McIntyre

The appellants appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal regarding the jurisdiction of the Canadian Transport Commission to authorize the abandonment of railway tracks.

Pursuant to section 75 of the Supreme Court Act, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal on consent, set aside the Federal Court of Appeal's decision, and restored the decision of the Railway Transport Committee.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences involving three complainants, raising issues regarding delays in reporting the alleged incidents.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, finding that the trial judge made no error in law.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding the interpretation of a contract for the provision of hydro-electric energy.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as moot in light of its concurrent judgment in Newfoundland (Attorney General) v. Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp.

The Attorney General of Newfoundland appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of Clause 2(e) of Part I of a statutory lease executed pursuant to the Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation Limited (Lease) Act, 1961.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that both the Trial Division and the Court of Appeal had arrived at the correct construction of the clause, albeit by different routes.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision upholding the validity of an insured's assignment of a cause of action against the insurer for failing to properly defend an action.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, adopting the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside his acquittal.

He argued that evidence should be excluded under s. 24 of the Charter because he was not informed of his right to retain and instruct counsel upon his initial detention, breaching s. 10(b).

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that although there was a breach upon initial detention, the evidence was obtained voluntarily after he was informed of his right to counsel.

Therefore, the evidence was not obtained in a manner that infringed a Charter right and should not be excluded.

Criminal appeal addressing whether cross-examination of an accused on prior convictions under s. 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act infringes the right to a fair hearing under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The majority held the provision is constitutionally valid because prior convictions are admissible on credibility, do not reverse the burden of proof, and can be controlled by limiting instructions, while also recognizing a judicial discretion to exclude such evidence in unusual cases where fairness would be undermined.

On the facts, the majority found no unfairness in admitting the accused's prior non-capital murder conviction given the centrality of credibility and the defence attack on the criminal records of Crown witnesses.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, with a dissent concluding the prior murder conviction should have been excluded and a new trial ordered.

The Minister of Health and Community Services appealed a decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal that set aside a guardianship order and substituted a custody order for two children in protective care.

The Court of Appeal had held that the Minister must prove parental moral turpitude and name specific adoptive parents to obtain a guardianship order.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the guardianship order, holding that the sole criterion under the Family Services Act is the best interests of the child.

The Court found that requiring proof of moral turpitude or the naming of specific adoptive parents contradicts the language and spirit of the Act.

The respondent's trial was discontinued due to exceptional publicity from statements made in the National Assembly regarding the defence and a witness's credibility.

Before a new trial date was set, the respondent successfully moved for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a stay of proceedings was premature as the possibility of selecting an impartial jury could only be determined at the jury selection stage.

The appellant was convicted under the New Brunswick Motor Vehicle Act for failing to yield the right-of-way while driving on an Indian reserve.

He appealed, arguing that he could only be charged under the federal Indian Reserve Traffic Regulations.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that provincial motor vehicle laws of general application apply ex proprio vigore on Indian reserves in the absence of conflicting federal legislation.

The Court found no conflict between the provincial Act and the federal regulations, as the federal regulations merely incorporated provincial laws by reference without demonstrating an intent to exclusively cover the field.

The appellant was charged with counselling theft and fraud after offering a hotel security guard money to obtain confidential information containing the names and addresses of hotel employees for a union.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that confidential information does not qualify as property for the purposes of the theft provisions in the Criminal Code, as it cannot be taken or converted in a manner that deprives the owner.

The Court also held that the conduct did not amount to fraud, as the hotel had no intention of dealing commercially with the information and thus faced no risk of economic deprivation.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittals restored.

The appellant was charged with unlawful possession of house-breaking instruments contrary to s. 309(1) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge quashed the indictment, finding the section violated the presumption of innocence in s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal set aside the order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 309(1) does not create a reverse onus and does not violate s. 11(d) of the Charter, as the Crown must prove all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was acquitted of unlawfully practising medicine.

The respondent appealed the acquittal by way of trial de novo under section 75 of the Summary Convictions Act.

The appellant argued that this procedure violated his right against double jeopardy under section 11(h) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an appeal by way of trial de novo by a prosecutor from an acquittal is essentially a new trial and violates section 11(h).

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.

The appellants appealed their convictions for income tax evasion, arguing that evidence obtained prior to the enactment of the Charter under a provision of the Income Tax Act later found to be unconstitutional should be excluded.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Ontario Court of Appeal that the Charter does not apply retrospectively to searches and seizures conducted before it came into force.

The appellant appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Applying the principles from Collins, Sieben, and Hamill, the Court found no error in the lower court's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's finding under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed from the bench.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings entered by the trial judge and ordered a new trial.

The stay had been entered based on allegations that the Crown's conduct at trial infringed the appellants' rights to fundamental justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's decision.

The appellant's first two trials on a charge of criminal negligence causing death ended with hung juries.

The trial judge stayed a third trial on the grounds that it would constitute an abuse of process and a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while prosecutorial misconduct is not an essential element of abuse of process, a third trial in these circumstances does not violate the community's sense of fair play and decency.

The appellant was stopped at random by a police officer during a spot check.

The officer demanded a breath sample after detecting alcohol, which the appellant refused.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the random stop and the demand for his licence and insurance.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the random stop constituted arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter, it was a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under section 1 due to the pressing need to combat impaired driving.

The Court also found that the demand for documents did not violate section 8 as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such documents.

The appellant was stopped by a police officer who detected an odour of alcohol and demanded a breath sample for a roadside screening device.

The appellant refused and was charged with failing to comply with a roadside demand.

He argued his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a roadside breath demand constitutes a detention under s. 10 of the Charter, triggering the right to counsel.

However, the Court concluded that the limitation on the right to counsel implied by the requirement to provide a sample 'forthwith' is a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter, given the importance of deterring impaired driving.

The appellant appealed a conviction for conspiracy to possess a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, challenging the validity of a wiretap authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the authorization adequately described the manner of interception in accordance with the Criminal Code, as established in the Wiretap Reference and Lyons v. The Queen.