Michael Finley

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for a stay and the granting of the respondents' motion to strike, the parties could not agree on costs.

The respondents sought partial indemnity costs.

The applicant argued that no costs should be awarded as this was public interest litigation.

The court held that the public interest nature of the case did not exempt the applicant from costs rules, especially given the voluminous record and the significant economic interests at stake.

The court fixed costs at $35,000 for the proponent and $12,500 for the City, payable by the applicant.

The applicant sought a stay of a zoning bylaw amendment that permitted a Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Ottawa, pending its application for judicial review.

The respondents opposed the stay and moved to strike portions of the application and the applicant's affidavit evidence.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favoured the respondents.

The court granted the motion to strike in part, striking the challenge to the Municipal Support Resolution as statute-barred, striking portions of the application that impermissibly sought reasonableness review of the bylaw, and striking several affidavits and portions of affidavits that contained impermissible opinion evidence from unqualified laypersons.

The Corporation of the City of Windsor sought to continue an injunction against "Persons Unknown" who were blocking the Ambassador Bridge.

The court had previously granted an interim injunction.

The City argued that protesters continued to breach municipal by-laws and the prior court order, and there was a risk of continued blockades.

The court found that the City established a strong prima facie case of by-law breaches and defiance of the prior order.

Applying the test for statutory injunctions under s. 440 of the Municipal Act, 2001, the court granted a permanent injunction, emphasizing the public interest in upholding the rule of law and that Charter rights do not protect unlawful conduct.

The successful appellant, Mount Pleasant Group of Cemeteries, sought costs of the appeal and the underlying application from the respondents.

The respondents argued they should be shielded from costs as public interest litigants.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the respondents were public interest litigants but held this did not excuse them from all costs consequences.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01(1) and the respondents' public interest status, the Court ordered the corporate respondent to pay $350,000 in total costs and the individual respondent to pay $10,000.

The appellant cemetery group appealed a decision declaring that its directors were invalidly appointed under 1849 legislation, that its funeral home and visitation centre businesses exceeded its statutory objects, and that it was a charitable purpose trust subject to the Charities Accounting Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that an 1871 Act fundamentally changed the cemetery's governance to a corporate model, displacing the pioneer public election process.

The Court also held that the ancillary funeral operations were within the cemetery's objects and that the cemetery was a statutory trust, not a charitable purpose trust.

The respondents' cross-appeal seeking an investigation by the Public Guardian and Trustee was dismissed.

This decision addresses motions for leave to intervene and to file records in a constitutional reference concerning the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to twelve parties, including three Attorneys General as of right and nine additional parties seeking discretionary leave.

The judge declined to grant leave to one individual applicant.

The decision also addresses the scope of factums, oral argument time allocation, and the relaxed approach to supplementing the record in constitutional references as a court of first instance.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's dismissal of an appeal.

The respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, citing the nature of the underlying allegations and the trial judge's findings.

The appellants argued for costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale, finding that while substantial indemnity costs were appropriate at trial due to the appellants' conduct, there was no principled basis to impose such costs for the appeal itself.

The appellants had a right to appeal and raised legitimate issues.

This appeal concerns a serious and sustained Internet defamation campaign orchestrated by the appellant Rabinowitz against the respondent Rutman, a Toronto chartered accountant and businessman.

Rabinowitz admitted liability for defamatory statements posted on the Internet alleging tax fraud, theft, and cheating.

The trial judge found the appellants Bergman and Artcraft Company Inc. jointly and severally liable for the defamation.

The trial judge awarded $200,000 in general damages, $200,000 in aggravated damages, and $250,000 in punitive damages against Rabinowitz, and $50,000 in punitive damages against Bergman.

The appellants appealed on grounds of liability and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on concerted action liability, vicarious liability of the corporation, and the quantum of damages awarded.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set a timetable for trial, while the defendants sought to dismiss the action for delay.

The plaintiff's lawyer cited medical and practice issues to explain the delay, which the court found lacked particularity.

Furthermore, a key defendant who provided independent legal advice had suffered a stroke and severe memory loss during the delay, causing non-compensable prejudice.

The court applied the Faris test and dismissed the action for delay.

The appellants commenced a proposed class action for damages for misrepresentations in a takeover bid circular under s. 131(1) of the Securities Act.

The motion judge ruled that plaintiffs must elect whether to sue the offeror or its directors/signatories, and that secondary market sellers could not rely on s. 131(1).

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that s. 131(1) allows a plaintiff to sue both the offeror and its directors/signatories for damages.

However, the Court upheld the ruling that secondary market sellers cannot assert a claim under s. 131(1), as they must rely on the statutory cause of action in Part XXIII.1.

The appellant purchased properties and executed vendor take back mortgages and a development agreement, paying land transfer tax on the total amount including the development milestones.

The development milestones were never met, the agreement was terminated, and the mortgages were discharged.

The appellant sought a refund of the land transfer tax paid on the development amounts.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the obligations under the development agreement formed an integral part of the consideration given on closing, and the contingent nature of the liability did not exclude it from the value of consideration under the Land Transfer Tax Act.

Following the successful certification of a class action concerning metal-on-metal hip implants, the plaintiff sought costs of $584,288 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court applied its established approach to certification costs, reducing the hourly rates to comply with the Rules Committee Grid.

The court further reduced the fees by 50 percent because class counsel spent an inordinate amount of time unnecessarily litigating the merits of the action.

Disbursements were also reduced, as an expensive expert report was deemed not essential for certification.

Ultimately, the court fixed costs at $200,000 payable forthwith and $65,000 in the cause.

The plaintiff sought certification of a proposed class proceeding alleging that large‑head metal‑on‑metal hip implants designed and distributed by the defendants were defective and caused injury.

The defendants contested certification primarily on the basis that the proposed common issues lacked sufficient commonality and that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

The court applied the “some basis in fact” standard under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and held that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence of product defect and class‑wide commonality to support most proposed common issues.

The court found that negligence, duty of care, breach of standard of care, medical monitoring costs, and punitive damages issues could proceed on a class‑wide basis, subject to certain amendments.

The action was certified as a class proceeding with most proposed common issues approved.