Lisa Mathews

The appellant appealed his convictions and life sentence for terrorism-related offences, including conspiracy to commit murder.

He raised several grounds of appeal, arguing the trial judge erred in handling national security privilege claims during O'Connor and Garofoli applications, failing to sever his trial from a disruptive co-accused, misdirecting the jury on the law of conspiracy, and finding the co-accused fit for sentencing.

He also alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias based on an out-of-court comment by the trial judge praising an undercover agent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no procedural or legal errors that compromised trial fairness, and upheld the life sentence as fit for the gravity of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import narcotics in association with a criminal organization.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule (the Carter analysis) and that the conspiracy conviction was inconsistent with his acquittal on a related trafficking charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were functional and not confusing, and that the disparate verdicts were intelligible given the distinct evidence and theories for each charge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and uttering a death threat, arguing that the wiretap authorization that led to his arrest was unconstitutional.

He contended that sections 185 and 186 of the Criminal Code violate section 8 of the Charter by allowing private communications to be intercepted based on a 'may assist' standard rather than a 'will assist' standard for specific individuals, places, and devices.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming prior jurisprudence that the 'will assist' standard applies to the authorization as a whole, while the 'may assist' standard for naming known persons is constitutionally compliant given the prospective nature of wiretaps and the robust statutory safeguards in place.

The accused, charged with four counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder arising from a vehicle attack on a Muslim family, applied for a change of venue.

The accused argued that extensive media coverage, community events, and political commentary in London, Ontario, rendered it impossible to select an impartial jury there.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that publicity was widespread and safeguards like challenges for cause were sufficient.

The court granted the application, finding that the saturation of local coverage and the community's sense of personal violation created a risk of subconscious bias that warranted moving the trial to ensure a fair and impartial jury.

The applicant challenged the constitutional validity of s. 577 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the Attorney General's power to direct an indictment without providing reasons or a preliminary hearing violates s. 7 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that binding precedent establishes there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing and that core prosecutorial discretion, including the decision to direct an indictment, is not subject to routine judicial review absent an abuse of process.

The Crown brought a motion to summarily dismiss the responding parties' application for disclosure under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The responding parties sought disclosure of alleged out-of-court communications between the trial judge and an FBI handler, which were referenced in a book published by an undercover agent, to support a reasonable apprehension of bias claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's motion, finding it premature to conclude the bias claim could not succeed, and ordered the Crown to make further inquiries regarding the alleged communications.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime, as well as his 20-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility, denying a change of venue, finding reasonable grounds for his arrest, and upholding the lawfulness of a strip search.

He also challenged the pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the credibility assessment, no error in the venue decision, and that the arrest and subsequent searches were lawful and Charter-compliant.

The court also deferred to the trial judge's discretionary calculation of pre-sentence credit.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code pending his re-trial on terrorism charges.

Before the terms of release were finalized, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the applicant's convictions, resulting in him serving a life sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 680 application as moot, noting that any future application for release must be brought under s. 679 for bail pending appeal.

A publication ban under s. 517 was also lifted.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order pending his retrial for terrorist-related offences.

The bail judge had dismissed his application on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The reviewing judge found the bail judge erred by misapprehending a risk assessment, failing to address the applicant's present ideology, and considering irrelevant factors regarding the proposed sureties.

Fresh evidence regarding trial delay, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the applicant's rehabilitation was admitted.

The application was allowed, and the applicant was released on strict bail conditions including house arrest, electronic monitoring, and four sureties.

The Crown appealed an acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a police search of a hotel bedroom was not a justified safety search and in excluding the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the officers had predetermined to conduct the search before arriving, which supported the trial judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable apprehension of imminent harm.

The Court found no basis to interfere with the exclusion of evidence, as the trial judge did not find the search was conducted in good faith.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld his conviction.

The appellant argued that the unusual fact situation required the court to grant leave regarding the law of entrapment.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding the law of entrapment well settled and its application to the facts uncontroversial.

The applicant corporation sought the return of $144,050 in cash seized by police during a drug and money laundering investigation targeting its former director.

The applicant argued it was the lawful owner of the funds, which it claimed were a business float, and that the funds were not required for the pending criminal proceedings.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that it was the lawful owner of the funds, and that the funds were required as evidence for the upcoming preliminary inquiry and trial.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction and sentence arising from an incident where he retained half of a quantity of marijuana that had been turned over to him while on duty during an internal police investigation.

He argued that the police investigation constituted entrapment and amounted to impermissible random virtue testing under the principles set out in R v Barnes.

The court held that the police had reasonable suspicion based on prior information suggesting chronic marijuana use by the appellant and that the reverse sting operation was a legitimate investigative step.

The court concluded there was no entrapment or abuse of process and upheld both the conviction and sentence, emphasizing the breach of trust inherent in the conduct of a serving police officer.

The accused brought an application to exclude evidence of drugs found during a vehicle search, arguing his arrest was arbitrary and the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The police had intercepted communications and conducted surveillance indicating the accused was transporting drugs.

The court found the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused based on this evidence.

The subsequent search of the vehicle was a valid search incident to arrest, and as a passenger, the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The appellant sought to appeal a forfeiture order regarding Hell's Angels paraphernalia seized from his residence.

During his sentencing, the appellant disavowed any interest in the property, claiming it belonged to the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Corporation.

He chose not to participate in the subsequent forfeiture proceedings.

After the Corporation's appeal of the forfeiture order was dismissed as abandoned, the appellant attempted to appeal the order himself.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it would be an abuse of process to allow the appellant to challenge an order made in proceedings he deliberately chose to ignore.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to grant a stay of proceedings based on the Crown's failure to disclose telewarrant documents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a stay is a remedy of last resort and should only be granted where there is no other adequate remedy or irreparable prejudice.

The court found that any prejudice could have been remedied by an adjournment, a mistrial, or allowing the withdrawal of admissions.

The stay was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal entered by the trial judge in a drug trafficking case.

The trial judge had ruled that the testimony of the alleged purchaser was essential to support a conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding ample basis in the police officer's testimony to infer a drug transaction occurred, and held that the trial judge erred in law.

The acquittal was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was stopped for stunt driving and his vehicle was impounded under the Highway Traffic Act.

During an inventory search of the vehicle, police opened a bag and found cocaine and marijuana.

The appellant appealed his drug convictions, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights because inventory searches should be limited to itemizing visible property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that police are entitled to search and itemize the contents of bags and containers during an inventory search to properly safeguard the property.