Matthew Philip Tunley

The appellants appealed a procedural decision of the Ontario Energy Board regarding their application to declare bypass compensation provisions of the Transmission System Code ultra vires.

The Board had determined the application was not a standalone application but was linked to an earlier Leave to Construct decision, and gave the appellants three procedural options to proceed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was interlocutory and discretionary, and raised no true question of law or jurisdiction.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Energy Board's Demand Side Management guidelines, arguing they were improperly adopted without a hearing and were binding on parties.

The Board, supported by intervenors, brought a motion to quash the application as moot.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the guidelines were not binding, as evidenced by subsequent rate hearings where the Board departed from them and an affidavit from Board counsel.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application, noting the applicant could challenge the guidelines in future rate proceedings.

The Ontario Energy Board brought a motion to quash two summonses issued by the appellant to a Board member and the Board's external counsel.

The appellant sought to examine them in aid of a motion to adduce fresh evidence on appeal, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias because the external counsel's firm had represented the appellant's competitors and was a member of an industry association.

The Divisional Court quashed both summonses, finding that the proposed lines of inquiry were irrelevant to the objective test for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court also analyzed testimonial immunity under s. 10 of the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998, deliberative secrecy, and solicitor-client privilege, finding multiple additional grounds to quash the Board member's summons and partial grounds to quash the external counsel's summons.

The appellant voluntarily agreed to appear on the reality television show Dragons' Den and signed a consent agreement that precluded the two actions he subsequently commenced.

The appellant argued that it would be unconscionable to enforce the consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was given ample time to read the consent, did not ask for more time, and signed it without expressing any concern, making its enforcement not unconscionable.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement regarding the costs of an appeal and a motion in the Superior Court.

The court ordered that the appellant, the Attorney General of Canada, be awarded costs in the cause in both courts, fixed at a total amount of $35,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The plaintiffs sued Canada in the Superior Court of Justice, alleging complicity in their torture by foreign governments and Charter violations.

Canada redacted disclosed documents under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act, claiming privilege on national security grounds, and applied to the Federal Court to confirm the prohibition on disclosure.

The plaintiffs moved in the Superior Court for unredacted production, arguing s. 38 unconstitutionally deprived the Superior Court of its core jurisdiction under s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 38 is constitutionally valid at the pre-trial stage because pre-trial discovery against the Crown did not exist at Confederation, and set aside the motion judge's declaration regarding s. 38's validity at trial as premature.

The applicant sought an adjournment of its judicial review application pending the Ontario Energy Board's reconsideration of an earlier decision regarding the applicant's failure to sign an assignment document.

The Divisional Court granted the adjournment, noting that the outcome of the reconsideration could significantly impact the judicial review application.

Costs of $600 each were awarded to the intervenors.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding a claim to Casino Rama profits, the successful respondents sought costs on a full or substantial indemnity scale, citing the appellant's conduct and shifting theories.

The Court of Appeal declined to award elevated costs, finding the appellant's conduct was not reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $250,000 for the Chiefs of Ontario and OFNLP, and $75,000 for Ontario.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering the repayment of a shareholder's loan.

The trial judge found that the loan, which had no fixed term, was payable within a reasonable period of time after a demand for payment was made.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's conclusion was a finding of fact supported by the evidence, including the directors' intentions, financial statements, and the hybrid character of the loan.

A cross-appeal regarding the date from which pre-judgment interest runs was also dismissed.

The Chippewas of Mnjikaning First Nation (MFN) appealed the dismissal of its action claiming a 35% share of net profits from Casino Rama.

MFN argued that its selection as the host site for the casino created a binding contract with Ontario based on its submitted proposal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the site selection process did not constitute a binding tender or RFP process for revenue sharing, and that revenue sharing was intended to be negotiated separately among all First Nations.

The Court also rejected MFN's arguments regarding breach of fiduciary duty, misapprehension of the Aboriginal context, and reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the trial judge's interventions.

The appellants brought an action in the Superior Court claiming they were exempt from paying GST on certain financial services under the Excise Tax Act.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the Tax Court of Canada had exclusive jurisdiction.

On appeal, the appellants argued the Superior Court had constitutional or concurrent jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the claim was not constitutional in nature and that the Tax Court of Canada Act, read with the Excise Tax Act, clearly gave the Tax Court exclusive jurisdiction over GST rebate claims.

The appellant closed an access road leading to the respondents' landlocked cottage properties after the respondents refused to pay an increased annual user fee.

The appellant argued it could close the road without a court order under the Road Access Act because the respondents had 'alternate road access' via an unopened municipal road allowance or by paying the requested fee for the existing road.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that 'alternate road access' requires an existing, different road, and neither an unopened road allowance nor the same road subject to a fee qualifies.

The appellants appealed two decisions of the Ontario Energy Board granting leave to construct a natural gas pipeline to the proposed Greenfield Energy Centre.

The appellants argued the Board erred by limiting its public interest consideration to the pipeline itself, rather than considering the environmental and socio-economic effects of the generating station and the resulting closure of a coal-fired plant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly limited its jurisdiction to the specific project before it and correctly deferred to the Ministry of the Environment on the assessment of the plant.

The Ministry of Correctional Services appealed an order granting a requester's counsel access to records subject to a claim of solicitor-client privilege for the purpose of arguing a judicial review application under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that records subject to a claim of solicitor-client privilege may only be disclosed where 'absolutely necessary'.

The Court found no such absolute necessity in this case.

The Court also held that while the procedural provisions of the Access Act prohibiting disclosure apply to the Commissioner, courts on judicial review are governed by their own procedural rules but must adopt procedures to protect confidentiality until a substantive decision is made.

The appellant, Toronto Hydro, appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed an Ontario Energy Board (OEB) ruling.

The OEB had found an implied agreement existed between Toronto Hydro and the respondent developer prior to a statutory transition date, allowing Toronto Hydro to charge higher pre-transition rates for an electricity connection.

The Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court erred in finding the OEB's decision unreasonable.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the OEB's reliance on industry practice and the parties' relationship was a tenable line of analysis.

The appeal was allowed and the OEB decision reinstated.

The applicant developer sought judicial review of an Ontario Energy Board (OEB) decision dismissing its complaint against Toronto Hydro.

The applicant argued that its subdivision project was governed by a new competitive regime for electrical distribution systems, while Toronto Hydro insisted the old monopolistic rules applied.

The OEB found that an implied agreement existed prior to November 1, 2000, exempting the project from the new rules.

The Divisional Court held that the OEB did not breach procedural fairness by declining to hold a hearing.

However, applying a reasonableness standard of review, the Court found the OEB's conclusion of an implied agreement prior to November 1, 2000, was unreasonable and an error of law, given that the parties had executed a written connection agreement expressly dated November 8, 2000.

The OEB's decision was quashed and remitted for further consideration.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Energy Board decision finding that a subdivision project was subject to an agreement with Toronto Hydro prior to November 1, 2000, thereby exempting it from new competition rules.

In dissenting reasons, the judge applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determined the standard of review was reasonableness, and concluded the OEB's interpretation of 'subject to an agreement' was reasonable given the transitional context and prior design agreements.

The dissenting judge would have dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed the judgment of Justice Swinton.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to comment on the standard of review and agreeing with the reasons of the motion judge which adequately dealt with the grounds of appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiffs claimed damages for historical sexual assaults against multiple defendants.

The plaintiffs entered into Pierringer settlement agreements with all defendants except three, and the action against the settling defendants was dismissed.

The remaining active defendant, Dr. Kerr, moved to set aside the dismissal order, arguing the trial judge might lack jurisdiction to apportion fault to the settling defendants under s. 1 of the Negligence Act.

The motions judge held the court lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court has jurisdiction to determine the degree of fault of the settling defendants, even though they will not be parties at trial, as this avoids prejudice to the non-settling defendants and promotes the public interest in settlement.

The Crown appealed a motions judge's decision refusing leave to amend its statement of defence and counterclaim in a breach of contract action regarding a software development project.

The Crown sought to add claims for negligent misrepresentation, professional negligence, and conspiracy against the plaintiff, and to add two related foreign corporate entities as defendants by counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge erred in concluding the tort claims were barred by the contract's entire agreement clause and in applying a 'presumptive refusal' rather than 'presumptive approval' test for amending pleadings.