Malcolm N. Ruby

This decision concerns a class action brought by victims and families of the 2018 Danforth Avenue shooting against Smith & Wesson Corp., alleging negligence for failing to implement authorized user technology in its handguns.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario held that the plaintiffs’ negligence claim should proceed as a class action, finding that the claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action and that the certification judge erred by applying a merits-based test at the certification stage.

The court struck the strict liability and public nuisance claims, holding that Canadian law does not recognize such claims against product manufacturers in these circumstances.

This addendum to a costs decision addresses two requested corrections: one regarding a consent order on costs for a motion to be in the cause of the certification motion, and another clarifying the actual amount of partial indemnity costs requested by the plaintiffs.

The court acknowledged the factual corrections but affirmed that these changes do not alter the original exercise of discretion regarding costs.

The plaintiffs sought to certify a class action against Smith & Wesson for design negligence following the Danforth Shooting, where a stolen M&P®40 handgun without "authorized user" (smart gun) technology was used to kill and injure multiple people.

The plaintiffs argued that Smith & Wesson was negligent in failing to incorporate authorized user technology into the handgun's design.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the common issues and preferable procedure criteria.

Specifically, the plaintiffs did not provide expert evidence from a firearm design expert to establish some basis in fact that the absence of authorized user technology constituted a design defect, or that an alternative design was feasible without impairing the handgun's utility for its intended military and police users.

This appeal arose from the dismissal of a class proceeding claiming damages against the Crown for negligence related to the presence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada between 2003 and 2008.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding it barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, and also that no duty of care was owed and no negligence occurred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, focusing solely on the application of section 9.

It found that various government programs providing financial assistance to cattle farmers in response to the BSE outbreak constituted "compensation" under section 9, thereby barring the negligence claim as it sought double recovery for the same factual basis of loss.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action brought two motions: one seeking leave to file third and fourth supplementary affidavits from an expert, Dr. Jooyoung Lee, and another compelling the defendant, Smith & Wesson Corp., to provide answers and documents from a cross-examination.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the supplementary affidavits were not relevant to the certification criteria and that the requested discovery questions were primarily merits inquiries or fishing expeditions, disproportionate to the needs of the certification motion.

The plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of Canadian cattle farmers against the Government of Canada, alleging negligence in its response to the threat of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as 'mad cow disease'.

The plaintiff claimed that Canada failed to implement a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban in a timely manner and failed to prevent cattle imported from the United Kingdom from entering the animal feed chain, which led to the discovery of a BSE-infected Canadian cow in May 2003 and the subsequent closure of international borders to Canadian cattle and beef.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the claim was barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act because the class members had received compensation through various government financial assistance programs.

Furthermore, the court held that Canada did not owe a private law duty of care to the cattle farmers and that its policy decisions regarding the monitoring of imported cattle and the timing of the feed ban were reasonable and did not breach the standard of care.

In a proposed class action against a firearm manufacturer for design negligence following a mass shooting, the defendant moved to strike portions of the plaintiffs' layperson affidavit evidence filed for the certification motion.

The impugned evidence included foreign patents for 'smart gun' technology and firearm-related crime statistics.

The court granted the motion to strike, finding that expert evidence in handgun design was required to establish some basis in fact for the design negligence claim, and a layperson could not provide the necessary factual logic or theory.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to file additional expert evidence and rescheduled the certification motion.

The plaintiffs moved for an order staying or adjourning the defendant's motion for leave to appeal a case management judge's decision on a Rule 21 motion.

The Rule 21 motion was heard together with the first stage of a bifurcated certification motion in a proposed class proceeding arising from a mass shooting.

The Divisional Court applied the RJR MacDonald test under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act and granted the stay, finding that the balance of convenience favoured postponing the leave motion until after the second stage of the certification motion was decided to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

During a class action trial regarding the federal government's alleged negligence in preventing mad cow disease, the defendant sought to read into evidence discovery transcripts from the current representative plaintiff, the deceased former representative plaintiff, and other class members.

The court denied the request to read in the current representative plaintiff's evidence, applying the rule in Browne v. Dunn, as the plaintiff had already testified and the evidence did not merely fill a gap.

The court also denied leave to read in the deceased former plaintiff's evidence under Rule 31.11(6) and (7), finding the excerpts to be of limited importance and lacking cross-examination.

However, the court permitted the defendant to read in discovery evidence from other class members, as it provided helpful real-world insight into the financial impact on different cattle producers.

During a common issues trial regarding the federal government's alleged negligence in preventing the spread of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (mad cow disease), the plaintiff sought to admit eight foreign public records for the truth of their contents.

The defendant argued the documents should only be admitted to show the government's knowledge of them.

The court held that the documents, which included reports from the World Health Organization and the European Commission, met the criteria for the public documents exception under s. 25 of the Ontario Evidence Act and were admissible for the truth of their contents, though the court reserved judgment on the weight to be given to them.

During a common issues trial concerning the impact of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) on Canadian farmers, the plaintiff sought to admit the affidavit and cross-examination transcript of a deceased witness, Mr. Mel McCrea.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, objected on the basis of necessity, arguing that other witnesses could provide similar information.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that Mr. McCrea's evidence met both the necessity and reliability thresholds.

The court emphasized the unique nature of Mr. McCrea's first-hand account regarding the first Canadian-born BSE-diagnosed cow and the prior cross-examination, ruling the evidence admissible.

This ruling addresses a hearsay objection raised by the defendant during a common issues trial concerning the 2003 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak.

The defendant sought to strike out several paragraphs from the affidavit of Lawrence Sears, the plaintiff's principal, arguing they contained inadmissible hearsay.

The court dismissed the objection, finding that the statements in the affidavit were based on Mr. Sears' personal knowledge, experience, and observations, and thus were not hearsay.

The judge emphasized that the evidence could be tested through cross-examination.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of the plaintiff's expert reports as evidence-in-chief in a complex common issues trial concerning the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak.

The defendant objected to the hybrid trial process, arguing that expert evidence should be presented viva voce rather than through reports.

The court dismissed the defendant's objection, affirming the trial judge's discretion to admit expert reports as direct evidence in non-jury hybrid trials, consistent with prior case management orders.

The decision emphasized that this approach enhances trial efficiency and does not prejudice the opposing party's right to cross-examination.

The plaintiffs commenced a proposed class action against the manufacturer of a handgun used in a mass shooting, alleging negligent design, public nuisance, and strict liability for failing to incorporate authorized user ('smart gun') technology.

The defendant moved to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21 for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the negligence claim, finding it fell within the established duty of care categories for goods dangerous per se and products liability.

However, the court struck the claims for public nuisance and strict liability, concluding they were legally untenable in the context of product liability.

The parties in a class action jointly sought an adjournment of the trial commencement to allow time to finalize settlement discussions.

The court granted the adjournment, moving the trial start date from February 1, 2021, to February 16, 2021, noting that no further adjournments would be granted.

The defendants in a 15-year-old class action regarding the federal government's response to the mad cow disease crisis brought a motion to adjourn the peremptory trial date of January 18, 2021, to September 2021.

They cited difficulties preparing due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the late delivery of supplementary expert reports by the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the motion for a lengthy adjournment, finding that the parties were well-resourced to conduct a virtual trial and that the late expert reports were responsive to the defendants' own late productions.

The trial commencement was postponed by two weeks to February 1, 2021, to allow for the completion of remaining pre-trial steps.

The plaintiff in a certified class action regarding the federal government's response to the Mad Cow Disease outbreak brought a motion under the Interprovincial Summonses Act to compel the attendance of the former federal Minister of Agriculture, Ralph Goodale, as a witness at trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the proposed witness's evidence would be relevant, it was neither necessary nor essential to the administration of justice.

The plaintiff already had copious documentary and oral discovery, and the federal government planned to call sixteen civil servants from Agriculture Canada at trial.

The representative plaintiff in a certified class action regarding the introduction of Mad Cow Disease into Canada brought a motion for approval of a third-party litigation funding agreement.

The court applied the four-factor test for approving such agreements and found that the funding was necessary for access to justice, made a meaningful contribution, protected the defendant's interests, and did not overcompensate the funder.

The court approved the agreement and pre-approved the funder's return of up to 10 percent of any recovery.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 39.02(2) for leave to file affidavits with additional documents after cross-examinations in support of a summary judgment motion to enforce a foreign restitution order.

Applying the Divisional Court framework for late evidence, the court held that although the proposed documents were relevant, the plaintiff failed to provide an adequate explanation for not filing them earlier and had made a strategic choice to confront the defendant with the documents on cross-examination instead of proving them by affidavit.

The court further held that admissibility cannot be ignored in the Rule 39.02(2) analysis, even if the ultimate ruling is left to the motion judge.

Leave was refused, and the court indicated the proposed evidence would have been inadmissible hearsay in any event.

No costs were awarded.

Following earlier rulings quashing garnishment notices issued against diplomatic bank accounts of a foreign state, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The proceedings involved complex and novel issues of diplomatic immunity, state immunity, and international law relating to enforcement of a judgment against a foreign state.

Although the foreign state was the successful party, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs due to the absence of improper litigation conduct and the novelty of the issues.

A third‑party bank that participated extensively in the litigation was found not to be a necessary party and was denied costs.

The creditor was ordered to pay the foreign state partial indemnity costs fixed at $100,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.