Michael Davies

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable with respect to treatment with psychotropic medication.

The Board had limited the appellant's cross-examination regarding the side effects of Clozapine, ruling it irrelevant because the respondent physician had stated he intended only to administer Abilify (Aripiprazole), not Clozapine.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, amending the Board's order to narrow the scope of authorized treatment to specifically "Aripiprazole" rather than all psychotropic medications, thereby curing the procedural fairness concern without requiring a new hearing.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding a Community Treatment Order (CTO).

The appellant argued the issuing physician failed to consult with the named health practitioners and that the substitute decision-maker had not signed the required undertaking when the CTO was issued.

The Superior Court found the Board's conclusion regarding consultation was reasonable.

However, the court held that the Board erred in law by not requiring the substitute decision-maker's undertaking to be in place before the CTO was issued.

The appeal was allowed and the CTO was quashed.

An appellant appealed a disposition decision of the Ontario Review Board dated June 7, 2016, which declined to modify the conditions of his detention order to provide broader community access privileges.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for second degree murder and was detained at a mental health facility.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the Board failed to consider readily available and relevant information from the original NCR hearing; and second, that the disposition was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable and that the NCR hearing information was not material to the narrow issue before the Board regarding whether the appellant's risk could be managed through modified detention terms.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated May 13, 2016.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the Board failed to apply the Winko test in concluding the appellant remains a significant threat to public safety and failed to order an absolute discharge; (2) the Board erred in failing to order a conditional discharge; and (3) conditions should be amended to allow community living in Brockville rather than North Bay due to North Bay's inability to receive the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first two grounds but allowed the appeal on the third ground, permitting the appellant to live in approved community accommodation in Brockville.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment imposed after a re-trial for dangerous driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

At his first trial, he had been sentenced to two years less a day.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to consider the fitness of the original sentence before imposing a greater sentence, as the facts at the second trial were essentially the same.

The appeal was allowed and the original sentence of 18 months for dangerous driving and six months consecutive for failing to remain was restored.

The appellant was convicted of firearms and drug trafficking offences following a police investigation involving wiretaps.

He appealed his convictions, arguing he should not have been named as an 'other known person' in the initial wiretap authorization, and appealed his sentence of five years and seven months on the basis of the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the low threshold for naming a known party in a wiretap authorization was met and the global sentence was reasonable.

The appellants, two bar managers, appealed their convictions and sentences for aggravated assault after punching a customer who had been ejected from the bar.

The victim suffered devastating head injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge reasonably identified the second assailant from video evidence and properly concluded the appellants acted in concert, making it unnecessary to determine which blow caused the injury.

The sentences of three and three-and-a-half years were upheld as fit.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for minor assaults and detained at a minimum forensic unit.

Despite his ongoing marijuana use, he had no history of aggression while detained.

The Ontario Review Board ordered his transfer to a medium security unit to restrict his access to drugs and help him develop insight.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the transfer unreasonable because it was more restrictive of his liberty and there was no evidence linking his marijuana use to a risk to public safety while detained.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a breath demand.

At trial, where he was self-represented, the trial judge found the breath demand was lawful but provided no analysis or findings of fact regarding the arresting officer's grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the principles from Sheppard, holding that the trial judge was required to provide clear reasons explaining why the officer had reasonable and probable grounds on both a subjective and objective basis.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing that his arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds once evidence obtained from an illegal police entry into a condominium was excluded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the totality of the remaining circumstances provided sufficient grounds for the arrest.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence and quashed the two-year probation order, as the Crown conceded it was illegal under s. 731(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of assault causing bodily harm relating to his two-month-old infant, who suffered 12 rib fractures on two separate occasions.

The appellant argued the first verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge misapplied the W. (D.) principles, and that the second verdict involved an error in applying the test for implied consent during an attempt to administer CPR.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings reasonable, the W. (D.) principles properly applied, and that the force used during the alleged CPR was excessive, vitiating any defence of implied consent.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to one year imprisonment and two years' probation.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed because he expected a 45-day sentence based on his counsel's advice.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing insufficient weight was given to his traumatic brain injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the plea was valid as the appellant knew he faced a custodial sentence, and the sentencing judge had properly considered his medical condition as a mitigating factor.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference against a 13-year-old complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting a hearsay statement from the complainant's sister and in accepting the mother's evidence regarding a change in the sisters' relationship.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay statement, the curative proviso applied because the trial judge explicitly stated he would have reached the same conclusion without it.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's acceptance of the mother's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following convictions for trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of proceeds of crime, the accused brought a post‑trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis of police entrapment and also renewed an application for further disclosure regarding a confidential informant.

The court considered whether a police “cold call” offering an opportunity to sell drugs occurred before the officer had reasonable suspicion that the accused was engaged in drug trafficking.

The court held that the exchange between the undercover officer and the accused during the initial call gave rise to reasonable suspicion before any offer to purchase drugs was made.

The accused therefore failed to establish entrapment or a breach of s. 7 of the Charter.

The renewed disclosure request relating to confidential informant information was also dismissed as an impermissible fishing expedition into privileged material.

The appellant, a deaf man with a lengthy record of sexual offences, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in finding there was no reasonable possibility of eventually controlling his risk in the community.

The Court of Appeal upheld the indeterminate sentence, finding the sentencing judge reasonably concluded that the appellant's history of medication non-compliance and need for concurrent, specialized treatments meant his risk could not be managed outside a secure setting.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

Following a deterioration in his mental state, he was readmitted to a secure forensic assessment unit.

The Ontario Review Board held a restriction of liberty hearing and found that his continued detention without usual privileges violated his s. 7 Charter rights, ordering the hospital to pay costs under s. 24(1).

The Court of Appeal allowed the hospital's appeal, holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the detention met the least onerous and least restrictive standard, and the Board lacked jurisdiction to award costs as a Charter remedy.

The appellant appealed his convictions arising from an alleged domestic assault.

At trial, the judge sought corroboration for the complainant's testimony and relied on the opinion evidence of an investigating police officer regarding the complainant's demeanour and injuries, as well as the complainant's prior consistent statements to her daughter and police.

The Court of Appeal held that the officer's evidence improperly ventured into expert opinion and was used to shore up the complainant's credibility.

Furthermore, the prior consistent statements were improperly used for their truth.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual touching involving a child complainant over a five-year period.

He was sentenced to nine and three-quarter years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence exceeded the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the appellant's position of trust, his related criminal record, and the profound impact on the complainant.

The appellants appealed their convictions for first and second degree murder arising from a firebombing that killed two children.

The Crown's theory was that the primary appellant orchestrated the arson to silence the children's mother, who had accused him of sexual assault, and hired the other appellants to execute the plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's admission of bad character evidence, Vetrovec caution regarding an unsavoury witness, instructions on unlawful object murder, or instructions on post-offence conduct.

The court also upheld the 23-year parole ineligibility period for the appellant convicted of second degree murder.

The appellant, a dual-status offender found not criminally responsible (NCR) and serving two life sentences for sexual offences, appealed conditions imposed by the Ontario Review Board.

The Board ordered his continued detention at a secure forensic psychiatric facility with conditions restricting his unmonitored use of email and requiring staff escorts for community access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the conditions were reasonable and did not violate the appellant's section 8 Charter rights or the Mental Health Act, as an NCR detainee has a significantly diminished expectation of privacy in a secure institutional setting.