Leonard Ricchetti

Parents brought cross-motions seeking interim sole custody of two young children following separation.

The court considered conflicting allegations of abuse, the parties’ work schedules, the children’s established residence, schooling, and involvement of paternal grandparents.

Applying the best interests test under s. 16 of the Divorce Act, the court prioritized stability and continuity in residence and schooling.

The father’s home offered continuity with the children’s long‑time residence, school, and extended family support.

The court granted the father interim sole custody with substantial weekend and mid‑week parenting time to the mother and directed the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to investigate.

The accused, charged with multiple offences including robbery and firearm offences arising from a home invasion, brought an application arguing that the objective mens rea component of section 21(2) of the Criminal Code violates section 7 of the Charter.

The accused argued that a constitutionally protected minimum subjective mens rea is required for these offences due to their social stigma and mandatory minimum sentences.

The court dismissed the application, finding that neither robbery nor the firearm offences carry the requisite level of social stigma to mandate a constitutionally protected minimum subjective mens rea.

The Crown brought a certiorari application seeking to quash a preliminary inquiry judge’s decision discharging the accused on first degree murder and committing them only on second degree murder following the death of a child.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence when assessing whether there was some evidence of planned and deliberate murder or murder while committing forcible confinement under ss. 231(2) and 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court held that the preliminary inquiry judge had reviewed the relevant evidence and determined that the circumstantial evidence did not permit a reasonable inference of planning, deliberation, or forcible confinement forming part of the same transaction as the killing.

Errors relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, even if wrong, are within the preliminary inquiry judge’s jurisdiction and do not justify certiorari.

The court found no jurisdictional error.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm after striking the complainant on the head with a broomstick during a confrontation inside a residence.

The defence argued that the accused acted in self-defence, asserting that the complainant possessed a pocket knife and posed a threat.

The trial judge rejected this version of events, finding the defence witness unreliable and concluding there was no credible evidence that the complainant had a weapon or acted aggressively.

Applying the principles governing self-defence and the air of reality test, the court found that none of the essential elements of self-defence were supported by the evidence.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally struck the complainant with the broomstick, causing bodily harm.

The parties sought clarification of a previous order detailing a parenting schedule for their child.

The court defined the school year, summer school break, and professional activity days on consent.

The court also resolved contested issues regarding the definition of statutory holidays and the suspension of the four-week parenting cycle during the summer school break, expressing frustration at the parties' inability to cooperate and the need for the court to micromanage their schedule.

During a criminal jury trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, the defence objected to the Crown calling a police officer as an expert witness on drug trafficking practices.

Following a voir dire, the court considered the admissibility of the proposed opinion evidence under the framework from Mohan.

The court held the officer was qualified through experience in drug investigations and that his proposed testimony regarding common trafficking indicators—such as multiple cell phones, separation of drugs and cash, and possession of large amounts of currency—was relevant and necessary to assist the jury in assessing the accused’s knowledge of the drugs.

The court limited the scope of the expert evidence, ruling the officer could not opine on whether the accused possessed the drugs for the purpose of trafficking or had knowledge of the cocaine.

The evidence was admitted subject to those restrictions.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Six days before the scheduled trial, the defence brought a Charter application seeking to exclude the drugs and money seized, but failed to file an Application Record or Book of Authorities as required by the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

The Crown brought an application to dismiss the defence's Charter application under Rule 34.03.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the defence's non-compliance with the rules was serious and prejudicial to the Crown, the history of the proceedings showed numerous missed opportunities to bring the application, and the Charter application itself had little to no merit.

The applicant brought an interim family law motion seeking child support, spousal support, imputation of income, parenting orders, financial disclosure, and interim disbursement from proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.

The respondent opposed portions of the motion and sought different parenting arrangements and disclosure of medical records.

The court found the respondent had failed to provide adequate financial disclosure and imputed income based on an agreed historical average.

Interim child support and spousal support were ordered, the primary residence of both children was confirmed with the applicant, and a parenting schedule for the respondent was established.

The court also ordered an interim disbursement from the matrimonial home proceeds to the applicant and directed the parties to participate in family counselling and seek the involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The plaintiffs, Nashaat and Taghreed Aly, claimed a partnership interest in a family grocery business, Nader Halal, operated by Adel Tohamy.

The court found a valid oral agreement from 2001 granting the Alys a 20% interest.

In a related family law application, Adel's former wife, Naiema, sought to set aside two separation agreements that released her claims to the family businesses and spousal support.

The court set aside both agreements under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act due to Adel's deliberate failure to disclose significant assets, unconscionability, and duress.

The court also found the defendants engaged in spoliation of evidence by destroying financial records and ordered the appointment of a receiver over the businesses pending the damages phase of the trial.

The applicant, sought by the United States for his alleged role in a massive tax fraud scheme, applied for bail pending his extradition hearing.

The Crown opposed release on the primary ground, arguing the applicant posed a significant flight risk.

The court found that the applicant had access to unrecovered funds, ties outside of Canada, and a history of using false addresses to conceal his whereabouts.

Furthermore, the proposed sureties were deemed inadequate to supervise the applicant or ensure his attendance in court.

The application for bail was denied.

The accused was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault after stabbing the victim during a consensual fist fight.

The victim suffered a deep hand laceration and a serious abdominal wound penetrating the diaphragm.

The court reviewed sentencing ranges for knife-related aggravated assaults arising in consensual fights and emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives.

Despite mitigating factors including youth, lack of prior record, supportive family, and positive pre‑sentence report, the seriousness of the stabbing warranted a custodial sentence.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day, with enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody, along with a DNA order, lifetime weapons prohibition, and probation.

The accused brought a pre‑trial Charter motion seeking to quash a telewarrant authorizing searches of two properties and to exclude the resulting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused argued the telewarrant was improperly issued because it was not impracticable to obtain a warrant in person, the information to obtain lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and the police failed to provide full, frank, and fair disclosure.

The court held that the threshold of impracticability under s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code was met after the officer attempted to obtain a warrant in person but was told the justice of the peace lacked time to review the application.

After reviewing alleged omissions and inaccuracies in the ITO, the court found they were either immaterial, typographical, or properly omitted and that the ITO contained sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the issuing justice’s decision.

Even if a Charter breach had occurred, the evidence would not have been excluded under the s. 24(2) analysis.

The respondent in a family proceeding brought a motion to set aside a Certificate of Pending Litigation registered against residential property, arguing the applicant had no reasonable claim to an interest in the land.

The applicant asserted a constructive, resulting, or implied trust based on unjust enrichment arising from an eight‑year cohabitation during which she performed domestic and caregiving roles that allegedly enabled the respondent to focus on his business activities.

Applying the test under s. 103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act and the principles in Kerr v. Baranow, the court held that although the claim appeared weak, it was not devoid of merit and constituted a reasonable claim to an interest in land.

The court further exercised its equitable discretion to maintain the certificate, noting evidence that the moving party had previously engaged in sham transfers and asset shielding.

The motion to discharge the Certificate of Pending Litigation was dismissed.

The accused, owner of a hydroponics and garden supply store, was charged with conspiracy to produce and possess marihuana for the purpose of trafficking, aiding and abetting those offences, and money laundering.

The Crown alleged the accused operated his store as a 'one-stop shop' to supply marihuana grow operations, using clandestine business practices to protect customers' identities.

The court found the accused guilty of the conspiracy and aiding and abetting charges, concluding he knew and intended that his products and services would facilitate marihuana grow operations.

However, the accused was acquitted of money laundering, as the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the funds used to purchase 'ghost ownership' properties were derived specifically from the production of marihuana rather than unreported store profits.

The plaintiff employer brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction restraining union members from blockading its premises and engaging in intimidation and other unlawful conduct during a labour dispute.

Evidence established that picketers blocked trucks carrying materials from entering or leaving the employer’s facility and intimidated employees who continued working at residential construction sites.

The court held that picketing is lawful only when it constitutes communication and not obstruction or blockade.

The deliberate obstruction of property access and threats against workers constituted tortious and unlawful conduct, satisfying the requirements for interlocutory relief.

The court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and a balance of convenience favouring the employer.

An interlocutory injunction was granted establishing an ingress/egress protocol and prohibiting tortious and unlawful conduct by union members.

Following a family law motion in which the respondent’s pleadings were struck for failure to provide financial disclosure, the court determined the costs consequences.

The applicant sought $15,539 on a full recovery basis, arguing that the result exceeded her Offer to Settle.

The court held that the offer was reasonable and that the respondent’s persistent failure to comply with disclosure obligations and court orders warranted substantial indemnity costs as a sanction.

After reviewing the bill of costs and considering the complexity of the motion, counsel rates, and time spent, the court reduced certain items including travel time and some junior lawyer hours.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $10,000 in costs to the applicant.

The moving parties sought an order discharging a collateral mortgage registered against a residential property, arguing the mortgage secured only an excess condominium deposit insurance facility that had been satisfied and that sufficient funds were held in trust to cover any remaining liability.

The court held that the collateral mortgage secured the entire amended financing facility, which combined Tarion warranty bonding obligations and deposit insurance obligations.

The documentation clearly indicated the security applied to all liabilities arising under the amended facility and its amendments.

The court further found that funds held in trust were not guaranteed to satisfy the insurer’s potential claims and that a court-ordered expungement of a mortgage from title through vesting orders was not equivalent to a registered discharge.

Accordingly, the moving parties were not entitled to have the collateral mortgage discharged.

Following a family law motion concerning child support issues including daycare expenses and security for support, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant sought over $9,000 in costs and argued the respondent's failure to file an answer, provide financial disclosure, and adopt a hard‑line litigation approach unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings.

The court found that the respondent's conduct caused delay and increased costs, though the applicant was not successful on all issues, including a request for life insurance as security.

Considering the applicant’s offer to settle and partial success by the respondent, the court awarded reduced costs.

The costs were ordered enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office as they were connected to child support.

The mother brought a motion seeking a parenting schedule she argued would better reflect the intent of a prior final order providing for near equal parenting time.

The father opposed the motion and sought enforcement of the existing order, an order directing mediation pursuant to the dispute‑resolution clause in the order, and an order striking portions of the mother's affidavit that disclosed settlement negotiations.

The court held that settlement communications included in the affidavit were privileged and abusive to disclose and struck the relevant paragraph.

The court emphasized that parties who agree to mediation as a precondition to litigation should ordinarily be held to that obligation.

However, given the impending expiry of the existing schedule and the need for certainty for the child, the court imposed a parenting schedule for 2013 consistent with the parameters of the prior order.

During a jury trial for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon arising from a stabbing during a fistfight, the defence sought to have the defence of self-defence put to the jury.

The accused testified he did not bring the knife and did not intentionally stab the victim.

The trial judge ruled there was no air of reality to self-defence under s. 34(2) or s. 37 of the Criminal Code, as the accused's evidence of an accidental stabbing negated the requirement of an intentional act committed for self-preservation.