Matthew John Chung

The applicant daycare sought judicial review of a Ministry of Education Director's decision refusing to approve its proposed supervisor.

The Director had previously revoked the supervisor's approval following an inspection.

When the daycare reapplied, the Director refused approval based on new, undisclosed concerns regarding absenteeism and past complaints that had not been raised as issues previously.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding the Director breached the duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide notice of the case the applicant had to meet.

The matter was remitted to a different director for a fresh decision.

Le demandeur a intenté une action en jugement déclaratoire contre le procureur général et le lieutenant-gouverneur en conseil, alléguant que le Tribunal des droits de la personne de l'Ontario (TDPO) ne comptait aucun membre capable d'entendre sa cause en français.

Les défendeurs ont présenté une motion en radiation de la déclaration.

La Cour supérieure a accueilli la motion, concluant d'une part qu'elle n'avait pas compétence puisque le litige concernait l'exercice d'une compétence légale relevant de la compétence exclusive de la Cour divisionnaire en matière de révision judiciaire.

D'autre part, la Cour a conclu que la déclaration ne révélait aucune cause d'action raisonnable, car la demande était prématurée et théorique, le demandeur n'ayant pris aucune démarche auprès du TDPO pour faire avancer son dossier ou demander une audience en français.

The applicant, a French-language health planning entity, sought judicial review of the Minister of Health's refusal to recommend it for designation as a 'public service agency' under the French Language Services Act.

The Divisional Court held that while the Minister's refusal to recommend was subject to judicial review, the applicable standard of review was reasonableness.

The Court found the Minister's decision reasonable, as the applicant's mandate involved providing advice and planning services to government agencies rather than direct services to the public.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant, an orthopedic surgeon, sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Services Appeal and Review Board upholding OHIP's denial of certain billing claims.

The applicant argued the Board erred by admitting opinion evidence from an OHIP medical advisor who was not an independent expert.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board reasonably exercised its broad statutory discretion to admit the evidence.

The court noted the witness, while not a traditional independent expert or a 'participant expert' under the civil rules, possessed relevant expertise as an employee of a party and her evidence was largely factual and explanatory.

The applicant, Mr. Sharma, sought a conditional stay of his jury trial until he received funding for his defence, arguing that his Charter rights would be infringed without counsel.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Mr. Sharma had not demonstrated a lack of financial means despite reasonable efforts, nor that counsel was essential for a fair trial given his education, English proficiency, and the trial judge's duty to assist unrepresented accused.

The self-represented applicant brought two applications seeking to challenge prior judicial decisions and seeking the recusal of a Regional Senior Justice in an underlying civil action.

The respondents moved to strike the applications.

The applicant sought a last-minute adjournment citing illness, which the court denied due to a lack of cogent medical evidence and a history of delay.

The court granted the respondents' motions, dismissing the applications as impermissible collateral attacks and an abuse of process.

The court also found the claims against the Attorney General and the Regional Senior Justice disclosed no reasonable cause of action due to judicial independence and absolute judicial immunity.

The plaintiffs brought an action against several defendants, including judges and police, alleging Charter violations.

The court reviewed the plaintiffs' written submissions following a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding the claims frivolous, vexatious, and barred by judicial immunity, the court dismissed the action in its entirety.

Additionally, the court revoked the plaintiff's fee waiver under the Administration of Justice Act to prevent further abuse of court resources.

The defendants requested a review of the plaintiffs' statement of claim under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed the action by one plaintiff, who was a declared vexatious litigant and had not obtained leave to institute the proceeding.

The court stayed the action by the second plaintiff, noting the claims against judges and court officials appeared frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and directed the registrar to issue a notice for written submissions on why the action should not be dismissed and his fee waiver cancelled.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision to dismiss his application under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The underlying application sought damages for alleged mistreatment by a housing corporation after the appellant was denied a housing subsidy and assessed a rent increase.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the application bore the hallmarks of querulous litigant behaviour and dismissed the appeal.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 to dismiss the plaintiffs' action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found that one plaintiff, Dr. Basmadji, was subject to a vexatious litigant order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act and had not obtained leave to institute the action.

The court also inferred that Dr. Basmadji, who is not a lawyer, improperly instituted the action on behalf of both plaintiffs, including Mr. Chevalier, who may be a party under disability.

Consequently, the action was stayed under Rule 2.1.03(1).

The stay was without prejudice to Mr. Chevalier's right to commence a further proceeding, provided he complies with rules regarding representation and disability.

No costs were awarded.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) dismissing her discrimination complaint due to delay and denying reconsideration.

The applicant, who was on sick leave for breast cancer, received a notice in 2014 that her position was eliminated and she would be laid off upon her return to work.

She filed her HRTO application in 2018.

The HRTO found the triggering event for the one-year limitation period was the 2014 notice, not her future return to work.

The Divisional Court held that the HRTO's decisions were reasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The appellant, Lina Ahmed, appealed the dismissal of her action against Justice of the Peace Louise Logue under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action alleged a Charter infringement due to the Justice of the Peace's refusal to accept a peace bond application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that a Justice of the Peace enjoys absolute immunity from civil liability in the exercise of judicial functions, rendering the claim frivolous and devoid of merit.

The Court also affirmed the motion judge's discretion to dismiss the action without seeking submissions from the appellant, as permitted by Rule 2.1.01(3).

The applicant brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel for her upcoming trials on charges of impaired driving and multiple domestic assault-related offences.

The Crown conceded the applicant lacked the financial ability to retain counsel, leaving trial fairness as the sole issue.

The court assessed the applicant's education, work history as a business analyst, and self-presentation, concluding she was highly capable of self-representing.

The court also found the charges were not legally or factually complex.

The application for state-funded counsel and the alternative request for the appointment of amicus curiae were dismissed.

The respondent, representing a class of seriously mentally ill inmates and inmates held in prolonged administrative segregation, brought a class action against Ontario for Charter breaches and systemic negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding that Ontario's use of administrative segregation violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter, and awarded $30 million in aggregate Charter damages.

Ontario appealed, arguing that the Charter breaches were not established for all seriously mentally ill inmates, that Charter damages were inappropriate due to good governance concerns, and that the negligence claim was barred by statute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the findings that administrative segregation of seriously mentally ill inmates constitutes cruel and unusual treatment, that Ontario's clear disregard for inmates' rights justified Charter damages, and that the operational implementation of segregation policies grounded a valid systemic negligence claim.

The applicant brought a motion for contempt against the respondents, a church and its elders, for breaching a court order that restrained them from holding gatherings of more than 10 persons in contravention of COVID-19 regulations.

The respondents did not oppose the motion.

The court applied the three-part test for civil contempt and found beyond a reasonable doubt that the order was clear, the respondents had notice of it, and they intentionally breached it by holding a service with approximately 225 people.

All respondents were found in contempt, and the matter was adjourned for sentencing.

The applicant, charged with sexual offences against his grandchildren, brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to provide full and frank financial disclosure to establish indigence and had not made reasonable efforts to save funds for his defence.

Furthermore, the court held that the case was not sufficiently complex to require counsel for a fair trial, noting that the trial judge could appoint counsel to cross-examine the complainants under section 486.3(2) of the Criminal Code.

The defendants, Ministry of the Attorney General and Justice of the Peace Louise Logue, requested the dismissal of the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found that Justice of the Peace Logue was immune from the claim and that no cause of action was pleaded against the Ministry of the Attorney General.

Consequently, the action was dismissed as frivolous and unsustainable at law.

The Crown moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff alleged that the Crown negligently supervised various entities, including the OSC, LSO, and judges.

The court dismissed the claim as a nullity because the plaintiff failed to provide the required 60-day notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

Furthermore, the court struck the claim without leave to amend, finding it disclosed no reasonable cause of action as the Crown is not vicariously liable for the independent entities named.

In a certified class action regarding Ontario's use of administrative segregation, the plaintiff sought to summons an independent expert appointed by Ontario to testify on an upcoming summary judgment motion.

Ontario opposed the summons, arguing it violated procedural rules regarding the timing of examinations.

The court declined to order the examination at this juncture, finding that it was more proportionate to simply order that the expert's Final Report be delivered to class counsel for use on the summary judgment motion once it is provided to Ontario.