Shelley Maria Hallett

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded restricted firearm and breach of a lifetime firearms prohibition order.

The sentencing judge had imposed a global sentence of six years, less pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found the sentences demonstrably unfit given the respondent's incorrigibility, his prior firearms convictions, and his illegal presence in Canada following a deportation order.

The Court allowed the appeal and increased the sentences to 7.5 years for the firearm offence and 1 year consecutive for the breach, less pre-sentence custody.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder following a nightclub shooting.

At trial, a Crown witness unexpectedly testified that he, not the appellant, was the shooter.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec caution followed by a W.D. instruction regarding this witness's evidence, with the agreement of defence counsel.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Vetrovec caution should not have been given or should have been limited to inculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice and noting the defence's tactical agreement.

The sentence appeal, challenging the denial of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit and delayed parole eligibility, was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and designated a dangerous offender after rejecting a pre-trial plea offer from the Crown.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in excluding the entirety of his spontaneous exculpatory statements made upon arrest, in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt and automatism, and in failing to stay the dangerous offender application as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that while spontaneous exculpatory statements upon arrest may be admissible if the accused testifies, the trial judge's exclusion of the statements did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The court also found no errors in the jury instructions and held that the dangerous offender application was not an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation, arguing that post-sentence psychiatric evidence suggested he might now be a candidate for long-term offender status.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the original dangerous offender order was conceded to be correct at the time it was made.

The court held that the parole board, exercising its jurisdiction under section 761 of the Criminal Code, was in a better position than a trial court to assess the appellant's progress and potential for release into the community.

The appellant appealed his effective eight-year sentence for firearms offences, arguing it failed to reflect his guilty plea and rehabilitative potential, and represented too large an increase from his previous sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, emphasizing the extreme seriousness of attending a meeting to purchase firearms while armed with a loaded handgun containing hollow-point bullets.

The court noted the appellant was subject to three firearms prohibitions at the time and had a significant related criminal record, concluding the sentence was fit and no error in principle occurred.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give credit for pre-trial custody that resulted from other charges in Ottawa and Pembroke.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's decision was not unreasonable.

The court noted that the sentence remained well within the appropriate range given the appellant's criminal record, even though not all pre-trial custody was used up in the subsequent disposition of the Ottawa charges.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, failing to remain, and careless storage of firearms.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the warrantless entry into the appellant's home was not justified by hot pursuit or consent, thereby violating section 8 of the Charter and requiring the exclusion of the firearms evidence.

The driving convictions were upheld, but the total sentence was reduced to three years and the DNA order was set aside.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault, arguing that the summary conviction appeal court judge failed to provide adequate reasons and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and applied unequal scrutiny to the testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal court judge's reasons were adequate and permitted effective appellate review.

The Court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding the trial judge's assessment of credibility, the complainant's prior statements, and the use of confirmatory evidence.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and leave to appeal the sentence was refused.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and forcible confinement, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainants' credibility regarding consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony about her lack of consent and concluding that the trial judge did not engage in impermissible propensity reasoning.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and aggravated assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting his videotaped confession.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to properly consider the voluntariness of the statement given the suspect nature of the unrecorded interrogations that preceded it.

Furthermore, the Court held that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated because police failed to provide him with access to a telephone after he requested to speak with a lawyer.

The statements were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the appeal was allowed, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and criminal harassment against his stepdaughter.

The abuse began when the complainant was a young child and continued for fourteen years.

The trial judge imposed a total sentence of 5 years and 1.5 months, including a consecutive sentence for criminal harassment, and a section 161 prohibition order.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentences should be concurrent, the total sentence was excessive, and the prohibition order was overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the consecutive sentence appropriate, the total sentence fit given the egregious breach of trust, and the prohibition order within the trial judge's discretion.

The young person appealed his convictions for robbery and related offences.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made three reversible errors: improperly relying on consistency and demeanour to accept the evidence of an accomplice, erroneously treating the doctrine of recent possession as creating a presumption of fact, and improperly using post-offence conduct (disposing of a stolen cell phone) as probative of robbery when it was equally explained by the lesser offence of possessing stolen property.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement arising from a jury trial involving a co-accused who was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal held that, although it would have been preferable not to exhort the jury when the trial judge did, the instruction created no reasonable possibility of coercion or interference with free deliberation.

The court further held that the verdicts were not inconsistent because the jury could reasonably have had a doubt about the co-accused while accepting the complainant’s evidence concerning the appellant’s second act of intercourse and the related confinement.

The court also rejected the challenge to the recent complaint instruction, finding that, read in context, it properly addressed the defence attack on credibility and did not invite improper use of prior consistent statements.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing he was defending himself and his property when he threatened to shoot police officers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had no legal justification for his actions, despite noting the police could have handled the situation with more sensitivity.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving causing death, arguing that the trial judge's interventions during the defence expert's testimony raised a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the judge misapprehended the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the judge's interventions were appropriate in a judge-alone trial involving highly technical evidence and that the judge correctly understood and rejected the defence theory.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for robbery.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence, which the Court of Appeal rejected as not capable of belief.

The Court found the trial judge conducted the trial with scrupulous fairness despite the appellant choosing to self-represent.

The verdict was not unreasonable, and the trial judge did not err in failing to expressly address the defence of intoxication, given the appellant's own testimony.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence and that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, noting the appellant's record for similar offences and that he was on probation for assaulting the same victim.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part because the trial judge failed to credit the appellant for pre-trial custody on a 2:1 basis.

The sentence on count 3 was reduced to two months consecutive.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the summary conviction appeal court erred in failing to so find.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's explanation for moving a bed, which the trial judge found was belied by videotape evidence.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the photographic copy of the videotape and concluded it was open to a reasonable trier of fact to reach the trial judge's conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed.