Matthew Peter Sammon

The Buyer (Mt.

Pleasant Roehampton Developments Limited) brought an application seeking a declaration that an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) was in full force and an order for specific performance.

The Vendor (Friedrich Christof Haussmann) brought a cross-application seeking a declaration that the APS was null and void and removal of a caution registered against title.

The central dispute concerned the interpretation of the "Investigation Period" deadline in the APS, with the Buyer arguing for March 31, 2017, and the Vendor for March 29, 2017.

The court found the plain wording of the APS established the deadline as March 29, 2017, and that the Buyer failed to waive conditions by that date, rendering the APS null and void.

The Buyer's alternative arguments of estoppel by convention and mutual mistake were rejected due to a lack of shared assumption or clear misrepresentation.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking a temporary 50-50 parenting regime for his three young daughters.

The applicant mother opposed, arguing the status quo was working and a parenting assessment did not constitute a material change.

The court dismissed the father's motion for 50-50 parenting, finding no compelling reason to alter the existing arrangement and that the assessor's observations did not amount to a material change of circumstances.

However, the court did address summer access, adopting a modified version of the mother's proposed schedule and implementing a brief modified 3-2-2 regime for the father starting in late August to allow him to demonstrate its viability before the scheduled trial.

The plaintiff sued the estate of a deceased priest and a Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation for damages arising from sexual assault.

The corporation cross-claimed against the estate for contribution and indemnity.

The motion judge applied section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002, finding the two-year limitation period ran from service of the plaintiff's claim on the corporation.

The estate appealed, arguing section 38(3) of the Trustee Act applied, with the limitation period running from the priest's death.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 38(3) of the Trustee Act applies to cross-claims and prevails over section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002 by virtue of section 19(4) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The cross-claim was statute-barred.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment against the defendants for improper use of a power of attorney.

The court found that issue estoppel applied based on previous trial findings that a defendant had misused the power of attorney for personal gain without the plaintiff's permission.

The plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages plus prejudgment interest.

The claim for punitive damages was denied, as the amount fell within Small Claims Court jurisdiction and a defendant had modest financial resources and recently declared bankruptcy.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff, balancing the defendant's breach of trust with the plaintiff's choice to bring the action in Superior Court despite the monetary amount.

The applicant sought judicial review of a procedural ruling made by its Discipline Committee mid-hearing.

The Committee had ruled that the applicant must comply with the notice and consent requirements of s. 35 of the Mental Health Act before tendering psychiatric records as evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify fragmenting the ongoing administrative proceeding.

The plaintiff succeeded in a defamation action arising from a sustained anonymous internet campaign accusing him, an accountant, of tax fraud, theft, and dishonesty.

The court found the principal individual defendant admitted authoring the campaign with malice, and held the second individual defendant and the corporate defendant jointly and severally liable based on concerted action and authorized corporate involvement.

The court awarded substantial general, aggravated, and punitive damages, emphasizing the uniquely pervasive and harmful nature of online defamation and the defendants’ misuse of the campaign as leverage in parallel business litigation.

Claims relating to assault and destruction of property were dismissed for lack of proof on a balance of probabilities, and no separate finding was made on conspiracy because no additional damages would follow.

This medical malpractice action concerned whether Dr. Henry Fairley breached the standard of care by performing a hysterectomy on Francine Breton in 2010, five years after a previous subtotal hysterectomy by another doctor.

The plaintiff alleged the surgery was unnecessary and resulted in a bladder injury.

The court found that Dr. Fairley had a reasonable clinical basis to proceed with the surgery, based on the plaintiff's persistent symptoms, imaging reports suggesting residual uterine tissue, and the previous pathology report confirming adenomyosis.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action, concluding that Dr. Fairley met the standard of care.

Following reasons for judgment in a family law application determining the valuation date for equalization and dismissing a spousal support claim, the successful party sought full indemnity costs.

The court applied the presumption under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules that the successful party is entitled to costs but considered the relevant factors under Rule 24(11).

Although counsel argued that full indemnity costs were appropriate due to discounted legal rates, the court relied on appellate authority cautioning against awarding full indemnity where the result would effectively replicate actual costs.

The court concluded that partial indemnity costs were appropriate and reduced the claimed amount by 30 percent.

Costs were awarded in the amount of $17,305 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of an interim suspension order imposed by the College's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee following allegations of sexual abuse and subsequent breaches of a prior monitoring order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the procedural fairness complaints were premature and should be raised before the Discipline Committee.

The Court also rejected the applicant's statutory interpretation argument that the entire 58-member committee was required to issue the order, and concluded that the suspension was reasonable given the applicant's demonstrated inability to comply with the monitoring order.

The applicant sought an uncontested divorce and asserted that the parties separated in 1999, arguing that the respondent’s claims for equalization and spousal support were statute‑barred.

The respondent contended the parties only legally separated in 2014 and sought retroactive and ongoing spousal support, equalization of net family property, and confirmation that funds she withdrew using a power of attorney were a gift.

The court applied the indicia of separation and found that the spouses had lived separate and apart since November 1999 despite maintaining friendly contact and ongoing voluntary financial assistance.

Any equalization claim was therefore statute‑barred, and the voluntary support provided over many years exceeded what would have been payable under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The court also found that the withdrawal of $22,000 using the power of attorney was not a gift.

The appellant employee deleted and took confidential information upon the breakdown of her employment.

The respondent employer sued and moved for an injunction.

The parties negotiated a settlement, but a dispute arose over whether the agreement included a full forensic sweep of the appellant's devices.

The respondent insisted on the sweep and adjourned its injunction motion, while the appellant claimed the respondent had repudiated the settlement.

The motion judge found a binding settlement without the forensic sweep term and held the respondent had not repudiated it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the respondent's insistence on the term and its steps to preserve the status quo via the injunction did not objectively evince an intention not to be bound by the settlement agreement.

This costs endorsement followed a contested motion in an estate administration dispute concerning access to trust fund accounting records and other relief.

The moving party succeeded on only one disclosure-related issue and failed on several others, while the responding estate trustee opposed broader relief.

Applying the Rule 57.01 costs factors and exercising broad discretion, the court declined to order personal costs against the respondent.

Instead, it ordered that each side recover $5,000 from the trust fund and otherwise bear its own costs.

The applicants sought a permanent injunction in a long-running neighbour dispute concerning interference with a right of way and lands acquired through prescriptive rights.

The court found that the applicants had acquired rights to the disputed portion formerly enclosed by a hedge, and that the responding neighbour had unlawfully removed the hedge and engaged in persistent harassing conduct.

A permanent injunction was granted restraining interference with the applicants' use and enjoyment of the disputed lands and further restraining harassment or annoyance.

The court also awarded substantial indemnity costs after finding self-help conduct, persistent denial of entitlement, and sanctionable behaviour that increased the applicants' legal costs.

The applicant sought to terminate a testamentary trust created by his grandfather, remove his uncle as estate trustee, compel a passing of accounts, and obtain a declaration of his right to use the estate's farm property.

The court found that the applicant held only a contingent interest in the trust fund and a vested future interest in the farm property, which did not grant him a present right to possession or use.

The court dismissed the requests to terminate the trust, remove the trustee, and compel a formal passing of accounts, but ordered the respondent to provide the applicant with copies of the existing accounting records.

The plaintiff employer brought a motion under Rule 49.09(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking judgment enforcing a settlement allegedly reached through email exchanges with a former employee.

The dispute concerned whether the parties had agreed to a settlement and, if so, the scope of an IT consultant’s work to delete and certify the destruction of confidential electronic information taken by the employee prior to departure.

The court held that the parties had reached a binding settlement through their email correspondence, despite subsequent disagreement when counsel attempted to draft formal minutes of settlement.

Interpreting the emails objectively, the court concluded the parties had agreed to the employee’s proposed process for wiping devices, but using the employer’s chosen IT consultant at the employee’s cost.

The employer’s later insistence on a broader “full sweep” did not amount to repudiation of the settlement.

Judgment was granted enforcing the settlement on the terms determined by the court.

A physician applied under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for remedies following an unlawful police search of his home computer that uncovered child pornography.

The criminal charges were withdrawn due to an invalid search warrant, but the physician’s professional regulator obtained a copy of the hard drive and commenced disciplinary proceedings.

The applicant sought orders requiring destruction of the copied hard drive and prohibiting the regulator from relying on the evidence in the discipline hearing.

The court assumed serious Charter breaches, including possible bad faith by police, but held that neither destruction nor prohibition was appropriate or just in the circumstances.

The Discipline Committee was best positioned to determine the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2) in the administrative proceeding.

Following the discontinuance of a civil action shortly before trial, the defendants sought directions regarding the management and trial of their remaining counterclaims.

The court noted that trial preparation had been substantially completed when the plaintiff discontinued the action.

In the interests of justice and efficiency, the court established a timetable for the amendment of pleadings, completion of documentary discovery and examinations for discovery, a pre-trial conference, and a scheduled trial date.

The court also adjusted the timelines under the Rules of Civil Procedure to accommodate the ordered schedule.

Following earlier reasons dismissing most applicants’ requests for interim advancement of legal expenses from a corporation, the court addressed the costs of the applications.

The respondent corporation sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $559,000 or alternatively partial indemnity costs, while the applicants argued that costs should remain in the cause of the underlying indemnity issue.

The court held that although the respondent was largely successful, payment of costs should be contingent on the outcome of the trial determining entitlement to indemnity.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs of $25,000 for a related motion and $165,000 for the applications, subject to specific allocations among applicants and exceptions for one successful applicant and another who withdrew participation.

The appellant former directors and officers of Look Communications Inc. sought advance funding for their legal costs to defend an action brought against them by the corporation for breach of fiduciary duty.

The corporation resisted the claims under s. 124(4) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, arguing the appellants had not acted in good faith.

The application judge refused advance funding, finding the corporation had established a strong prima facie case of bad faith regarding equity cancellation payments and legal retainers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that s. 124(4) applies to actions brought by the corporation and that the strong prima facie case standard is the appropriate test for denying advance funding.

On a contested passing of accounts, the court considered the compensation claimed by an estate trustee during litigation for administering a complex estate over several years involving extensive litigation, missing assets, and the unwinding of a corporate entity owned by the estate.

One charitable beneficiary objected to aspects of the trustee’s compensation, including the application of percentage fees on large capital transactions and the treatment of accounting fees.

The court accepted certain accounting adjustments and deductions but declined to reduce the trustee’s compensation in light of the extraordinary complexity of the estate administration and the significant recovery work undertaken.

A special fee was also awarded for the additional effort required to wind up the corporate estate asset.

The court further determined the outstanding legal fees payable to counsel for several charitable beneficiaries and ordered costs on the passing of accounts.