Melvyn Lloyd Solmon

The appellant sued its former lawyer for negligence after he failed to appeal a bankruptcy trustee's disallowance of its secured claim.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the bankrupt had no rights in the disputed funds, meaning the appellant's security interest never attached and it suffered no damages.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred and raised a new 'loss of chance' argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings on attachment and refusing to entertain the new loss of chance argument due to unfairness and lack of evidentiary foundation.

The defendants moved to settle the order following a previous decision striking portions of the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The court addressed the sealing of motion materials and the impact of the Apology Act, 2009 on the pleadings.

The court ordered the contested documents sealed from the public file and confirmed that references to an apology in the statement of claim must be struck, as the Apology Act prevents such statements from being used to establish liability.

Lawyers under investigation by their professional regulator sought constitutional declarations and procedural protections concerning potential disclosure of client confidential information during disciplinary proceedings.

They argued provisions of the governing statute violated ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter by failing to adequately protect solicitor‑client privilege and requested public interest standing to advance broader constitutional relief.

The court held the application was premature because the administrative process before the regulator’s tribunal had not yet been completed.

The tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the constitutional arguments and grant most requested remedies, with courts reviewing the matter only after the administrative process concluded.

The application was dismissed and public interest standing refused.

The moving parties, comprising approximately 175 lenders, brought a motion to reopen a previously dismissed motion for leave to appeal.

The original motion for leave was brought by the appellants regarding an Ontario Securities Commission decision that found they traded securities without registration and ordered disgorgement.

The lenders argued they were not given notice of the leave motion and had a right to be heard on the disgorgement remedy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to reopen, finding the lenders were not 'affected' by the order dismissing leave under rule 27.14, as the regulatory proceedings were not civil proceedings designed to compensate them directly.

The appellant appealed an order granting a stay of proceedings pending arbitration.

The parties had a Services Agreement with an arbitration clause and a survival clause that did not explicitly list the arbitration clause.

After the respondent terminated the agreement, the appellant sued for breach of contract and torts, and sought a declaration that the arbitration clause did not apply.

The motion judge stayed the proceedings, finding it arguable whether the arbitration clause survived, and referred the jurisdictional issue to the arbitrator under the competence-competence principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the competence-competence principle or his decision to defer the jurisdictional question to the arbitrator.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed the Chief Justice's summary dismissal of his complaint against a Case Management Master.

The appellant alleged the Master lacked integrity and impartiality, and that the Chief Justice exceeded her jurisdiction and denied him procedural fairness by asking the Master for comments without disclosing them or referring the matter to a committee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Chief Justice had clear authority under s. 86.2(2) of the Courts of Justice Act to dispose of groundless complaints summarily and was not precluded from seeking the Master's comments.

The defendants brought a motion under rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to strike or expunge large portions of a statement of claim arising from a wrongful dismissal dispute between a lawyer and her former employer.

The court reviewed extensive jurisprudence on the proper function of pleadings, emphasizing that pleadings must contain concise statements of material facts rather than evidence, argument, or scandalous allegations.

Applying proportionality and the rules of pleading, the court struck numerous paragraphs and subparagraphs of the statement of claim that were found to contain evidentiary detail, inflammatory allegations, or unnecessary particulars more appropriately addressed through discovery or particulars.

Certain causes of action, including negligent infliction of nervous shock and defamation, were struck with leave to amend due to insufficient particulars.

The plaintiff was granted leave to deliver a fresh amended statement of claim, and the defendants were permitted to file a fresh amended statement of defence.

The applicants moved for leave to appeal a costs order to the Divisional Court.

The underlying order dismissed a motion to set aside a $1.2 million judgment and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the respondent, but denied the applicants' request for costs payable personally by the respondent's lawyer.

The court held that the costs order against the non-party lawyer was part of the final judgment and could not be severed.

Therefore, the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as appeals of final orders over the monetary limit lie to the Court of Appeal.

Investors in real estate development projects brought an oppression application under ss. 161 and 248 of the Business Corporations Act seeking, among other relief, the appointment of an inspector to investigate the use of investor funds.

The evidence showed project funds had been commingled in a separate entity rather than segregated as investors had been led to expect, financial disclosure was deficient, audited financial statements were unavailable, and a dividend was withheld from one preferred shareholder.

The court held that these circumstances raised a prima facie case that reasonable security holder expectations had been defeated and that oppressive conduct may have occurred.

The court ordered the appointment of a court‑appointed inspector and granted additional relief including payment of an unpaid dividend, redemption of preferred shares, and production of a shareholder list.

Appeal from a master's ruling on a refusals motion arising during examinations conducted under rule 39.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in connection with a motion for particulars.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants waived solicitor‑client privilege over their entire litigation file by filing an affidavit from counsel stating that the defendants lacked knowledge necessary to plead.

The court held that filing a solicitor’s affidavit results only in a limited waiver of privilege confined to matters directly placed in issue by the affidavit.

Solicitor‑client privilege remains fundamental and must be interpreted narrowly when assessing waiver.

The master correctly concluded that only documents connected to the affidavit’s subject matter were producible and that broader disclosure of the law firm’s entire file was not required.

The appellants, a solicitor and his law firm, appealed a summary judgment finding them liable for professional negligence in a commercial real estate transaction.

The respondent purchasers had relied on the solicitor's advice that a minor title issue regarding a city-owned laneway would be covered by title insurance.

When the respondents later attempted to sell the property, they discovered the city required $106,000 for the laneway and their title insurance claim was denied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the limitation period did not begin until the title insurance claim was denied, and that expert evidence was not required to establish the standard of care given the clear failure to warn.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's decision to grant summary judgment to the respondents despite the lack of a cross-motion, citing the principle of proportionality.

The applicant commenced an action and an application following the termination of a services agreement, arguing the arbitration clause did not survive termination.

The respondent moved to stay the proceedings in favour of arbitration.

The court applied the competence-competence principle, finding it was arguable that the dispute fell within the arbitration clause and that the clause survived termination.

The court granted the motion to stay the action against the corporate respondent under the International Commercial Arbitration Act, and stayed the action against the individual defendants under the Courts of Justice Act, leaving the jurisdictional challenges to be determined by the arbitral tribunal.

The appellants brought two companion libel actions arising from an article in a corporate newsletter that was posted on a website.

The respondents, Shaw Satellite G.P. and Bell Expressvu Limited Partnership, successfully moved for summary judgment, and the actions against them were dismissed.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motions judge erred by failing to draw an adverse inference from refusals given on cross-examinations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding it was open to the motions judge to decline to draw an adverse inference based on the record.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to enforce a settlement agreement, and alternatively, leave to appeal the costs order.

The motion judge had found that there were material issues of fact regarding whether the applicant had sustained the alleged investment losses, which was a condition of the settlement.

The Divisional Court held there was no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and no conflicting decisions on principle.

The application for leave to appeal both the substantive order and the costs order was dismissed.

Following dismissal of a discovery motion seeking answers to refused questions on examinations related to a motion for particulars, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The successful defendants sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $13,000, while the plaintiff argued for a significantly reduced amount.

Applying the discretionary framework under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized proportionality and fairness.

Considering the extensive materials, length of the hearing, and the importance of the issues, the court found the defendants largely entitled to their claimed costs but applied a modest reduction for unspecified time responding to undertakings.

Costs were fixed at $12,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff brought a refusals motion seeking answers to numerous questions refused on examinations conducted in connection with a pending motion for particulars in a professional negligence and breach of contract action against former lawyers.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants’ affidavit asserting lack of knowledge regarding certain particulars waived solicitor-client privilege over the defendants’ files and related information.

The court held that any waiver of privilege was limited to the knowledge addressed in the affidavit at the time it was sworn and did not extend to the entirety of counsel’s files.

The requested questions and document production exceeded the scope of the limited waiver and intruded upon solicitor-client privilege.

The court dismissed the refusals motion and confirmed the propriety of the defendants’ redactions and document production.

The successful plaintiffs sought recovery of expert witness disbursements following a summary judgment decision in their favour.

The parties agreed on partial indemnity costs of $25,000 plus HST, leaving only the amount recoverable for the plaintiffs’ expert report in dispute.

The court considered the reasonableness of the expert’s hourly rate and time spent, noting that the expert evidence had been largely unnecessary and that costs awards must be fair and reasonable under rule 57.01(1).

Applying principles governing recovery of expert fees similar to those for counsel fees, the court reduced the claimed expert disbursement from $13,000 to $9,000 plus HST.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the dismissal of their summary judgment motion in a solicitor negligence action.

The motion judge had found that the limitation period began to run from the date the plaintiffs' title insurance coverage was denied, rather than the date the plaintiffs learned the City was demanding payment for conveying lands.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the issue raised questions about the application of limitation period case law in the context of insurance claims that warranted appellate review, particularly as a related appeal was already proceeding to the Court of Appeal.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiffs' pleadings.

They argued the motion judge erred by failing to apply the doctrine of merger to strike the conspiracy claims and by applying the wrong test to the fraudulent misrepresentation claims.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the motion judge correctly declined to apply the doctrine of merger at the pleadings stage and correctly applied the test for pleading fraud.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal and for a stay of an order removing her as executor and requiring her to vacate an estate property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding it was not properly before the court because the underlying orders were final.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties.