Matthew Peter Sammon

The College of Nurses of Ontario brought disciplinary proceedings against a Registered Practical Nurse for applying inappropriate physical force to an elderly, cognitively impaired resident and for failing to disclose a past criminal conviction on his annual renewal forms.

The Discipline Committee found that the nurse breached the Therapeutic Nurse-Client Relationship Standard by pushing the resisting resident down a hallway, constituting physical and emotional abuse.

The Committee also found the nurse committed professional misconduct by falsifying his 2002 annual payment form to conceal a prior criminal conviction.

The nurse's certificate of registration was suspended for three months, and he was ordered to complete remedial education and notify future employers of the decision.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which had overturned a decision by the College of Physicians and Surgeons' Complaints Committee to take no further action on a complaint.

The complaint alleged the physician treated a patient with contempt and prejudice before the patient's death from pneumonia.

The Divisional Court found that the Board failed to apply the proper standard of reasonableness and deference to the Committee's screening function.

The Court held that the Board's requirement for further investigation into the physician's credibility and use of the word 'lifestyle' was unreasonable.

The application for judicial review was granted, the Board's decision was set aside, and the Committee's decision was restored.

The appellant, an executor of the Lorraine Penna estate, appealed the dismissal of a motion for a declaration that claims against the estate were statute-barred.

The respondents sought to hold the estate liable for the fraudulent actions of a co-trustee in the administration of the Paul Penna estate.

The Court of Appeal held that the two-year limitation period in s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act applied and was preserved by s. 19 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the fraud exception in s. 43(2) of the former Limitations Act did not apply because the deceased trustee was not a party or privy to the fraud.

The court also declined to apply the special circumstances doctrine to add the estate as a defendant.

The appeal was allowed in part, declaring the summary judgment motion barred by the limitation period.

The appellants were injured in a bus collision in 2000 and commenced an action against several defendants in 2001.

In 2006, after the expiry of the former two-year limitation period under the Highway Traffic Act, they sought to add a doctor as a party defendant.

The Court of Appeal held that the transition provision in s. 24(3) of the Limitations Act, 2002 applied, which barred the proceeding.

While the court confirmed that the common-law doctrine of special circumstances remains available to extend a former limitation period under the transition provisions, it upheld the motion judge's finding that no special circumstances existed because the appellants had made a deliberate decision not to sue the doctor before the limitation period expired.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) appealed a decision regarding a priority dispute over a $4.5 million tax refund to an insolvent company.

RBC had a perfected security interest when an interim receiver was appointed under s. 47 of the BIA.

However, RBC failed to file a financing change statement after the debtor's name changed, making its interest unperfected by the time the debtor was assigned into bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an interim receiver is not a 'person who represents the creditors of the debtor' under s. 20(1)(b) of the PPSA.

Therefore, the relevant date for determining priority was the date of bankruptcy, at which point RBC's unperfected security interest was ineffective against the trustee in bankruptcy.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order that dismissed his claims against his former employer regarding changes to his compensation structure and unpaid trailer fees.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the limitation period barred claims respecting changes to the compensation structure.

However, the Court found that the limitation period did not apply to the limited claim for trailer fees earned by the appellant and received by the employer in the first quarter of 2000 before his departure.

The appeal was allowed in part against the corporate respondent only.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario released an addendum on costs following an appeal.

The respondents were awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $10,000 inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The deceased's estate brought a medical malpractice action against the appellant doctor for failing to diagnose and treat bladder cancer.

The action was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period in s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act.

The estate pleaded that the doctor fraudulently concealed his negligence by lying to the family about having recommended radical treatment.

The doctor moved to strike the claim as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision dismissing the motion, finding that the common law doctrine of fraudulent concealment can toll the limitation period in s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act, and that the facts as pleaded were capable of supporting a finding of fraudulent concealment.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for partition and sale of lands held in trust for a partnership among four brothers, and the granting of the respondents' counter-application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's finding of a partnership and his exercise of discretion in denying partition, noting the partners' interest was not possessory.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs, finding the award of substantial indemnity costs unduly harsh given the history of acrimony, and varied the costs below to $10,000.

The self-represented applicant filed a notice of motion to review an order refusing leave to extend the time for bringing an appeal, but failed to perfect the motion.

The respondents sought to have the motion dismissed for delay.

The Court of Appeal declined to dismiss the motion, noting the lack of time limits in the Rules for perfecting such a motion, the applicant's unrepresented status, and the respondents' failure to bring a formal motion to dismiss.

The court scheduled the motion for a full hearing and set strict deadlines for perfection.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision declaring that it unreasonably withheld consent for the respondent tenant, Loblaws, to change its supermarket banner to 'No Frills' and temporarily close for renovations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation of the lease's use and continuous operation provisions.

The court applied a deferential standard of review to the factual findings and upheld the refusal to admit new evidence.