Allan J. Lobel

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging a breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The overall delay from charge to anticipated trial was approximately 70 months.

Applying the framework from R. v. Morin, the court analyzed the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

Significant portions of the delay were found to be waived by the defence or attributable to inherent time requirements, with only 14 months of unwaived institutional and Crown delay.

Although some prejudice was inferred from the length of delay, the court found the prejudice modest and concluded the delay was not unreasonable.

Following convictions for attempted murder and related firearm and violence offences arising from a brief but violent incident, the court imposed a global penitentiary sentence.

The offender abducted and confined the complainant at gunpoint in retaliation for a dispute with her partner and attempted to shoot her, but the firearm malfunctioned.

The court reviewed appellate jurisprudence on sentencing ranges for attempted murder and assessed aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including the offender’s criminal record, the absence of physical injury, and the psychological impact on the victim.

Applying the totality principle and granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, the court determined that a 10‑year global sentence was appropriate before credit.

After credit of 35 months for pre‑sentence custody, the effective sentence imposed was 85 months' imprisonment.

The applicant was arrested for public intoxication under the Liquor Licence Act after an officer observed him urinating in an alley and exhibiting signs of impairment.

A subsequent search incident to arrest revealed controlled substances and currency.

The applicant brought a Charter motion to exclude the evidence, arguing the arrest was unlawful because the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe the arrest was necessary for his safety.

The court agreed, finding breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), concluding that the Charter-infringing conduct was serious and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.