MacDonnell

During a voir dire in a criminal trial, the court considered the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police officers responding to a 911 call at her apartment, where her husband's dead body was found.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of her Charter rights against arbitrary detention and right to counsel.

The court found that the accused was not a suspect at the time of the initial questioning, the statements were voluntary, and she was not psychologically or physically detained.

The statements were ruled admissible.

The appellant appealed his conviction for conveying a threat to cause death to a judge via email.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on the contents of the email to establish his identity as the sender and in finding the words constituted a threat.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's use of circumstantial evidence and self-identification to prove identity, nor in the objective conclusion that the email's contents constituted a threat to cause death.

The court released Reasons for Judgment subject to a temporary publication ban to allow parties to consider redactions.

As counsel for the applicants and respondent advised that no redactions were requested, the court rescinded the temporary publication ban.

The applicants, a media company and a journalist, sought to quash or vary a production order requiring them to produce communications with a suspected terrorist, and to unseal the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court dismissed the applications to quash or vary the production order, finding that the authorizing justice properly balanced the state's interest in investigating serious crimes with the media's right to privacy under the Lessard principles.

The court allowed the application to vary the sealing order in part, permitting access to a redacted version of the ITO, but imposed a temporary publication ban on certain details to protect the fair trial rights of the accused and the integrity of the ongoing investigation.

The accused, a project manager on a balcony restoration project, was charged with four counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after a swing stage collapsed, causing five workers to fall 100 feet.

The court found that the accused had the authority to direct the workers and breached his duty under s. 217.1 of the Criminal Code by permitting six workers to board the swing stage when he knew there were only two lifelines available.

The court held that this failure constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable supervisor, showing wanton and reckless disregard for the workers' lives and safety.

The accused's negligence was found to be a significant contributing cause of the deaths and injuries, and he was found guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with exercising control over a 17-year-old for the purpose of aiding her to engage in prostitution, procuring her to become a prostitute, and living on the avails of her prostitution.

The Crown conceded there was no evidence of procuring.

The court found the accused not guilty of the remaining charges, concluding that merely driving the complainant to a 'date' did not constitute exercising control over her movements, and that there was evidence to the contrary rebutting the presumption of living on the avails, as the accused never received or asked for money from the complainant.

The offender was sentenced for his role in a violent armed robbery of a jewellery store, during which his co-accused shot and wounded an employee.

The court considered the offender's significant cooperation with police in a separate murder investigation, which placed him at great personal risk and resulted in harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court determined a global sentence of six years was appropriate, which was reduced to 27.5 months after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion for directions on whether the jury should be instructed on self-defence using the former or newly amended provisions of the Criminal Code.

The alleged offence occurred before the Citizen's Arrest and Self-defence Act came into force.

The court held that the presumption against retrospective application of legislation affecting substantive rights was rebutted.

The new provisions were intended to clarify and simplify the law, providing a benefit to claimants, and therefore apply retrospectively to the applicant's trial.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The trial judge had excluded the Intoxilyzer certificate, finding the tests were not conducted 'as soon as practicable' due to an unexplained 14-minute delay.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by treating the 'as soon as practicable' requirement as a precondition to admissibility rather than the presumption of identity, and by misinterpreting the requirement to demand an exact accounting of every minute.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant was arrested for public intoxication under the Liquor Licence Act after an officer observed him urinating in an alley and exhibiting signs of impairment.

A subsequent search incident to arrest revealed controlled substances and currency.

The applicant brought a Charter motion to exclude the evidence, arguing the arrest was unlawful because the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe the arrest was necessary for his safety.

The court agreed, finding breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), concluding that the Charter-infringing conduct was serious and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to arrest him for impaired driving and make a breath demand, asserting the officer only had a suspicion.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the officer's observations of the appellant's driving, behaviour, and physical symptoms provided an objectively reasonable basis to believe his ability to drive was impaired by alcohol.

The applicant, a federal inmate, applied for a writ of habeas corpus and Charter relief to challenge his security classification, his correctional plan requiring sex offender programming, and the anticipated denial of his statutory release.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, holding that habeas corpus is not available to review a refusal to transfer to a lower security facility or to challenge a correctional plan.

The court further held that absent a valid habeas corpus claim, it lacked jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies regarding the administration of the sentence, as exclusive jurisdiction rests with the Federal Court.

The challenge to the anticipated denial of statutory release was also dismissed as premature.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence of five months' imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the standard of proof to a credibility contest, failed to give sufficient reasons, and made errors in principle during sentencing, including failing to give sufficient weight to the likelihood of his deportation.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the principles underlying the W.(D.) instruction, provided sufficient reasons, and correctly concluded that a discharge was contrary to the public interest despite the immigration consequences.