Sergio Grillone

The defendant process server brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, which alleged fraud, conspiracy, negligence, and breach of contract arising from allegedly forged affidavits of service and fraudulent billing.

The court struck the breach of contract and negligence claims without leave to amend, finding no privity of contract and no tenable duty of care owed by the defendant in his capacity as a commissioner of oaths.

The fraud and conspiracy claims were struck with leave to amend, as the plaintiffs failed to plead the requisite material facts and elements with specificity.

Inflammatory paragraphs were also struck.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion to set aside a judgment obtained by the plaintiff litigation lender.

The judgment had been granted based on Minutes of Settlement executed by the parties after the defendants defaulted on a settlement agreement.

The defendant argued the judgment was incorrect, failed to acknowledge past payments, and was obtained using forged affidavits of service.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the judgment was a consent judgment, not a default judgment, and the defendant failed to establish any valid grounds such as fraud or mistake to set aside the underlying agreement.

The court also noted the defendant's significant delay in bringing the motion.

The defendants to the counterclaim brought a motion to set aside a noting in default.

Their counsel inadvertently missed the deadline to deliver a defence to the counterclaim after a negotiated resolution of a prior motion to strike.

The court found that the moving parties demonstrated a clear intention to defend the counterclaim, the delay was due to counsel's inadvertence, and the motion to set aside was brought promptly.

The court exercised its discretion to set aside the noting in default to allow the complex claims to be resolved on their merits.

The appellant, a self-represented lawyer, appealed an Associate Justice's dismissal of his motion for security for costs.

The appellant argued the Associate Justice erred by not first determining if the prerequisite factors under Rule 56.01(1) were met before exercising discretion, and by excluding a late-filed reply affidavit.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law.

The Associate Justice correctly applied a holistic approach to determine if a security for costs order was just, properly concluded the appellant failed to prove entitlement to costs as a self-represented litigant, and appropriately excluded the late affidavit due to prejudice.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement.

The core issue was the interpretation of an email clause regarding the direction of share purchase monies, specifically whether the phrase 'Subject to any contrary direction by His Honour' allowed the motion judge to direct funds into court for creditors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding it was open to him based on the record.

The appellants' application to introduce fresh evidence was dismissed as irrelevant or already dealt with by the settlement terms.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff lender brought a motion for summary judgment against a lawyer who failed to honour an irrevocable direction to pay settlement funds to repay a litigation loan.

The lawyer had acknowledged the direction but mistakenly paid the settlement funds directly to his client.

The court found the lawyer personally liable for breaching his covenant, treating it akin to a solicitor's undertaking.

The plaintiff was awarded the principal amount plus contractual interest up to the date of the breach, and statutory prejudgment interest thereafter.

The claim against the lawyer's LLP was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

The plaintiffs brought a Rule 21 motion to strike portions of the defendants' amended statement of defence and counterclaim, which relied on the doctrine of ex turpi causa.

The defendants alleged the loan funds advanced by the plaintiffs were obtained through illegal means.

The court struck the counterclaim without leave to amend, noting ex turpi causa operates only as a defence, not a cause of action.

The court also struck the relevant portion of the statement of defence, finding no pleaded nexus between the alleged illegal schemes and the loan transactions, but granted leave to amend.

The plaintiffs sought costs for their successful Fresh Evidence and Mareva Injunction motions against the Grillone Defendants, and the defendant Lisa Gatto sought costs for the Mareva Injunction motion that was withdrawn against her.

The court awarded Gatto $7,500 in partial indemnity costs payable by the plaintiffs.

The court found the Grillone Defendants engaged in dishonourable conduct deserving of censure and awarded the plaintiffs substantial indemnity costs totaling $44,500, which included the amount the plaintiffs were ordered to pay Gatto.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dated January 16, 2018.

However, no counsel appeared for the appellant at the hearing, and counsel for the respondent advised that a Notice of Abandonment was to be filed.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2)(a) to amend a 2014 default judgment against the defendant Grocery Dayton to make the defendant Wakefern Food Corporation liable for the judgment.

This was the second time the plaintiffs brought this motion; the first was dismissed and upheld by the Court of Appeal.

Wakefern raised a preliminary objection of res judicata.

The court found that the motion sought the same relief as the previous motion and that the new evidence relied upon by the plaintiffs could have been discovered with due diligence or did not constitute an admission.

The court dismissed the motion based on the doctrine of res judicata.

The plaintiff was injured during a soccer game when he was unexpectedly punched by an opposing player after the referee blew the whistle.

The plaintiff sued the opposing player, the soccer clubs, the coach, and the league for negligence.

The soccer club defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action against them.

The court granted the motion, finding that the assault was a sudden, unprovoked, and unforeseeable event, and that the coach and club defendants did not breach their standard of care.

The defendant Greensward brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the adequacy of salting at a commercial property where the plaintiff slipped and fell.

Alternatively, Greensward sought to stay the plaintiffs' action for non-compliance with an interlocutory order concerning undertakings.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues of material fact, particularly concerning the adequacy of salting and the standard of care, which required a trial and credibility assessment.

The court also dismissed the motion to stay the action, noting that the plaintiffs had shown partial compliance and that a stay was not "just" given the circumstances, but ordered the plaintiffs' counsel to provide a detailed affidavit on the status of all undertakings.

This endorsement concerns the costs of a motion where the defendants were entirely successful.

The defendants sought $3,938.05, but their bill of costs lacked time dockets, preventing the court from assessing potential duplication of effort by two counsel.

The plaintiff proposed paying $2,500.

The court found the plaintiff's proposed amount reasonable given the circumstances and the lack of detailed dockets from the defendants.

The plaintiff sought an order staying a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) application and a declaration that the defendants were estopped from bringing it.

The defendants had pleaded that the action was statute-barred under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, and had initiated a WSIAT Right to Sue Application.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants had attorned to the Superior Court's jurisdiction by consenting to a pre-trial conference date.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that the WSIAT has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the right to sue issue and that the defendants had not waived their right to proceed with the WSIAT hearing.

The defendants, Dr. Hans Dietrich Strauss and The Credit Valley Hospital, brought motions for summary judgment in a medical malpractice case concerning the death of Paul Delicata.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence in the care of the deceased.

The court found the plaintiffs' expert evidence inadmissible due to procedural non-compliance (not attached to an expert's affidavit, non-compliance with Rule 53.03 requirements).

Even if admissible, the expert reports were deficient and contradicted by hospital records.

The court accepted the defendants' expert evidence, concluding there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the standard of care or causation.

The motions for summary judgment were granted, and the action was dismissed against both defendants.

The defendant insurance company brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for long term disability benefits.

The insurer denied the claim based on a pre-existing condition exclusion, arguing the plaintiff only became eligible for coverage after a three-month waiting period following his transition to full-time employment.

The plaintiff argued he was not subject to the waiting period.

The court found the policy clearly defined an employee as permanent and full-time, and the plaintiff's own discovery evidence confirmed he understood his eligibility date.

The court granted summary judgment for the defendant and dismissed the action.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, arguing the claim was barred by s. 267.6 of the Insurance Act because the plaintiff’s automobile insurance was retroactively voided by the insurer after the accident.

The court considered whether the plaintiff was contravening s. 2(1) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act at the time of the accident.

The evidence showed the vehicle was insured on the date of the collision and the insurer confirmed coverage shortly afterward before later voiding the policy retroactively.

The court held that the statutory bar applies only where the vehicle was uninsured at the time of the incident.

A retroactive voiding of insurance after the accident did not establish that the vehicle was uninsured at the relevant time.

The plaintiffs brought an action for damages arising from a workplace accident where the plaintiff truck driver suffered a severe leg fracture while using an electrical pallet jack at the defendant's premises.

The action proceeded as an undefended trial against the defendant Grocery Dayton, who failed to file a Statement of Defence.

Liability was deemed admitted under Rule 25.07(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court assessed damages based on the plaintiff's evidence and filed reports, awarding $125,000 in general damages, $799,100 for future economic loss, $26,100 for future care costs, and $30,000 for the spouse's Family Law Act claim, totaling $980,200.

The plaintiff sought damages arising from a motor vehicle collision in which liability was admitted.

A jury assessed general damages at $35,000 but awarded nothing for competitive disadvantage or handyman services.

The trial judge was required to determine whether the claim met the statutory threshold under s.267.5 of the Insurance Act for recovery of non‑pecuniary damages.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that his ongoing symptoms were caused by the collision, given significant prior back injuries and more persuasive defence expert evidence.

In any event, the alleged impairments did not amount to a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function.

The action was dismissed for failure to meet the statutory threshold.

The court addressed deficiencies in materials previously submitted regarding claims involving minors represented by a litigation guardian.

The court had earlier directed counsel to provide additional medical, psychological, and factual details to demonstrate that the infant claims did not exceed $15,000, or alternatively to pay funds into court.

Counsel failed to respond to the court’s direction before the minors reached the age of majority.

The court ordered the solicitor to deliver a written report explaining the failure to comply with the court’s direction and outlining the ultimate result of the action.