M.A. Code

The three accused were arrested while exiting an apartment building and entering a taxi, and each was found in possession of a loaded handgun.

They brought a Charter motion alleging violations of their rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10, arguing they were unlawfully detained and searched.

The court found that the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention and pat search based on the totality of the circumstances, including the high-crime area, a recent shooting, and the accused's behaviour.

The Charter motions were dismissed, the firearms were admitted into evidence, and the accused were found guilty.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay impaired driving charges against the respondent due to a violation of s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found seven weeks of Crown delay related to disclosure and six and a half months of institutional delay, along with actual prejudice.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in characterizing the delay periods, which should have been classified as neutral inherent time requirements or defence delay.

The court also found palpable and overriding factual errors in the trial judge's assessment of prejudice, noting the respondent's own conduct caused substantial delays.

The stay of proceedings was set aside and the matter remitted for trial.

The appellant appealed convictions for one count of common assault and one count of sexual assault arising from allegations by a spouse.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge failed to address significant inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, despite the case turning entirely on credibility.

The appeal court held that the failure to consider material inconsistencies constituted reversible error.

Due to ambiguity between the trial judge’s reasons and the endorsed verdicts on the information, acquittals were directed on both common assault counts and no retrial could be ordered for them.

The conviction for sexual assault was set aside and a new trial ordered on that count.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusal to provide a roadside breath sample, arguing that the trial judge improperly used his silence as evidence of guilt.

The appeal challenged references made by the trial judge to the appellant’s failure to explain his inability to provide a sample at the roadside and his decision not to testify at trial or during a Charter motion alleging lost evidence.

The court held that comments about the absence of testimony on the Charter motion were permissible because the burden rested on the accused in that context.

The court further held that the trial judge’s observation that no defence evidence contradicted the officers’ testimony did not improperly use silence as proof of guilt, but merely noted the unchallenged nature of the Crown’s case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a child complainant.

The Crown cross-appealed the conditional sentence, arguing it was illegal due to a mandatory minimum.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge misapprehended significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence regarding the location and frequency of the alleged assaults.

As this misapprehension played an essential part in the trial judge's credibility assessment, the conviction appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown's cross-appeal against sentence was dismissed in light of the successful conviction appeal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

At trial, defence counsel filed a Charter challenge to amendments enacted through Bill C‑2 but intentionally led no evidence and made no substantive argument, inviting the court to dismiss the application in order to preserve the issue pending appellate decisions on the legislation’s constitutionality.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application due to the absence of an evidentiary record and convicted the appellant relying on statutory presumptions of accuracy and identity.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge should have required a proper evidentiary record or withdrawal of the application.

The court held that constitutional challenges require a factual record and that the trial judge properly dismissed the application where no evidence supported it.

The conviction and dismissal of the Charter application were upheld.

The accused was charged with robbery as an aider and abettor.

The Crown's case relied on video surveillance, an oral utterance made upon arrest, and a fingerprint found on a duct tape wrapper in the getaway car.

Following a voir dire, the court excluded the oral utterance under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that police breached the accused's s. 10(b) rights by showing him a surveillance photo to elicit a response before advising him of his right to counsel for the robbery charge.

On the trial merits, the court found that the remaining circumstantial evidence—a general resemblance in the video and the fingerprint—raised a strong suspicion but failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a roadside breath demand under the Criminal Code.

The appeal argued that the trial judge improperly relied on a roadside utterance captured on video in violation of jurisprudence limiting the use of compelled roadside statements while the right to counsel is suspended.

The court reviewed the governing principles from the Elias line of cases and the actus reus exception recognized in appellate authority.

It held that statements made during the testing process may be admissible where they form part of the actus reus of the refusal offence or help determine whether the accused genuinely attempted to comply.

The impugned statement was admissible because it demonstrated the accused’s linguistic understanding and was relevant to whether the repeated failed attempts constituted a constructive refusal.

The conviction was therefore upheld.

Police officers convicted of assault causing bodily harm arising from an arrest for public intoxication appealed their convictions and conditional sentences.

The appeal court found that the trial judge misapprehended key medical evidence by concluding the complainant’s injuries independently proved repeated blows, when the medical evidence was equally consistent with a fall during the arrest.

Applying the stringent misapprehension-of-evidence test, the court held the error was material and formed an essential part of the reasoning process leading to conviction.

The Crown argued the convictions could still stand on an alternative theory of unlawful arrest, but the court found the trial judge had not clearly analyzed or relied on that theory.

The convictions were therefore unsafe and a miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to appear under s. 145 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge rejected the appellant’s explanation that he mistakenly attended the wrong courthouse and then attempted to travel to the correct location.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred by assessing the appellant’s evidence in isolation and by failing to consider corroborating evidence from the appellant’s mother, whose credibility was acknowledged by the Crown.

This omission constituted both a misapprehension of evidence and a failure to consider relevant evidence on a material issue.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The Superior Court conducted a fresh analysis of the delays after finding that the trial judge had mistakenly omitted a two‑month period when calculating delay.

The court concluded that most delays were attributable to inherent time requirements of the case or institutional delay, with only one month attributable to the Crown.

The total unjustified delay of approximately eight months fell within the Morin guidelines and did not justify an inference of prejudice.

Balancing the limited delay, weak evidence of prejudice, and the strong societal interest in a trial on the merits, the court found no Charter breach.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for breach of a probation order under s. 137 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act involving a prohibition on contact with a co‑accused subject to limited exceptions for vocational, educational, employment, or counseling purposes.

The trial judge acquitted after concluding the Crown bore the burden of proving the accused was not within the counseling exception and had failed to investigate whether counseling was occurring.

The appeal court held the trial judge erred in law by treating the exception as an element of the offence despite no evidentiary foundation giving it an “air of reality.” The evidence established the accused and the co‑accused were simply sitting and walking together outside a building, which could not fall within the counseling exception.

The acquittal was set aside and a conviction entered, with the matter remitted for sentencing.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against two young boys.

The Crown alleged the accused sexually assaulted the boys during the summer and fall of 2009 while spending time with their family.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming a close father-son bond with one boy and denying any inappropriate contact.

The court found the boys' evidence credible and reliable, supported by circumstantial evidence including anal injuries and behavioral changes.

The court also admitted the boys' accounts as similar fact evidence, finding they mutually corroborated each other.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault causing bodily harm against one boy and sexual assault simpliciter against the other.

The applicant, having been acquitted of criminal harassment, initiated a private prosecution against the complainant for perjury and other offences.

After a justice of the peace issued process, the Crown intervened and entered a stay of proceedings, citing no reasonable prospect of conviction and public interest.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash the stay, alleging abuse of process and flagrant impropriety by the Crown.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown's decision to stay proceedings is a core prosecutorial discretion immune from judicial review absent flagrant impropriety, which the applicant failed to establish.

In a judge-alone retrial involving historical allegations of sexual abuse by a mother's intimate partner against two child complainants, the court separately assessed the allegations because evidence of collaboration undermined the force of similar fact reasoning.

The court found the evidence relating to one complainant insufficiently reliable to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given inconsistencies, frailties in disclosure, and surrounding family dynamics.

However, the allegations of the other complainant were accepted as credible and reliable, supported by circumstantial evidence and, most significantly, a surreptitious tape-recorded conversation treated as containing implicit admissions.

Convictions were entered on two counts, with acquittals on the remaining two.