Matthew Cornett

The applicant sought judicial review of two Toronto Licensing Tribunal decisions that first suspended and later revoked his vehicle-for-hire licence due to uncivil behaviour toward municipal staff.

The applicant argued the tribunal ignored evidence of provocation and breached procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the tribunal reasonably weighed the evidence, considered the context, and appropriately prioritized the public interest after the applicant continued his behaviour despite completing anger management counselling.

The respondent City of Toronto brought a preliminary motion to strike portions of the applicant's 1,127-page application record in a judicial review of a zoning bylaw amendment for supportive housing.

The applicant sought to introduce affidavit evidence regarding other City projects to demonstrate a pattern of closed-mindedness and lack of consultation.

The court partially granted the motion, striking evidence that was irrelevant, argumentative, inflammatory, or related to post-decision events, while permitting some evidence regarding the applicant's claims of bias and an improperly restricted record to remain for the panel's consideration.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the City of Toronto from raising the flag of the State of Palestine at City Hall.

The applicants argued the approval was ultra vires, breached the City's Flag Policy, and violated the duty of neutrality.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found no serious issue to be tried, as the City's decision was reasonable and within its authority.

The court also found the applicants failed to establish irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses a motion for costs brought by the Toronto Police Service Board following the abandonment of an appeal by Gary Curtis and Tanya Rebello.

The court found that the Board was entitled to costs, as its responding materials were served before the Notice of Abandonment was filed.

The court rejected the applicants' arguments regarding entitlement and quantum of costs, and awarded the Board $19,365.37, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The applicant, a declared vexatious litigant, brought a 16-page Notice of Application.

The City of Toronto, as the first named respondent, sought dismissal of the application under Rule 2.1.03.

The court found that the applicant failed to follow the required procedure for vexatious litigants to seek leave to proceed, as established by a prior order.

Citing previous decisions involving the same applicant, the court dismissed the application in its entirety and ordered the applicant to pay costs on a substantial indemnity basis to each respondent.

The Applicant sought to quash a City of Toronto by-law (By-law 1515-2019, section 1(A)) that limited the issuance of new payday loan establishment licenses to renewals only, arguing it was ultra vires the City of Toronto Act, 2006, discriminatory, and in conflict with federal and provincial legislation.

The court dismissed the application, finding the by-law to be a valid exercise of the City's broad authority for consumer protection, not discriminatory in the municipal law sense, and not in conflict with higher legislation, as it did not prohibit all payday loan operations nor frustrate the purpose of the relevant Acts.

The plaintiff brought an action for malicious prosecution and Charter breaches against the Crown and the Toronto Police Services Board, arising from a 2013 police shooting during the execution of a search warrant and his subsequent criminal prosecution, which ended in acquittals in 2014.

The plaintiff sought leave under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act to continue his claim against the Crown.

The Board moved for summary judgment based on the expiry of the limitation period, and the Crown moved to strike the Charter claims.

The court denied leave, finding no reasonable possibility of success for the malicious prosecution claim.

The court granted summary judgment to the Board, as the action was commenced more than six years after the acquittals and the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability.

The Charter claims against the Crown were also struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The defendant Toronto Police Services Board brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's amended statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(a) and (b).

The plaintiff claimed damages in negligence, alleging a police officer failed or refused to lay charges after investigating his complaint of assault.

The court held that police do not owe a private law duty of care to victims of crime regarding the investigation or prosecution of alleged crimes, as this duty is owed to the public as a whole.

Finding it plain and obvious that the claim had no reasonable chance of success, the court struck the claim without leave to amend.

The plaintiffs, taxicab plate owners, brought a proposed $1.7 billion class action against the City of Toronto, alleging negligence in the enforcement of its taxicab bylaws against Uber and in the enactment of a new bylaw permitting private transportation companies.

The plaintiffs moved for certification under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the City's enactment of the bylaw was a legislative function immune from private damage suits, and its enforcement of the bylaws was a public duty that did not create a private law duty of care to the taxicab plate owners for pure economic losses.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice in which the trial judge determined that the site occupied by the appellant belonged to the City of Toronto and that the appellant was not authorized to place his property there.

The appellant raised substantially the same arguments on appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's determination regarding ownership of the site was a question of fact and that no palpable and overriding error had been committed.

The conclusion that the City had the authority to remove and destroy the appellant's property was well-founded.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision refusing to set aside a Registrar's dismissal of their action for delay.

The original action alleged negligence by police and Crown attorneys, and claims of terror, intimidation, assault, and unauthorized searches by police, stemming from a private prosecution that resulted in an acquittal.

The Master's decision was based on the appellants' failure to explain the delay, their lack of promptness in moving to set aside the dismissal, and the presumption of prejudice to the respondents.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the Master's discretionary decision, noting that the appellants' action was also unlikely to succeed due to prosecutorial immunity.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving parties sought to set aside a registrar's dismissal order made for delay under the Rules of Civil Procedure in an action alleging police misconduct, bad faith investigation, and Charter breaches arising from events tied to a prior criminal prosecution.

Applying the established four-factor framework, the court held the moving parties failed to adequately explain the litigation delay, failed to show inadvertence in missing the deadline, and failed to bring the motion promptly.

The court further found a presumption of prejudice arising from the passage of time, held that presumption was not rebutted, and found actual prejudice to the police defendants due to unavailable witnesses and faded memories.

In a contextual assessment, the court also accepted that there was no valid cause of action against the provincial Crown on the pleaded facts.

The motion to set aside the dismissal was dismissed, with no costs sought.

The municipality sought an injunction requiring the respondents to obtain a licence as either a taxicab broker or a limousine service company under Chapter 545 of the City of Toronto Municipal Code.

The application alleged that the respondents, through their smartphone platform, accepted requests for transportation services and therefore carried on a regulated business.

The court interpreted the by‑law definitions of “taxicab”, “limousine service company”, and the requirement to “accept calls”, concluding that the automated software platform merely relayed digital requests between passengers and drivers.

Because acceptance occurred only when an individual driver chose to accept a trip request, the respondents themselves did not accept calls or requests within the meaning of the by‑law.

Accordingly, the respondents were not operating as a taxicab broker or limousine service company requiring a municipal licence.

On a motion for a sealing order in the context of a municipal enforcement application concerning ride-sharing services, the moving parties sought to keep an insurance policy confidential under s. 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Applying the Sierra Club test, the court held the evidence did not establish a real and substantial risk to an important commercial interest capable of being expressed as a public interest in confidentiality.

The absence of evidence from the insurer and the nature of the document as an insurance policy undermined the claim of confidentiality and competitive harm.

The court further indicated that, even if the first branch had been met, the salutary effects would not outweigh the deleterious effects given the open court principle and the public interest nature of the underlying proceeding.

The motion was dismissed.