Leonard Ricchetti

The applicant moved to strike the respondent's pleadings due to persistent non-compliance with court orders for financial disclosure.

The respondent had a history of obstructing the sale of the matrimonial home and failed to provide complete financial documentation despite being given a "final opportunity" by prior court orders.

The court found the respondent in deliberate breach of disclosure orders, noting the critical importance of financial disclosure in family law.

Applying the three-pronged test for striking pleadings, the court determined that this was an exceptional case where no other remedy would suffice, and therefore struck the respondent's pleadings.

The accused brought pre-trial applications alleging racial profiling by police, breach of his right to counsel, and seeking to quash a search warrant for his vehicle.

The accused also sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant.

The court dismissed the application to cross-examine the affiant, finding no reasonable likelihood it would assist in challenging the warrant.

The court rejected the accused's evidence entirely, finding the police officer recognized the accused from a recent shooting investigation and did not engage in racial profiling when running his license plate.

The court found the accused was properly provided his right to counsel and that the search warrant was validly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The moving party, previously declared a vexatious litigant, sought leave to bring a motion declaring he had complied with a consent order requiring him to demolish and remove an existing structure on his property.

He had removed the wooden shell but left the cement foundations, arguing they were not a 'structure'.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the court was functus as the proceeding had been finally settled, the foundations clearly constituted a structure, and there was an inordinate and unexplained two-year delay in bringing the motion.

The defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim (NAD) brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's (HTS) pleadings for delay and failure to produce documents, and sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent HTS from using NAD's trademarks or confusingly similar marks to sell air diffusers.

The court declined to strike HTS's pleadings, giving them one final opportunity to produce a complete Affidavit of Documents.

However, the court granted the interlocutory injunction, finding that NAD established a strong prima facie case of passing off, irreparable harm due to potential market loss and unquantifiable damages, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction despite NAD's delay in bringing the motion.

Following a partial summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, the court determined the reserved costs of the motion.

The plaintiff sought full indemnity costs based on a contractual indemnity provision.

The court affirmed its discretion to ensure costs are fair and reasonable despite the contractual term.

The court awarded solicitor and client costs but deducted $5,000 due to the plaintiff's delay in correcting misnamed defendants, fixing total costs at $39,803.18.

Following a family law trial, both parties sought costs.

The applicant father sought full indemnity costs of $103,581.45 based on an offer to settle, while the respondent mother sought no order as to costs due to mixed success.

The court found that the father was substantially successful on custody and child support, but the mother was substantially successful on access, relocation, spousal support, and equalization.

Given the divided success, the unreasonable conduct of both parties, and the father's lack of financial disclosure, the court declined to award costs to either party.

The plaintiff obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction and Certificate of Pending Litigation against the defendants, alleging fraudulent and deficient electrical work during a home renovation and claiming the defendants were dissipating assets to avoid judgment.

On the motion to continue the injunction, the court dissolved the orders, finding the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure regarding available insurance and the extent of deficiencies.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case or a serious risk of asset dissipation, as the evidence of fraud and intent to hide assets was largely speculative and contradicted by the defendants' evidence.

The applicants, two brothers involved in a family drywall business, sought interlocutory injunctive relief against their brother and the corporation.

They sought to preserve the business assets, the proceeds of sale of various properties allegedly held in trust, and to be reinstated as employees.

The court granted the injunctions preserving the business and the property proceeds, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding beneficial ownership, irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured preservation.

However, the court declined to grant a mandatory injunction reinstating the applicants as employees, as they failed to demonstrate a strong prima facie case.

The court also permitted the applicants to file a required undertaking as to damages within 7 days.

The Plaintiff, Falcon Lumber Limited, sought to strike the pleadings of the Lotey Defendants due to their persistent and deliberate failure to comply with numerous court orders for document production and examinations for discovery over a three-year period.

The Lotey Defendants engaged in a "corporate shell game" involving undisclosed security agreements, receivership, and asset transfers to new companies controlled by Mr. Lotey, all while obstructing discovery.

The court found the defendants' conduct to be contumelious, demonstrating a flagrant disregard for the Rules of Civil Procedure and judicial orders.

Consequently, the court struck the Lotey Defendants' pleadings without leave to amend, noted them in default, and allowed the Plaintiff to obtain default judgment.

Additionally, the court awarded full indemnity costs of the motion against the Lotey Defendants' counsel personally, finding counsel complicit in the deliberate delay and obstruction of justice.

The defendant, B.G., was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault, touching for a sexual purpose of a person under 14, inviting a person under 14 to touch him for a sexual purpose, and uttering a threat to cause death, all against his daughter, N. The court imposed an 8-year custodial sentence, with all counts served concurrently, after considering aggravating factors such as the position of trust, the young age of the victim, the prolonged and intrusive nature of the abuse, physical violence, and death threats.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record and employment history.

Ancillary orders for DNA, lifetime Section 109 and SOIRA orders, and a Section 161 prohibition were also issued.

This family law proceeding under the Divorce Act addressed decision-making authority, parenting time, child support, and equalization of net family property.

The court found both parents capable but noted significant conflict, particularly regarding children's non-school activities.

Joint decision-making was ordered, with a mechanism for resolving disputes over extracurriculars.

Equal parenting time was granted, conditional on the Father relocating to the children's school district by a specified date.

Child support was ordered on a set-off basis.

The court made specific rulings on equalization claims, including rejecting the Mother's claim for household contents, accepting her loans from siblings, valuing Fern Property appliances at zero, and rejecting the Father's alleged loans to relatives and vehicle gifts.

Post-separation adjustments for the Fern Property were to be recalculated by the parties.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action arising from statements made during a local union election.

The court found that the election of an official to a local union is a private matter and not a matter of public interest under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court also noted that the statements, which included allegations of criminal conduct and vulgar language, were not the type of expression worthy of protection.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused brought pre-trial Charter applications alleging abuse of process, unlawful searches, and multiple right-to-counsel breaches arising from his arrest on an outstanding warrant and ensuing firearm and drug investigation.

The court rejected allegations of police cover-up, fabrication, and perjury, and dismissed most alleged s. 8 and s. 10 breaches, but found specific breaches when an officer went onto the unit balcony without authority, when police asked the accused 'where's the gun' before a proper opportunity to consult counsel, when a canine officer re-entered the unit without lawful authority, and when Unit searches proceeded under invalid Criminal Code and CDSA warrants.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded observations and evidence flowing from those specific breaches, including all observations and items seized under the invalid Unit warrants.

The court held, however, that the firearm and drugs found on the neighbouring balcony were not obtained in a manner that infringed the accused's Charter rights and remained admissible.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The defendant, Natalia Safroni, was found guilty by a jury of importing opium.

A Gardiner hearing was held to determine the quantity of opium for sentencing purposes, as the exact amount could not be scientifically quantified.

The court determined that a substantial, though not precisely quantifiable, amount of opium (approximately 3 kilograms of residue/solvent containing opium) was imported.

Considering mitigating factors such as no prior criminal record, youthfulness, and prospects for rehabilitation, and aggravating factors including the serious nature of importing a Schedule 1 narcotic and the significant quantity, the court imposed a custodial sentence of 2 years less pre-sentence custody.

Ancillary orders for a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA sample, and forfeiture of offence-related property were also issued.

The defendant, Shane Trought, facing firearm and drug charges, brought motions seeking a sealing/non-communication order regarding his submissions on police credibility and extensive disclosure of CPIC audits.

The court dismissed the sealing order, finding no basis to presume Crown misconduct and emphasizing the Crown's duty to prepare witnesses.

Regarding disclosure, the court distinguished between Stinchcombe (first-party) and O'Connor (third-party) disclosure.

It ordered the Crown to produce CPIC information related to specific license plates and Mr. Trought himself, deeming these "fruits of the investigation." However, disclosure requests for other individuals (Mr. Velasquez, Mr. White, Mr. Tryden Reis, and Mr. Royden Reis) were dismissed as speculative "fishing expeditions" and due to the lack of proper service required for third-party disclosure applications.

The Applicant Father and Respondent Mother brought competing motions for interim custody and access.

The Father sought sole custody and supervised access for the Mother at a supervised access facility, along with a restraining order and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The Mother sought interim joint custody, exclusive possession (which became moot due to a fire), and increased supervised access transitioning to equal parenting time.

The court also addressed preliminary issues regarding the admissibility of MVA medical reports, surreptitiously recorded video/audio, and Children's Aid Society (CAS) records.

The court granted interim joint custody, finding no evidence that the parties could not agree on child-related decisions prior to separation, and noting the Father's unilateral decisions regarding residence and daycare.

The Mother was granted increased supervised access (Tuesdays, Thursdays, Saturdays, 10 am to 7 pm), supervised by Millie Fogliano or Jane Morrow, with conditions regarding alcohol/marijuana consumption and driving.

A mutual restraining order was issued, and a non-removal order.

The court emphasized the need for a review in 6 months due to ongoing conflict and the Mother's need to demonstrate stability.

The applicant, a lawyer, brought an interim motion seeking to nullify his suspension by the Law Society of Ontario for non-payment of a costs award.

The court dismissed the motion, noting that the applicant had already paid the costs award, rendering the issue moot, and was currently suspended for entirely different reasons related to professional misconduct.

The court found the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence, failed to serve the Attorney General regarding his constitutional challenge, and failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured him.

The defendants in a construction lien action brought a motion to amend their counterclaim to add two separate corporate entities and their principal as plaintiffs, or alternatively, to have the counterclaim proceed as a separate action.

The court held that the Construction Lien Act prohibits adding non-parties as plaintiffs by way of counterclaim.

However, the court granted leave to withdraw an admission regarding the contracting party and ordered that the proposed counterclaim be severed and proceed as a separate action to be tried together with the lien action.

The applicant was unsuccessful in her motions and the respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the applicant had misappropriated funds contrary to a consent order and attempted to cover it up, which precipitated the motions.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixing the amounts at $24,817.63 for the family law proceeding and $29,443.41 for the civil proceeding.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court order staying his defamation action regarding statements made by the respondents on WhatsApp and posters during a union election.

The Deputy Judge had stayed the action on the basis that the appellant failed to give notice under the Libel and Slander Act, finding that WhatsApp messages constituted a 'broadcast'.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Deputy Judge erred by concluding WhatsApp was a broadcast without a sufficient evidentiary record, and by failing to address the poster statements.

The court upheld the Deputy Judge's finding that the union constitution did not mandate arbitration for this dispute.