Paul E.F. Martin

The applicant, Roderick John Melson, sought a declaration that cement blocks placed by the City of Kawartha Lakes trespassed on his property and an injunction for their removal.

The City argued the blocks were on public land forming part of the Victoria Rail Trail and were placed to address safety concerns caused by Melson's unauthorized use of the trail for industrial truck access.

The court found the City's land survey confirmed the blocks were on public land and that Melson could not establish a prescriptive easement, as his use was not continuous for 20 years.

The application was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the City.

The Township of Georgian Bay applied, without notice, for an order under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act permitting its Council members to participate in decision-making on certain matters despite declared conflicts.

The court granted the order, subject to judicial oversight for settlement approvals and indemnification issues, due to the impossibility of forming a quorum.

The decision discusses the statutory remedy of necessity and the appropriate controls to address conflicts in small municipalities.

This appeal arose from a personal injury action where the Town of Milton, a defendant, brought a third-party claim against Milton Hydro Distribution Inc. for contribution and indemnity, alleging negligent removal of a street luminaire.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the third-party claim, finding Milton Hydro owed no duty of care and that the Town of Milton's failure to inspect constituted an intervening act breaking causation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by conflating duty of care and causation analyses and incorrectly applying the intervening act doctrine.

The court emphasized that the passage of time alone does not negate foreseeability and that multiple parties can be responsible for harm.

The third-party claim was remitted for trial with the main action.

The applicant sought a declaration that mutual easements among the parties, which granted rights for vehicular and pedestrian access and egress, did not include the right for users to park on each other's lands.

The court found that the easements unambiguously dealt only with access and egress, and that parking rights were contractual obligations established through separate agreements, such as a Site Plan Agreement and a tripartite agreement, rather than property rights conveyed by the easements.

The application was granted, and the counter-application was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a food and beverage operator, sued the defendant hotel for unlawful and bad faith termination of their commercial leases and service agreements.

The hotel terminated the agreements during the COVID-19 pandemic, alleging unpaid rent and other breaches, while secretly negotiating with a replacement operator.

The court found the termination was unlawful and in bad faith, as the hotel wrongfully withheld deposits, owed the plaintiff money, and unreasonably refused to assist with a government rent subsidy application.

The court awarded the plaintiff reliance damages for its capital investments and employee termination costs, less a set-off for the hotel's proven counterclaim.

The City of Kawartha Lakes brought an application for a permanent injunction, a closure order, and a mandatory remediation order against the respondents for operating an illegal commercial fill site on environmentally sensitive land.

The City also brought a motion for contempt against one respondent for continuing the fill operation in breach of a prior interim injunction.

The court granted the permanent injunction, closure order, and mandatory order, finding the respondents had blatantly violated municipal by-laws and imported massive amounts of contaminated fill.

The court also found the respondent in contempt beyond a reasonable doubt and ordered him to purge his contempt by remediating the property at his own expense.

The appellant municipality appealed an interlocutory order that set aside a consent dismissal of an action and consolidated it with another ongoing action.

The parties had previously agreed to settle the action, but a dispute arose over the specific wording of the release regarding the respondent's ability to call evidence in the ongoing action.

The motion judge found the settlement was contingent on the respondent agreeing to the release terms.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error as the essential terms of the settlement had been agreed upon and the proposed release accurately reflected those terms.

The settlement was enforced and the consent dismissal reinstated.

The appellant was electrocuted by stray voltage from a light pole at a municipally-owned soccer field.

The damage to the pole was caused by a lightning strike.

The appellants sued under the Occupiers' Liability Act, but the trial judge dismissed the action, finding the municipality met the standard of care.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in his factual findings regarding the timing of the lightning strike and in admitting and relying on the respondent's expert evidence regarding the inefficacy of pen testers to detect stray voltage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's factual findings or evidentiary rulings.

The plaintiff, a Starbucks franchisee, sought an urgent interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendants (landlords) from interfering with its use of a "Disputed Space" essential for its operations at Hotel X. The defendants sought to terminate the tenancy, asserting the plaintiff was trespassing on the Disputed Space, which was not explicitly included in the lease but was built out and paid for by the plaintiff.

The court applied the R.J.R. MacDonald test, finding a prima facie case, irreparable harm to the plaintiff, and that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunction, subject to terms regarding rent and sharing of the space.

The defendant director brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing claims against him personally in a commercial dispute arising from a proposed hotel development joint venture.

The plaintiff alleged the director breached fiduciary duties and induced breach of contract and trust after removing the plaintiff from negotiations with a municipal authority.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring trial regarding the director’s personal liability.

Directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, not to third-party stakeholders, and the plaintiff failed to establish a fiduciary relationship or any trust asset arising from the letter of intent.

The court further held that the director’s actions were taken bona fide on behalf of the corporation and were protected by the Said v. Butt principle.