudreault, Justice Sherr held that the following are additional principles regarding temporary relocation cases:

a. The burden is on the parent seeking the change to prove compelling circumstances exist that are sufficient to justify the move;

b. Courts are generally reluctant to permit relocation on a temporary basis. The decision will often have a strong influence on the final outcome of the case, particularly if the order permits relocation. The reality is that courts do not like to create disruptions in the lives of children by making an Order that may have to cause further disruption later if the order has to be reversed.

c. Courts will be more cautious about permitting a temporary relocation where there are material facts in dispute that would likely impact on the final outcome.

d. Courts will be even more cautious in permitting a temporary relocation when the proposed move involves a long distance. It is unlikely that the move will be permitted unless the court is certain that it will be the final result.

e. Courts will be more cautious in permitting a temporary relocation in the absence of a custody order.

f. Courts will permit temporary relocation where there is no genuine issue for trial, or where the result would be inevitable after a trial.

g. In assessing whether the three considerations in Plumey, the court must consider the best factors…and any violence and abuse in assessing a parent’s ability to act as a parent…as well as the leading authority on mobility cases, such as Gordon v Goertz.

h. These principles apply with necessary modification to an initial consideration of custody and access and not just to a variation of access.

i. The financial security of the moving parent is a relevant factor in mobility cases.

j. Several cases have recognized that requiring a parent to remain in a community isolated from his or her family and supports and in difficult financial circumstances will adversely impact a child. The economic and financial benefits of moving to a community where the parent will have supports, financial security and the ability to complete their education and establish a career are properly considered in assessing whether or not the move is in the child's best interests.

k. There is case law that says that if a primary caregiver is happier, this will benefit the child.

l. The level of co-operation that the moving parent will provide in facilitating access to the other parent is also a relevant consideration in a mobility application.

[58] Sanjay submits that the interim relief that Beejal is seeking would render a trial meaningless. He states the threshold to permit relocation on an interim basis is high. He maintains that any parenting order must facilitate a meaningful relationship between Shriya and her father.

[59] I made the Order allowing Beejal to relocate to London for reasons found under the relevant factors of s. 16.92 and those set out in Plumley. This result was reached upon the application of the sum of those parts to reach my conclusion that it would be in Shriya’s best interests to relocate with her mother to London. These reasons include Beejal’s emotional well-being as Shriya’s primary caregiver, the family supports that Beejal and Shriya have in the UK, and the financial opportunities in the UK for Beejal to provide for Shriya. I was also mindful of Beejal’s willingness to accommodate Sanjay’s parenting time during this interim period.

Best interests

[60] It is self evident that Beejal’s motion for an interim order allowing relocation pending trial implicitly includes a consideration of what parenting plan would be best for Shriya. This element raises the issue of Shriya’s best interests as the paramount, if not the only consideration. This is also the prime consideration on Sanjay’s own motion for parenting time.

[61] Sanjay refers to s. 16.1 of the Divorce Act that provides the court with the authority to make interim or final orders with respect to parenting time for a child of the marriage. In addition to the factors set out in s. 16(3), he relies on the principle formerly known as the “maximum contact” rule that directs “In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.”

[62] The Court of Appeal explained in Knapp v. Knapp, 2021 ONCA 305, at para. 34 that the objective of a child focused approach is to achieve as much time with each parent as possible. This principle is a guide to benefit the child. However, this objective is but one factor in the determination of what parenting order would be in the best interests of a child: Bjornson v. Creighton, 2002 CanLII 5125 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 22-30. The application of this principle may or may not result in equal parenting time between parents: Knapp, at para. 34.

[63] A party must not benefit from the artificial creation of a favourable status quo: Izyuk v. Bilousov, 2011 ONSC 6451. This court has held that the status quo for the parenting of a child relevant to temporary parenting motions is the arrangement that existed just prior to separation. The status quo that results from the unilateral actions of one party, without the consent of the other, does not create a status quo that is subject to the cogent evidence necessary to justify a variation under Papp v. Papp, 1969 CanLII 219 (Ont. C.A.). However, the overall view of the court must be ascertained from the child’s perspective, not the parent’s wished and preferences. Those preferences and rights are not relevant to the equation except to the extent that they are necessary to identify the best interests of the child. See Gordon v. Goertz, as well as Young v. Young (1993), 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC).

[64] There is conflicting evidence between affidavits and the questioning transcripts filed as to the extent Sanjay provided parenting to Shriya. This raises a credibility issue that cannot be assessed on a written record. However, there is enough evidence in the record that can be considered at this stage to make an interim decision permitting Beejal as Shriya’s primary caregiver to relocate temporarily, even though it may disrupt the status quo Sanjay says was in place before separation.

[65] There is more evidence to effectively usurp the status quo. The evidence Beejal has filed contains disturbing allegations of Sanjay’s emotional, verbal and psychological abuse of her throughout the marriage. She alleges that he often berated her, intimidated her, threatened her and acted in a coercive and controlling manner. She alleges that he “engaged in significant intimate partner violence throughout the relationship” in para. 11 of her affidavit dated June 15, 2023. In paras. 16 to 22 of that affidavit, Beejal describes the language Sanjay would use on many of those occasions, often profane and, it would seem, always angry.

[66] Beejal describes a particularly fearful event that occurred in the early morning hours of January 16, 2022 in para. 24 of her affidavit. Sanjay woke up around 5 or 6 a.m. and told her he felt unwell and that he thought he was going to have a heart attack. Beejal told him she would call an ambulance, which Sanjay then refused. According to Beejal, Sanjay then began shouting and swearing at Beejal. This conduct was unfolding in front of Shriya, who had been sleeping in the bed between them.

[67] Beejal goes on to describe how Sanjay’s behavior escalated to his use of profanity and name calling towards her. When she left the bedroom for Sanjay to calm down, he allegedly locked himself and the child inside the bedroom and refused to come out.

[68] Beejal called 911 and the police responded with a visit to the family home. Sanjay left the home for an hour at the recommendation of the police, but returned with his parents to demand and obtain Shriya’s passport. He then gathered some belongings and left the home.

[69] Sanjay disputes particular allegations described by Beejal, and puts into question Beejal’s motives for making them, as well as her state of mind. He admitted to yelling and swearing at Beejal, and to calling her names when he was questioned on June 9, 2023. He does, however, state that he is “extremely remorseful” about his communications with Beejal during the marriage. He states that his emotions got the best of him at times, but that should not be taken as a reflection of his parenting ability.

[70] Parliament has included the concept of family violence as a factor for the court to consider when deciding what parenting time would be in the best interests of a child. It is a factor among those to be considered under s. 16(3), and the those factors related to considering the impact of any family violence are set out in s. 16(4). The court is mandated by the word “shall” in s. 16(4) to take these factors under consideration when making a parenting decision.

[71] Sanjay is correct when he refers to s. 16(5) that provides that the court shall not take into consideration any past conduct of any person, but that prohibition is subject to the proviso that it apply “unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of their parenting time.”

[72] I am not making any finding that Sanjay has committed any acts of family violence at this time. He is entitled to make a full response to those allegations at trial. If need be, the trial judge can hear evidence on both sides of the allegations and make whatever credibility assessments are necessary. However, these allegations are troubling enough for me to find that Beejal’s descriptions of the nature and frequency of certain events would impact Sanjay’s ability to engage in a meaningful parenting arrangement with her as the other parent in Ontario. If Beejal was required to stay in Ontario until trial, the immediacy of participating in any shared parenting time with Sanjay would likely expose her to further risk, should those allegations have any element of truth to them. This would in turn impact on the child in a manner to which s. 16(4) refers.

[73] The occurrence or prospect of family violence can have a profound effect on a child as a direct or indirect consequence if her mother’s physical, emotional and psychological well-being is compromised: McBennett v. Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610. In McIntosh v. Baker, 2022 ONSC 4235 , Fowler Byrne J. put it succinctly at para. 18 when she held that “The suggestion that domestic abuse or family violence has no impact on the children and has nothing to do with the perpetrator’s parenting abilitly is untenable.”

[74] If Sanjay shared the parenting of Shriya with Beejal prior to separation, I fiind there are sufficient grounds to change that status quo pending trial. This includes a variation to the amount of parenting time I have allocated to Sanjay in the relocation Order. I determined the appropriate amount of parenting time he should be given when I made the Order on July 20, 2023 as this amount of time accords with his ability to parent Shriya as well as his availability when in the UK as well as in Canada.

Reason for relocation

[75] While I am of the view that Sanjay has the burden of showing that the relocation is not in Shriya’s best interests, Beejal must also show that her interests will be well served under the Order made. I have found this to be the case, based on Beejal’s reasons for seeking to relocate.

[76] Beejal has brought the motion to relocate with Shriya to London, England at this time because she has accepted an offer from Krisku Investments Ltd. in London as an Investment Analyst. This position will pay her significantly more than she would earn as a teacher at her level with the PDSB.

[77] Sanjay submits that Beejal is using the job offer from Krisku Investments as the primary reason to relocate, and that this offer has been “manufactured” by Beejal and her family. He list the following reasons in evidence for this assertion:

a. Beejal has no experience or educational background in the financial sector. For the entirety of her career, she has been an elementary school teacher.

b. Krisku Investments is owned by Beejal’s family and is a business created to manage the wealth/investments of her family which exceeded $14,000,000 CDN as of July 31, 2021.

c. Krisku Investments had one employee at the end of the 2021 fiscal year (other than the two Directors of the business who are Beejal’s uncles) whose LinkedIn Profile provides that he is “the sole investment manager for a family office where he works closely with the family to develop various strategies consistent with their return and risk parameters.”

d. Not only is the business willing to extend the period of time prior to the commencement of her employment from the timing of her interview in October 2022 to the end of July 2023, but the employer was willing to sign an Affidavit for a court matter in another country (i.e. this matter).

[78] Sanjay further states that Beejal has not made any genuine efforts to find employment in Ontario around the time he served a Request for Information in this proceeding. He submits that she applied to teach grades she had never toaught before, and two finance positions for which she had no credentials to preserve the optics of seeking employment to justify accepting the position in the UK.

[79] Since the parties separated, it appears from the evidence that Beejal has been living in an impoverished state. She has been for Shriya and herself without any assistance of significance from Sanjay. They have been living in a basement apartment on a subsistence income. Owing to her parental responsibilities and her only vocation in Canada as a supply teacher, Beejal’s income has little prospect of increasing. Beejal’s opportunity to improve her situation in the UK is understandably attractive.

[80] In my view, it does not make a palpable difference that Krisku Investments is a small investment firm operated by a relative of Beejal’s family and that its main undertaking is to look after the holdings of the family. Nor does it matter to any great extent that Beejal is currently untrained in investment matters. Sanjay has put forward no evidence that the position Beejal has taken does not exist, only that she has no qualifications for the position and that the firm is dedicated to investing for the family as its one client. Beejal fulfilled the one requirement set by the employer that the candidate be a graduate of Cambridge University, from which she has earned a Masters degree. It is beyond the scope of this motion to assess whether the employer and the employment is genuine.

[81] It is also significant that London is home for Beejal. Relocating to London to take this position with Krisku Investments will also bring her home to London where she and the child will be in close proximity to Beejal’s parents and lateral family. This family comprises the support network described above, many of whom Shriya has met on her three trips to London. Beejal states that this family support will be in Shriya’s best interests, instead of living in the rented basement apartment until trial.

[82] The happiness and wellbeing of Beejal as Shriya’s mother is also an important factor in the best interests analysis. The Divisional Court in Kazberov v. Kotyachkova, 2021 ONSC 5006 allowed the mother’s appeal in that case to permit her to relocate with her child from Waterloo, Ontario to Ann Arbor, Michigan. The Divisional Court remarked that the trial judge did not respect the mother’s desire to make the move. The Court found that the trial judge did not follow the directions in the authorities that the best interests of the child must include a consideration of the effect on the child if her primary parent is unhappy because of an inability to move forward with her life. Sachs J. cites the Court of Appeal in Bjornson, which overturned the decision of the trial judge in that case for much the same reason, stating at para. 30:

[30] With the greatest respect to the learned trial judge, he did not contemplate what improvement, if any, would result to the interests of the child if the custodial parent were permitted to move to Alberta. I agree with the statement of counsel for the mother, as expressed in her factum, that the trial judge failed to "give due regard to the relationship between the quality of the custodial parent's emotional, psychological, social and economic well-being and the quality of the child's primary care-giving environment". The learned trial judge failed to appreciate the multi-faceted nature of the mother's desire to return to Alberta with the child and the concomitant positive effects on the child's best interests in being cared for by a well-functioning and happy custodial parent.

[83] The move to London will provide Beejal the opportunity of self fulfillment at her new job as well as the means to care for herself and Shriya. She will also have the support network that family can provide in a home setting. Following the logic of the authorities in Kazberov, a happy mother will more than likely lead to a happy child.

[84] It is equally important to appreciate that young children are adaptable to change. This reality was reflected in the following observation by the Court of Appeal in Reeves v. Brand, 2018 ONCA 263, at paras. 30-31:

[30] Children’s adaptability to change, especially at Ray’s age, bolsters the trial judge’s conclusion. As Furey J. sensibly noted in his recent decision in Sexton v. Tipping, 2017 CanLII 56984 (N.L. S.C.T.D.), at paras. 81-82:

It is a reality of the times in which we live that many couples with children come together through partnership or marriage, separate or divorce after a period of time and then move on with their lives. … The crux of these scenarios is change – for the parents and for the children.

Change is a constant in all our lives. As a general principle, children are adaptable in their lives. They change communities. They change schools. They change friends. Many change families, not because of their actions but because of the actions of their parents. That has happened in this matter.

[31] Ray is young. The disruption to the life of a six year old is likely to be less significant than the disruption to the life of, say, a fifteen year old.

[85] Shriya is just about to turn three years of age. Her parents have been engaged in acrimonious interaction with each other for the most recent twelve months of her young life. The parties have not provided the most positive environment in which to raise Shriya. She is at an age where she is adaptable to where she lives with her mother, whether it be in the UK or if the court decides after a trial that she should live in Ontario. Shriya’s adaptability will no doubt be relevant to any status quo that develops iin the meantime. The sooner the parties can bring this case to trial, the more adaptable Shriya will likely be to any outcome.

[86] The Order made on July 20, 2023 not only permitted the relocation of Beejal and Shriya to the UK on an interim basis, the Order specifically makes a finding that Shriya was last habitually resident in Ontario as the place she last resided with both parents. I made the finding at the outset that this court has jurisdiction to make a parenting order with respect to Shriya. This jurisdiction is not limited to the motion; the jurisdiction will extend to trial when a final decision can be made on all the evidence. This evidence will include how the parties abide by this Order.

[87] In terms of the factors to consider on a motion for an interim relocation order, most notably those setout in Plumley, I considered the evidence given by both parties to be sufficient to alter any status quo on Shriya’s parenting to date. There are compelling reasons to permit Beejal’s relocation with the child, having regard to the principles that govern parenting issues generally and final orders regarding relocation in particular. On the evidence before me on the two motions, I found there is a strong probability that Beejal’s position as the parent with whom Shriya resides will prevail at trial. I therefore found it just to make the temporary Order allowing Beejal to relocate to London England. In my view, this Order was made with Shriya’s best interests in mind.

Parenting time motion

[88] As Beejal’s motion to relocate is granted, the motion Sanjay brought for a graduated parenting plan to follow in Ontario is dismissed. However, it was an essential feature of the relocation motion that the court has ordered a fair and frequent parenting plan for Sanjay to enjoy with Shriya according to the schedule ordered.

Costs

[89] Beejal was clearly the more successful party on the two motions. She was also successful on terms of achieving a more favourable result than Sanjay’s offer to settle on his parenting motion, which means that he obtained a less successful result than the terms offered. Beejal is therefore presumptively entitled to costs of the motions under FLR 24(1). It is up to Sanjay to provide me with persuasive evidence or any reason to rebut that presumption.

[90] Sanjay has asked me to consider the following submissions, which I will address in the course of this review.

Mobility cases should not attract costs

[91] Sanjay acknowledges that he is not the successful party. However, he submits that he approached the issues in good faith and proceeded with his motion in the genuine belief that it was the best interests of Shriya to oppose Beejal’s relocation motion, and to seek the parenting order he put forward. Sanjay submits that mobility cases should not be decided on a winner or loser basis.

[92] In this regard, Sanjay relies on Reati v. Racz, 2026 ONSC 3769 and Reid v. Mulder, 2006 CanLII 9981 as authorities for his position that the court should exercise its discretion to decline to award costs to either party. In Reati, Mitrow J. found that the presumption to entitlement to costs under FLR 24(1) was applicable in the case before him. While he agreed that a court, in appropriate circumstances, may exercise discretion to decline an award of costs to a successful party in a mobility case, such a result will depend largely on the specific facts.

[93] Reati was a case about the quantum of the costs to be awarded, not entitlement to costs. Mitrow J. applied the overriding principle of reasonableness that resonates throughout the law of costs generally. In the result, he awarded $17,500 all-inclusive to the successful party, to be offset against any remaining equalization payment owing by the party to whom the costs were payable.

[94] I have also considered the decision of Reilly J. in Reid. In that case, an order was made after trial granting custody of a child to her mother, and permitting the mother and child to relocate to Fiji. After stating that he appreciates that the Family Law Rules mandate an award of costs for all issues, Reilly J. declined to direct a costs award related to the issues of custody because of what he considered to be the “rather special circumstances of the case”. Reilly J. specifically refused to designate the mother as the “winner” or the “more successful” party in the family litigation that had unfolded before him.

[95] Counsel for Sanjay refers to a commentary by the late Phil Epstein on a costs award made against the “losing” parent to pay costs made by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Stav v. Stav, 2012 BCCA 154. Mr. Epstein observed that it appeared no consideration was given as to whether principles on costs ought to be adjusted to reflect the fact that these are intractable cases. He made the comment that, given the uncertainty of the law, the parties should bear their own costs absent bad faith. I do not consider this commentary to have the currency it once had given the amendments to the Divorce Act and the implementation of section 16.1 for the governance of mobility cases in Canada today.

[96] FLR 24(1) does not provide an exception for relocation motions or cases from the presumption that the successful party shall be entitled to costs for a reason. In my view, that reason is that relocation as an issue on a motion or at trial should be treated as other important issues in a family case as subject to the same costs regime. Any adjustment to costs for the specific circumstatnces of a case can be made on the scale at which costs are awarded, or the amount of those costs. The factors for the court to consider when deciding the amount for costs are framed in language that provides this flexibility. While not assigning designations of “winner” or “loser” to any party, the presumption in FLR (1) favours the successful party in a step of a case based on the result achieved.

The applicant’s approach was reasonable

[97] In Stewart and Bernard v. Fuhgeh, 2020 ONSC 4850, Justice Shelston of this court made the following statement: “Family law litigants are responsible and accountable for the positions they take in the litigation.”

[98] I agree.

[99] The modern approach taken by the courts when awarding costs is to patrol against unreasonable litigation. There are simply too many cases, and too great a scarcity of judicial resources, for any party to take an unreasonable position on a motion without sanction. To conclude otherwise would result in too great an expense to a party seeking an Order setting out the rights and obligations of the respective parties in a family law case. To deal with the aftermath of a motion where one party was overly ambitious, and the other party was clearly successful without awarding costs that would indemnify the successful party in whole or in part would be to not deal with the case justly.

Costs should not include questioning

[100] Sanjay makes the point in his submissions that the questioning conducted by counsel for Beejal encompassed all issues, and was not just cross-examination on affidavits. He submits that costs incurred with respect to questioning would be addressed in the final adjudication of the matter, and not at an interim motion addressing parenting issues. Sanjay submits that it appears from the bill of costs that the respondent incurred approximately $9,660 plus HST for a total of $10,924.84 for questioning. Sanjay submits that the fees incurred for examinations should not to be considered for the costs on the motions for the temporary parenting orders.

[101] I agree with the applicant’s submission on the costs associated with questioning. I declined to award those costs as part of the motions for which I am setting costs, with those costs reserved to the trial judge.

Respondent’s post-separation conduct

[102] I do not consider any of Beejal’s conduct to detract from her entitlement to costs.

Scale

[103] Beejal is therefore awarded the costs of the two motions, including the preliminary objections, heard in July. The questions for me to determine are at what scale those costs should be awarded, and for what amount.

[104] Costs can be awarded at an elevated level where one party has served an offer to settle under FLR 18 and has obtained a result from the court that matched or exceeded the terms of the offer. Elevated costs are also available for conduct based reasons. One instance of this basis is in circumstances where the person against whom costs are claimed is shown to have acted in bad faith under FLR 24(8), which attracts costs at a full recovery level.

[105] I do not find any conduct based reason to award costs at a higher level than partial indemnity costs. Sanjay should not have to pay higher costs for bringing his motion or opposeing Beejal’s relocation motion because he believes his position with respect to parenting Shriya is in her best interests. There is no evidence that Sanjay’s belief in the rightness of his cause is anything but honestly held.

[106] I refer back to the decision of Mitrow J. in Reati with respect to his comments on the conduct of the unsuccessful party when deciding the scale costs to award. Mitrow J. found in that case that the mobility issue was of utmost importance to each party. He also found that each party behaved reasonably. He rejected the mother’s submissions that the father had acted unreasonably in pursuing the appeal, stating “litigants can pursue an appeal, and lose, without being branded as unreasonable.”

[107] I agree with that observation. The same reasoning applies to the motions heard with respect to the temporary parenting order I made for Shriya. The approach Sanjay took when pursuing the parenting motion and opposing Beejal’s motion to relocate with Shriya to London was not unreasonable to warrant a costs award on an elevated level.

[108] On reviewing Beejal’s two offers to settle, I note that in addition to the relocation and alternate parenting arrangement for Sanjay to exercise in the UK, most if not all of the other issues between the parties are proposed on a final basis. Those other issues were not before me on the motions, and remain to be adjudicated. Therefore, I consider that the offers to settle do not apply in this case to entitle the respondent to costs at an elevated level.

[109] I do not consider either of Beejal’s offers to settle to apply to the motions. They are offers of general application to settle all issues in the litigation but served for the purpose of settling the relocation issue. Saying little else about those offers to settle is saying enough so that the effect of those offers, if kept in place, preserves Beejal’s costs position in the event of a trial.

[110] The costs to which I have found Beejal is entitled are awarded on a partial indemnity basis.

Quantum

[111] I asked the parties to file their submissions on costs and any offers to settle so that I would have them to award costs after I had decided the motions. Beejal filed two offers to settle served under FLR 18. She submits that she has exceeded the terms of both of those offers to justify her claim for costs on a full recovery basis. Beejal requests those costs in the amount of $27,844, plus the cost of transcripts in the amount of $3,827.36 to the date of her offer to settle dated June 27, 2023. Beejal seeks to fully recover her costs in the amount of $8,277.25 since the date the offer was made, for a total of $39,940.61.

[112] The Court of Appeal in Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867 confirmed that the modern rules for costs that apply in family law cases are designed to reinforce three fundamental purposes: (1) to partially indemnify successful litigants; (2) to encourage settlement; and (3) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants. To those purposes the Court added a fourth principle to reflect the primary objective under FLR 2(2): to deal with cases justly. I must ensure that these objectives are met by the amount I set for the costs Sanjay should be ordered to pay.

[113] The amount for fees must be fair and reasonable. Setting the fee portion of a costs award requires balancing the various principles that apply when deciding what is fair and reasonable. The court must keep in mind the nature of the issues, the difficulty with proving facts on the balance of probabilities, and the proportionality of the amounts claimed for fees relative to the amounts at stake. See Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840.

[114] I must also consider the factors set out in FLR 24(12) when deciding the amount to award for costs. These factors are the guideposts for the court when exercising the discretion to award costs that are fair and reasonable.

[115] I am not discounting any costs that may be awarded to Beejal because of Sanjay’s claim that he will incur excessive costs to exercise parenting time for Shriya. I have been provided with no authority to consider any perceived or actual cost for exercising parenting time as a factor under the Family Law Rules or under the case law. There are elements of the parenting time granted to the applicant that will take place in Ontario, and that Beejal will incur costs to bring Shriya back to Ontario to her father for parenting time. The expense for Shriya’s return flight that Beejal must pay balances out the costs of parenting time in the UK that Sanjay may incur.

[116] I am therefore reducing the amount Beejal is claiming for costs to a partial indemnity level for a gross of $31,844 ($27,844 plus $4,000 of the $8,277 of the amount claimed for full recovery costs claimed under the offers). I further reduce that amount by the $10,924 I am exempting for the time based fees expended on examinations to a net base of approximately $20,920. The disbursement for the cost of examination transcripts in the amount for $3,800 must also be exempted at this time for consistency.

[117] Beejal Patel is awarded cost for the two motions fixed in the amount of $20,920, plus HST of $2,720 for a total of $23,640. I consider this amount to be fair, reasonable and proportionate. It is an amount sufficient to satisfy the purposes that costs in a family case are designed to serve.

Released: November 7, 2023 Emery J.

COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-105159-00

DATE: 2023 11 07

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

SANJAY PATEL

Applicant

and -

BEEJAL PATEL

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

Emery J.

Released: November 7, 2023

Patel v. Patel, 2023 ONSC 6307

Case Summary

REASONS FOR DECISION

Emery J.

Rulings on the objections

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Expert Witnesses

Financial Outcomes

Issues

Statutory Provisions 7

Legal Tests 3

Legislation 1