Leonard Ricchetti

Two related applications addressed whether a commercial general liability insurer owed a duty to defend or indemnify its insured gas station operators for environmental contamination claims brought by a landlord.

The landlord sought a declaration requiring the insurer to indemnify the tenants, while the insurer sought a declaration that its policy provided no coverage.

The court held that the landlord, as a stranger to the insurance contract, could not pursue indemnification before obtaining judgment against the insured under s. 132 of the Insurance Act.

Interpreting the policy wording and pollution exclusion clauses, the court found the claim fell squarely within the policy’s pollution exclusions.

The insurer therefore had no duty to defend or indemnify the tenants in the underlying environmental contamination action.

On competing interim motions in a family law proceeding, the responding party sought temporary sole custody, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, child support, and an interim disbursement, while the other party sought a nesting arrangement allowing the children to remain in the home with parents alternating residence weekly.

The court considered the best interests of the children under s. 24 of the Family Law Act and the practical implications of a nesting arrangement, including cost, housing availability, and stability for the children.

The court found the proposed nesting arrangement impractical and potentially destabilizing, particularly due to financial strain and the likely loss of a long-standing caregiver.

Balancing the statutory factors and the children’s interests, the court granted the mother temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home while maintaining interim joint custody and equal parenting time.

The applicants sought to set aside corporate Change Notices filed with the Ministry of Government Services that purported to remove existing directors of a non-profit amateur football corporation and replace them with the respondent and her supporters.

The dispute arose from competing groups seeking control of the organization and its assets.

The court found that the respondent lacked authority to unilaterally file the Change Notices and that the removals were not supported by proper corporate procedures, written resignations, or valid resolutions.

Evidence showed several directors had not resigned and continued to assert their positions.

The court set aside the Change Notices and directed that a properly constituted meeting be held to address the corporation’s governance issues.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that she was totally disabled and entitled to long term disability benefits under a group insurance policy.

The insurer argued that a prior settlement and release barred the claim and that there were unresolved factual issues concerning whether the plaintiff’s current condition was the same condition previously released.

The court held that determining whether the current condition fell within the scope of the prior release required medical expert evidence and credibility assessments not suitable for determination on a written record.

Additional issues remained regarding the plaintiff’s eligibility under the policy and whether she could perform other occupations after the initial disability period.

The court concluded that the evidentiary record did not allow a full appreciation of the issues on a summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff employee brought a summary judgment motion seeking entitlement to a profit‑sharing bonus following termination without cause.

The employer argued that the bonus was discretionary and payable only to employees actively employed at the time of announcement after the fiscal year.

The court held that the profit‑sharing bonus formed part of the employee’s compensation and that the statutory notice provisions of the Employment Standards Act, 2000 prohibited altering terms of employment during the notice period.

Because the bonus was announced during the statutory notice period, denying the payment would improperly alter the employee’s compensation.

Summary judgment was granted and the employee was awarded her share of the fiscal‑year bonus.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving entered after trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, where a $500 fine was imposed.

The appeal challenged the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the actus reus and mens rea of dangerous driving and raised additional issues regarding judicial notice of the roadway and the disclosure of settlement discussions during trial.

The appeal court held that the trial judge reasonably accepted the police officer’s evidence describing excessive speed and running a red light in a busy urban area and rejected the appellant’s contradictory testimony.

The court also found no prejudice arising from the trial judge’s inquiry about potential settlement discussions.

The conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and no reversible error occurred.

The court provided procedural directions for a consolidated trial involving corporate oppression claims, family law claims, and disputes over alleged ownership interests in several companies and properties.

Multiple parties proposed competing structures for the order in which the issues should be tried.

The court held that the determination of ownership interests in the companies and properties must occur first before any remedies could be considered, as premature remedies could prejudice other parties’ claims.

The court rejected a proposal to resolve one party’s oppression action in its entirety before the others and instead structured the trial into staged phases addressing ownership, family law and corporate claims, and finally remedies.

The court also imposed strict deadlines for motions, disclosure, and examinations prior to trial.

The court addressed three related proceedings involving family law claims and corporate oppression claims concerning ownership and profits of several closely held companies.

The issues included whether a former spouse retained a share interest in corporate entities following separation agreements and whether other parties were entitled to equity interests or damages relating to the same companies.

The court determined that the proceedings involved overlapping factual issues concerning share ownership, corporate value, and entitlement to profits.

To avoid inconsistent findings, duplication of evidence, and unnecessary costs, the court ordered that the three proceedings be tried together as a single consolidated trial under Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Procedural directions were issued governing pleadings, motions, and scheduling of the unified trial.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a final custody order respecting an adult child with significant developmental disabilities.

The prior consent order provided for joint decision-making and shared residence with disputes to be resolved by a parenting coordinator with binding authority.

The court found a material change in circumstances because the parenting coordinator process had collapsed due to the responding party’s refusal to cooperate, leaving the parties unable to make joint decisions regarding the child’s care and programming.

Applying the best interests test under s. 17 of the Divorce Act, the court concluded that sole custody with the applicant was necessary to ensure consistent decision-making and access to structured support programs.

Primary residence was granted to the applicant with alternating weekend access to the respondent and shared holidays.

The parties, equal shareholders in a successful machining business, reached a deadlock that paralyzed the companies' operations for eight months.

Bank accounts were frozen, creditors were unpaid, and the business ceased functioning.

The respondent brought a motion to appoint a receiver-manager.

The applicant agreed a receiver was necessary but sought a delay to negotiate a buyout.

The court found that further delay would be futile and disastrous for the companies, and ordered the immediate appointment of a receiver-manager under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act and s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

At a status hearing, the defendants argued that the action had been deemed dismissed as abandoned under Rule 48.15(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure because no step had been taken between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2011.

The plaintiff contended that Rule 48.15 applies only to undefended actions and that the proper rule governing defended actions was Rule 48.14.

The court reviewed the history and purpose of both rules and held that Rule 48.15, including its transition provision in subrule (6), was enacted to address undefended actions that had not progressed.

The court concluded that the rule does not apply to defended actions, which are already governed by the status hearing regime under Rule 48.14.

The action was therefore not deemed dismissed.

Sentencing following convictions for possession of a loaded restricted firearm, breach of a firearms prohibition order, and conspiracy to commit forcible confinement arising from a planned home invasion-style abduction.

Police discovered the offenders while they were surveilling the intended victim using GPS tracking and preparing restraints, disguises, and weapons.

The court held that the conspiracy had progressed beyond mere planning and was partially implemented, making denunciation and deterrence paramount.

For the primary offender, the presence of a loaded firearm and a significant violent criminal history were major aggravating factors.

The court imposed consecutive sentences but applied the totality principle to reduce the aggregate sentence.

The accused was charged with four counts of fraud over $5,000.

He represented himself as a wealthy, successful business person with influential connections to induce three individuals to invest money in an upcoming IPO for Interactive Brokers.

The accused did not invest the funds as promised and the victims lost their money.

The court found the accused guilty on three counts of fraud, concluding he made deceitful and false statements to obtain the funds.

The accused was found not guilty on the fourth count involving a school board, as the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the scoreboard in question did not exist.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings during a jury trial for sexual assault with a weapon and uttering threats, arguing that the police lost key seized items including the complainant’s nightgown and the accused’s underwear which could have contained potentially exculpatory forensic evidence.

The defence alleged the loss breached the accused’s s. 7 Charter rights by preventing full answer and defence.

The court applied the framework from R. v. La and R. v. Bero concerning the Crown’s duty to preserve relevant evidence and whether its loss resulted from unacceptable negligence.

The judge found the evidence was misplaced after many years but not due to unacceptable police negligence, noting the items were properly logged and secured and that much of the delay was attributable to the accused fleeing the jurisdiction for extended periods.

The court further held that the defence failed to demonstrate actual prejudice or that the missing evidence would materially assist the defence.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing claims alleging assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and breaches of Charter and human rights.

The action arose after the plaintiff refused to leave a retail store following a dispute over a refund and was subsequently detained by mall security and charged by police.

The court found that the moving defendants neither physically touched the plaintiff nor participated in his detention, arrest, or prosecution.

The evidence showed the detention was carried out by mall security and police after the plaintiff repeatedly refused to leave the premises.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the claims against the moving defendants.

During a criminal jury trial for sexual assault with a weapon and uttering threats, the defence applied for a mistrial after a police officer testified that seized items and a sexual assault kit were not sent to the Centre for Forensic Sciences because investigators believed sexual intercourse had occurred and the issue was consent.

The defence argued this constituted undisclosed information and prejudicial hearsay undermining the defence theory that no sexual intercourse occurred and that the Crown lacked corroborative forensic evidence.

The court held that disclosure obligations had not been breached and that the defence assumption about forensic testing did not arise from the disclosure provided.

While the officer’s explanation constituted inadmissible hearsay, the prejudice could be cured by a limiting instruction to the jury explaining that the evidence could not be used to establish that sexual intercourse occurred or that police had a reasonable basis for such a belief.

The court concluded there was no real danger of a miscarriage of justice requiring a mistrial.

The accused were charged with conspiracy to commit unlawful confinement, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The police discovered the accused and others in a secluded area with a rental vehicle containing items such as homemade zip-tie handcuffs, a mask, and a loaded handgun.

The accused were also using a laptop to track the GPS location of the intended victim's vehicle.

The court found both accused guilty of conspiracy to commit unlawful confinement.

The driver of the vehicle was found guilty of the firearm offences, while the other accused was acquitted of the firearm offences due to lack of evidence of knowledge or control.

The Crown sought a ruling that a videotaped police statement made by the accused was voluntary and admissible for use in cross-examination if the accused testified.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt because it did not call all police officers who might have had contact with the accused during the approximately ten-hour period between arrest and the interview.

The court held that the Crown is not required to call every officer who might have had incidental contact with an accused and that speculation about possible improper contact is insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.

The evidence showed the accused understood his rights, consulted counsel, and appeared alert and cooperative during the interview.

The court found no evidence of threats, inducements, or circumstances that would overbear the accused’s will.

In a pre-trial evidentiary motion during a criminal jury proceeding, the Crown sought to admit recordings of two 911 calls made shortly after an alleged sexual assault.

The defence argued the calls were not contemporaneous with the alleged offence and therefore could not qualify as spontaneous utterances, and further argued the evidence was unnecessary because the complainant could testify directly.

The court held that the complainant remained under the stress of the startling event when the calls were made, as she had fled the residence, was being pursued, and was crying and distraught.

The statements were therefore admissible under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

The court also held that the calls would be admissible under the principled approach due to reliability and necessity.

In a pre‑trial evidentiary application during a jury trial for sexual assault with a weapon and uttering a death threat, the accused sought to exclude alleged post‑offence conduct.

The Crown proposed to introduce evidence that the accused failed to attend a preliminary hearing and was later re‑arrested when returning to Canada.

The court held that the proposed evidence was not relevant to the issues at trial because there was no evidence establishing when or why the accused left the country or failed to attend court.

The judge further concluded that the evidence carried a high risk of prejudicial reasoning by inviting speculation that the accused fled due to guilt.

Even if minimally relevant, the prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative value and the evidence was excluded.