Meaghan Thomas

The accused, a former foster mother, was charged with historical sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a former foster child.

The complainant alleged a sexual relationship occurred when he was a teenager living in the accused's care.

The accused testified and denied the allegations, providing plausible explanations for their relationship and interactions.

Applying the W.(D) framework, the court found the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt and noted significant inconsistencies and a lack of detail in the complainant's testimony.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

A 16-year-old youth was charged with sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code for conduct that occurred on December 13, 2015.

The complainant, a 19-year-old, alleged that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina without consent during a sexual encounter that began with consensual sexual activity.

The accused admitted to vaginal intercourse but claimed it was unintentional and that he believed he was engaging in anal intercourse to which the complainant had consented.

The trial addressed both the admissibility of the accused's statement to police under section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the substantive elements of sexual assault, including the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The applicant, who was convicted of manslaughter, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing that the delay of approximately six years and seven months from the date of charge to the anticipated end of his trial was unreasonable under s. 11(b).

The court applied the Jordan framework and determined that the delay attributable to certiorari proceedings and appeals therefrom should be excluded from the calculation.

The court found that the net delay was well below the 30-month ceiling.

Alternatively, even if the appellate delay was included, deductions for defence delay and exceptional circumstances (including discrete events and case complexity) brought the delay below the ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter for his role in a home invasion and robbery that resulted in the shooting death of a 19-year-old victim.

The accused provided information and assistance to the perpetrators but was not present during the home invasion and did not have subjective foresight of death.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of a planned home invasion for greed against mitigating factors including the accused's youth, lack of criminal record, and adherence to bail conditions over five years.

The accused was sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment, less 17 months' credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused brought a section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with more than the legal amount of alcohol in his blood.

The parties agreed that the net delay was less than 18 months, placing the case within the presumptively reasonable delay threshold established in R. v. Jordan.

The court applied the transitional framework from Jordan, considering whether the accused took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and whether the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The court found that after deducting neutral delay periods (intake period, preparation time, defence counsel unavailability, and post-adjournment defence delay), the Crown delay was approximately 8.6 months, well within Morin guidelines.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender/long-term offender assessment under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code and sought to designate Dr. Philip Klassen as the assessor.

Defence counsel opposed this designation, proposing alternative psychiatrists.

The court held that while the accused has a role in the expert designation, the court should defer to the Crown's choice absent cogent and compelling reasons indicating the Crown's choice is inappropriate, such as lack of qualifications, bias, or unavailability.

The court found no such reasons to reject Dr. Klassen and rejected the defence's proposals due to potential bias (treating psychiatrist) and unavailability.

Dr. Klassen was designated.

The Member, a registered nurse, was found guilty of manslaughter in relation to the death of her husband.

She admitted to failing to provide the necessities of life and failing to seek medical assistance when he was in medical distress.

The Discipline Committee found that the Member committed an act of professional misconduct.

Accepting a joint submission, the Committee ordered the immediate revocation of the Member's certificate of registration, emphasizing the need for general deterrence and public protection.

The appellant appealed her conviction for sexually assaulting a five-year-old child.

At trial, the judge relied on the unlikelihood that a young child would have knowledge of oral sex without having experienced it with the appellant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by dismissing her application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant about a prior incident involving another child, which might have explained the complainant's sexual knowledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's trial counsel had explicitly chosen not to cross-examine on the incident itself, but only on the motive to fabricate, and that the trial judge made no error in her ruling.

The accused was tried on child pornography offences arising from files found on a LimeWire-enabled computer in a shared residence.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework, rejected the accused's evidence that his roommate was the true user, and found on circumstantial and forensic evidence that the accused was the sole user of the computer and had constructive possession of the files.

However, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew, or was wilfully blind to the fact, that LimeWire was a file-sharing program that made files available to others.

Convictions were entered on two possession counts, the accessing count was dismissed, and the accused was acquitted on making child pornography available.

The Crown sought to qualify a police detective as an expert witness on drug trafficking indicators in a prosecution for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The proposed opinion evidence addressed crack cocaine consumption patterns, typical quantities held by users, and the absence of consumption tools as indicative of trafficking.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and subsequent guidance from appellate jurisprudence, including Sekhon, emphasizing the trial judge’s gatekeeping role regarding expert evidence.

The court held the proposed opinions were largely anecdotal, insufficiently grounded in specialized expertise, and not necessary to assist the trier of fact.

Given the modest quantity of drugs seized and the proximity of the opinion to the ultimate issue of intent, the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value and the evidence was excluded.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, attempted aggravated sexual assault, attempt to administer a noxious thing, and sexual assault against a developmentally delayed complainant, alleging he attempted to infect the complainant with HIV.

The trial was severed from counts involving other complainants.

The court found the accused intended to infect others with HIV, but the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused attempted to anally penetrate the complainant without consent, due to inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The accused was acquitted of the main charges but found guilty of a conceded breach of probation charge.

The Crown brought an application to admit a videotaped statement made by the accused to police.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to a missing minute of the video recording, an unrecorded cell block visit, and a failure to comply with a remand warrant.

The accused also argued that a previous ruling in a separate proceeding excluding the same statement should bar its admission based on issue estoppel.

The court held that issue estoppel does not apply to voluntariness rulings.

The court further found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, as the missing recording and technical warrant violation did not overbear the accused's will.

The Crown sought to admit a videotaped statement made by the accused to police.

The statement had previously been ruled inadmissible in a separate proceeding before a different judge.

The court held that issue estoppel did not apply to voluntariness rulings and permitted the voir dire.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to a missing minute of video recording, an unrecorded interaction in the holding cells, and a failure to transport him directly to the remand centre after bail court.

The court found the police explanations reasonable, no evidence of improper conduct, and concluded the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The accused applied under s. 591(3)(a) of the Criminal Code to sever counts relating to one complainant from a multi-count indictment involving seven complainants alleging sexual offences and attempted murder arising from nondisclosure of HIV-positive status.

The accused argued he intended to testify regarding the severed complainant’s allegations, which included disputed non-consensual conduct, but not regarding the other complainants whose sexual encounters were admitted to be consensual at the time.

The Crown opposed severance, asserting a strong factual nexus among the counts and a viable similar fact evidence application based on an alleged pattern of behaviour and extensive chat log evidence demonstrating intent.

The court held that the accused established an objectively justifiable basis for testifying on the severed counts but not the others, and that forcing a joint trial would prejudice the accused’s right to choose whether to testify.

Severance of the counts relating to the particular complainant was therefore granted in the interests of justice.

The accused was charged with breaking and entering into a residential unit and committing assault therein.

The Crown sought a conviction for mischief as an included offence after the accused was acquitted of the primary charges.

The court examined whether mischief constitutes an included offence within a break and enter charge under section 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court applied the strict test from R. v. G.R., finding that mischief is not necessarily committed every time a break and enter occurs, and therefore cannot qualify as an included offence.

The accused was acquitted of mischief.

The appellant appealed the imposition of a lifetime prohibition order under s. 161(1)(a) of the Criminal Code following convictions for serious sexual offences against young persons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the order appropriate given the appellant's history, psychological reports, and failure to obey court orders.

The Court noted the appellant could apply to vary the order in the future under s. 161(3) if his circumstances changed.