Matthew Peter Sammon

The appellants, beneficiaries of a family trust, appealed a trial judge's decision on the passing of accounts of the respondent trustee.

They argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, erred in failing to find a conflict of interest when the trustee hired lawyers from his own firm, and awarded unreasonable compensation.

They also sought leave to appeal the full indemnity costs awarded to the trustee.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal and denied leave to appeal costs, finding the trial judge's reasons were adequate in context, there was no palpable and overriding error in finding no conflict of interest, the compensation reduction was reasonable, and the costs award properly reflected the public policy of indemnifying trustees for reasonable administration expenses.

The applicant brought a motion for child support and disclosure, while the respondent sought a shared parenting arrangement for their two youngest children.

The court ordered ongoing child support based on the respondent's current income but declined to order retroactive support on a temporary basis due to conflicting evidence.

The court dismissed the respondent's request for a week-about parenting schedule, finding it was not in the children's best interests, and maintained the status quo of alternating weekends with a mid-week visit.

The appellant, an employee, appealed a motion judge's order striking parts of his statement of claim in a wrongful dismissal action, which included claims against corporate directors for unpaid vacation pay under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA) and the Business Corporations Act (OBCA), and for oppression under the OBCA.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the ESA claim without leave to amend, finding the statutory preconditions were not met.

It also upheld the striking of the OBCA oppression claim with leave to amend, noting insufficient pleading of reasonable expectations.

However, the Court set aside the striking of the OBCA s. 131 claim for unpaid vacation pay without leave to amend, finding material facts were pleaded, and allowed it to proceed with amendment.

It also set aside the striking of certain paragraphs (14-23) related to the reprisal claim and varied the striking of paragraph 40, only removing irrelevant allegations.

The original costs award against the appellant was reduced to reflect his partial success on appeal.

The applicant moved for the partition and sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home.

The respondent opposed the sale, seeking exclusive possession to assess the home's value and potentially purchase the applicant's interest.

The court granted the motion for partition and sale, finding no malicious or oppressive conduct by the applicant and noting the respondent failed to establish a realistic claim for exclusive possession under section 24 of the Family Law Act.

The court ordered the property to be listed for sale and directed the parties to exchange updated financial statements to account for personal property sold post-separation.

The respondent father brought a motion to change the custody provisions of a 2013 final order and requested a section 30 assessment under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The applicant mother opposed, arguing no material change in circumstances, bad faith, and parental manipulation.

The court dismissed the motion for an assessment, emphasizing the long-standing status quo of primary parenting by the mother, previous consent orders, and concerns about the father's manipulation, concluding that an assessment was not warranted.

The appellant physician appealed a finding of professional misconduct and penalty imposed by the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The Committee had dismissed the original allegations of sexual abuse but found professional misconduct based on the physician's failure to respect the patient's privacy during an examination.

The College conceded that this finding was procedurally unfair because the privacy issue was not raised in the Notice of Hearing.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal on consent and quashed the liability and penalty decisions.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons brought a motion to settle an order flowing from previous reasons for judgment and to vary its terms due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The motion addressed the wording of the order regarding the handling of Patient A's medical file, specifically the inclusion of a caveat allowing transfer of records "to the extent necessary for the College to carry out its regulatory functions." The court found the College's proposed wording, though an addition, accurately captured the implicit logic of the prior reasons.

Additionally, due to public health concerns, the court varied the order to allow the College's investigator, Greg Hutchinson, to be the repository for Patient A's file instead of SJO's counsel, and permitted the investigator to share materials with the College's expert, Dr. Sian Rawkins.

The court also clarified that newly discovered emails from SJO's hospital account were part of the file covered by the ruling and that the restrictions on file handling did not apply past the investigation stage.

An amended Reasons for Judgment was also ordered to address privacy concerns.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons initiated an investigation into a psychiatrist, SJO, concerning boundary violations and the receipt of confidential information from a patient (Patient A), who was a former College employee.

SJO resisted producing Patient A's medical records, arguing patient-psychiatrist privilege and a conflict of interest for the College due to parallel investigations.

The court dismissed SJO's application for an injunction, holding that the College's statutory investigatory powers under the Regulated Health Professions Act and Health Professions Procedural Code override common law claims of privilege and patient confidentiality in this regulatory context.

The court ordered SJO to produce the patient's medical records and communications to an external investigator, with strict confidentiality protocols to limit College staff access.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding he committed sexual abuse and professional misconduct, and revoking his license.

The Divisional Court upheld findings that he removed patients' clothing without warning and breached a chaperone order.

However, the Court quashed the finding of sexual abuse regarding Patient B due to a flawed credibility assessment and a reversal of the burden of proof.

The Court also quashed a finding of professional misconduct regarding abdominal contact with two other patients because it was an unpleaded allegation.

Finally, the Court held that the mandatory revocation provisions of the Protecting Patients Act, 2017 did not apply retrospectively.

The penalty was substituted with a suspension for the period already served.

The plaintiff moved to compel answers to undertakings and refusals from the defendants, while the defendants moved for a confidentiality order.

The court upheld the defendants' refusal to answer one question regarding "any other assets under administration" as too broad and irrelevant to the plaintiff's claims.

However, the court compelled a more responsive answer regarding Sun Life's typical practice for commission payments.

The defendants' motion for a confidentiality order concerning client investment information and an executive's employment contract was dismissed, as much of the information was already publicly available or had been filed with the court, negating a serious risk of commercial harm or privacy violation.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal from an order liquidating the corporate defendant, the respondent sought costs of the appeal and a prior stay motion.

The Divisional Court fixed costs at $25,000 on a partial indemnity basis, payable solely by the personal appellants to prevent the respondent from effectively paying half of his own costs through the corporation.

The court also ordered the personal appellants to fully indemnify the respondent and the corporation for the fees of a monitor appointed during the stay, as the monitor was necessitated by the personal appellants' oppressive conduct.

The appellants appealed a motions judge's decision ordering the liquidation of a closely-held corporation as a remedy for oppression and breach of fiduciary duty.

The appellants argued that the remedies of disgorgement and constructive trust were sufficient and that liquidation was punitive.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge properly exercised his discretion to order liquidation because the trust underpinning the shareholders' agreement had been destroyed, the appellants had committed grave breaches, and the business was no longer operating as originally intended.

The court also upheld the brief two-week election period granted to the appellants to purchase the respondent's shares.

RBC Dominion Securities Inc. (RBCDS) sought leave to amend its statement of defence to a counterclaim by Jeffrey Kowal, introducing new grounds for his employment termination.

Kowal did not oppose the amendment but sought compensation for prejudice in costs.

The court granted leave to amend, finding that while RBCDS was successful in obtaining the amendment, Kowal was more successful on the issue of terms, particularly costs.

The court ordered RBCDS to pay Kowal $10,000 in costs as a condition of filing the amended defence, acknowledging the delay by RBCDS and the additional work required by Kowal.

The court determined costs following a successful application where oppression and breach of fiduciary duty were found, leading to a corporate wind-up.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs, which were awarded due to the seriousness of the misconduct, including breaches of statutory and fiduciary duties, self-dealing, and obstructive litigation conduct by the respondents.

The court also directed that the costs of the litigation be borne solely by the individual respondents, with adjustments made during the corporate winding-up process to prevent the applicant from indirectly bearing the respondents' costs.

A motion to strike brought by the respondents was also dismissed with costs to the applicant.

The defendant, Dr. Nicholas Peter Plaskos, moved for summary judgment to dismiss a medical malpractice action, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs, Ms. Lewis and her sons, alleged delayed diagnosis due to a failure to order an MRI.

The court found that the plaintiffs' counsel did not exercise objective reasonable diligence in reviewing hospital records, leading to a delayed discovery of Dr. Plaskos's potential involvement.

Consequently, the claim against Dr. Plaskos was deemed statute-barred and dismissed.

The applicant, as estate trustee, brought an oppression application alleging breach of fiduciary duties and corporate opportunity appropriation by the individual respondents concerning the "Greystar" transaction and mismanagement of Di Battista Gambin Developments Limited (DBG).

The court found that the individual respondents breached their fiduciary duties and statutory obligations under the OBCA by appropriating a corporate opportunity (Markham property) for Greystar's benefit and engaging in self-dealing through a $3 million mortgage from DBG to Greystar without proper disclosure or shareholder approval.

The directors also abdicated their responsibilities, leading to an unjustified accumulation of cash.

The court concluded that the conduct was oppressive and unfairly prejudicial, warranting a remedy of either winding-up DBG and Whitwood or a buy-out of the applicant's interests by the DiBattista respondents at fair market value, along with an accounting of benefits from the Greystar transaction.

The applicant brought a motion to freeze funds removed from a joint investment account and for an accounting.

The respondent had transferred the entire joint account, derived from the sale of his farm, to his sole control.

The applicant argued the funds were joint property, while the respondent claimed they were for estate planning and his sole income source.

The court, applying Section 14 of the Family Law Act, found that while some control was necessary, the applicant's request for a full freeze was overreaching.

A preservation order was issued for one half the account's value at separation, with conditions proposed by the respondent, reflecting the historical pattern of usage.

Costs were fixed in the cause.

The respondent brought a motion for the sale of the jointly-owned family home and equal division of proceeds, challenging a prior vesting order in favour of the applicant.

The parties were unmarried but had children together.

The respondent's pleadings had previously been struck for failure to disclose.

The court corrected a calculation error from a previous endorsement regarding the home's equity and post-separation expenses, resulting in a small deficit which the court treated as a wash.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion to contest the vesting order, finding it inappropriate given his failure to pay outstanding costs orders, child support arrears, and consistent disregard for court orders.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's dismissal of an appeal.

The respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, citing the nature of the underlying allegations and the trial judge's findings.

The appellants argued for costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale, finding that while substantial indemnity costs were appropriate at trial due to the appellants' conduct, there was no principled basis to impose such costs for the appeal itself.

The appellants had a right to appeal and raised legitimate issues.

This appeal concerns a serious and sustained Internet defamation campaign orchestrated by the appellant Rabinowitz against the respondent Rutman, a Toronto chartered accountant and businessman.

Rabinowitz admitted liability for defamatory statements posted on the Internet alleging tax fraud, theft, and cheating.

The trial judge found the appellants Bergman and Artcraft Company Inc. jointly and severally liable for the defamation.

The trial judge awarded $200,000 in general damages, $200,000 in aggravated damages, and $250,000 in punitive damages against Rabinowitz, and $50,000 in punitive damages against Bergman.

The appellants appealed on grounds of liability and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on concerted action liability, vicarious liability of the corporation, and the quantum of damages awarded.