Ian Bell

On a criminal appeal from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the appellant challenged an order staying proceedings.

The Supreme Court heard the appeal and delivered oral judgment the same day.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the stay order, and remitted the matter for trial.

Reasons were stated to follow.

The appellant appealed her conviction resulting from a guilty plea to possession of cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a concealed weapon.

She challenged the validity of her guilty plea, claiming it was not voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

She also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis that counsel failed to assist her in striking her plea and failed to oppose a no-contact order with her co-accused.

The court found that the trial judge conducted an extensive inquiry to ensure the appellant understood the plea and its consequences, and that the appellant's plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The court also found that counsel's assistance was not ineffective, as counsel reviewed disclosure, advised on trial prospects, and followed the appellant's instructions throughout the proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an application judge's order staying drug trafficking proceedings against the respondents due to a breach of their right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling, and the Crown argued the delay was justified by the complexity of the multi-accused project investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the Crown failed to meet its burden to show the case was sufficiently complex to justify the delay, particularly since the respondents were not participating in a lengthy pre-trial application that complicated other related prosecutions.

The appellant appealed the termination of a conditional sentence for breach of conditions, specifically contacting a prohibited person and engaging in drug trafficking.

The appeal also sought credit for a 13-month delay during which the sentence was suspended but conditions remained.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence for the breach and no exceptional circumstances to grant credit for the delay, as most of the delay was attributable to the appellant.

The applicants, Mahmoud Al-Ramahi and Atour Paul, sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence under ss. 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging improper interception and handling of solicitor-client privileged communications during a wiretap investigation ("Project Siphon").

Al-Ramahi claimed widespread violations of his ss. 7 and 8 Charter rights due to intercepted audio calls and text messages with his lawyers.

Paul joined the application, arguing the overbroad search and "unfair advantage" to police affected him.

The court found that Al-Ramahi failed to prove improper interception or handling of audio calls but succeeded in demonstrating that his privileged text messages were improperly accessed and handled, breaching his ss. 7 and 8 rights.

The court dismissed the request for a stay of proceedings, finding it too drastic, but ordered the exclusion of all of Al-Ramahi's text messages intercepted after May 29, 2020.

Paul's application was dismissed as he did not suffer a breach of his own Charter rights and lacked standing to claim a remedy based on breaches of another's rights.

The appellant appealed his convictions and life sentence for terrorism-related offences, including conspiracy to commit murder.

He raised several grounds of appeal, arguing the trial judge erred in handling national security privilege claims during O'Connor and Garofoli applications, failing to sever his trial from a disruptive co-accused, misdirecting the jury on the law of conspiracy, and finding the co-accused fit for sentencing.

He also alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias based on an out-of-court comment by the trial judge praising an undercover agent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no procedural or legal errors that compromised trial fairness, and upheld the life sentence as fit for the gravity of the offences.

The applicant, Terry Lynn Bardwell, sought bail pending appeal of her conviction and sentence for drug trafficking and carrying a concealed weapon.

She had previously pleaded guilty and received a conditional sentence, which was later terminated due to breaches, leading to her incarceration.

The court applied the test for bail pending appeal under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, finding that while the appeal was not frivolous, the applicant failed to satisfy the court that she would surrender into custody or that her detention was not necessary in the public interest, given her history of breaching the conditional sentence terms while living with her proposed surety.

The application for release pending appeal was dismissed.

This is a motion brought by Raed Jaser, an appellant in a terrorism-related conviction appeal, seeking production of a post-sentence psychiatric report pertaining to his co-accused, Chiheb Esseghaier.

Jaser argues the report is necessary to support a fresh evidence application on appeal, contending that if Esseghaier was unfit to stand trial, it could constitute a miscarriage of justice for Jaser.

The Crown opposed the production.

The Court of Appeal, applying the Trotta and McNeil factors, found that Jaser met the prima facie entitlement for production.

Given Esseghaier's privacy interests as a non-party, the court ordered the psychiatric assessment to be produced to the panel for in camera inspection, reserving the decision on full production to the parties.

The appellant, Nicholas Baksh, appealed his convictions for four counts of drug trafficking and three firearm offences.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper use of similar act evidence across trafficking counts, erroneous limitation of cross-examination on an arresting officer's prior discreditable conduct, and unreasonable firearm verdicts based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly distinguished between similar act evidence and cross-count evidence used for identification, properly limited cross-examination consistent with precedent, and that the firearm verdicts were reasonable inferences from the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

This decision addresses the appellant's desire to abandon his appeal, raising concerns about his current mental capacity.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario determined it has the discretion to reject a Notice of Abandonment if the appellant lacks capacity, likening the test to that for entering a guilty plea.

The court decided to proceed to a second stage of analysis to determine whether to accept the abandonment, setting a case management conference to explore the evidentiary record on capacity and offering to appoint counsel for the appellant for this limited purpose.

The applicants, who were charged with child pornography offences following searches of their digital devices at the border, brought a constitutional challenge against s. 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act.

They argued that the provision, which allows customs officers to search imported goods without any legal threshold, violates the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter when applied to personal digital devices.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the profound privacy interests in digital devices require a legal threshold for searches.

The court held that the provision violates s. 8 and is not saved by s. 1, declaring it of no force or effect with respect to digital devices, but suspended the declaration of invalidity.

Youssef Messoudi was found guilty of importing 754 grams of methoxyacetyl fentanyl, an analogue of fentanyl with an estimated street value of $23-38 million, and occupying a vehicle with a prohibited weapon.

The Crown sought a sentence of 15-20 years, while the defence proposed 8 years.

The court emphasized deterrence and denunciation as paramount for fentanyl offences, acknowledging the drug's extreme danger and societal impact.

While considering the offender's youth (23 years old) and rehabilitative efforts (completing high school), the court found him to be involved beyond a simple street trafficker.

A Charter s. 10(a) breach (failure to promptly inform of arrest reason) was found but did not warrant a sentence reduction due to lack of deliberate police misconduct.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 years for importing fentanyl and 3 years concurrent for the firearms offence, with a credit of 1 year for pre-trial custody and house arrest, resulting in a total sentence of 11 years imprisonment.

The applicant, charged with drug and firearm offences, brought an application to exclude evidence seized by police during the execution of a general warrant and upon his arrest.

The court previously found that the applicant's Charter rights were breached.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court found that the police conduct was serious, noting that the lead investigator provided misleading information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) regarding the necessity of a general warrant.

Although the evidence was reliable and essential to the Crown's case, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the serious state misconduct.

The application was granted, and the evidence was excluded.

The appellant, Noordin Premji, appealed a 13.5-year prison sentence for heroin importing.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the appellant's advanced age (77 at sentencing) as a mitigating factor, contrary to the principles established in R. v. M. (C.A.).

Considering the appellant's significantly deteriorated health and the Crown's concession, the court performed its own sentencing analysis.

While rejecting a conditional sentence due to the seriousness of the offence, the court varied the sentence to nine years, emphasizing that this reduction was due to the highly unusual circumstances of the appellant's advanced age and severe medical problems, not a general change in sentencing approach for large-scale drug importing.

The applicant brought an application to quash a general warrant and exclude evidence obtained during a covert entry and search of his residence.

The police had obtained a general warrant that authorized them to enter the applicant's unit once identified, provided they determined there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe evidence of drug trafficking was inside.

The Superior Court of Justice found the general warrant invalid on two grounds: it impermissibly delegated the judicial function of determining reasonable and probable grounds to the police, and it violated s. 487.01(1)(c) of the Criminal Code because the police could have obtained a standard search warrant under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act once the unit was identified.

The applicant's s. 8 Charter rights were breached, and a subsequent hearing was ordered to determine the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown brought a motion to summarily dismiss the responding parties' application for disclosure under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The responding parties sought disclosure of alleged out-of-court communications between the trial judge and an FBI handler, which were referenced in a book published by an undercover agent, to support a reasonable apprehension of bias claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's motion, finding it premature to conclude the bias claim could not succeed, and ordered the Crown to make further inquiries regarding the alleged communications.

The defendant, Youssef Messoudi, brought an application to exclude evidence in a criminal prosecution for drug and firearm offences, alleging infringements of his Charter rights under sections 10(a) (right to be promptly informed of reasons for detention) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found a serious breach of section 10(a) because police officers initially detained and handcuffed Messoudi for 15-20 minutes without informing him of the reasons for his detention.

However, the court found no breach of section 10(b), accepting that a subsequent officer informed Messoudi of his right to counsel immediately upon taking custody, and Messoudi chose to wait to speak to his lawyer at the police station.

Applying the section 24(2) Grant analysis, the court determined that the police conduct, while serious, was not deliberate misconduct, and the evidence sought to be excluded (gun, controlled delivery observations) was not directly linked to the section 10(a) breach.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellants, Conroy and Kharla Rose, appealed their convictions for possession of proceeds of crime and money laundering.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals from conviction and ordered a new trial on two main grounds: the trial judge erred in dismissing an additional juror without random selection, thereby improperly constituting the jury, and erred in admitting evidence of Conroy's prior convictions in the form of judicial reasons without proper balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect and inadequate jury instructions.

Kharla Rose's separate appeal regarding unreasonable trial delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter was dismissed, as the delay was deemed reasonable under the pre-Jordan Morin framework.

The three accused, charged with conspiracy to import cocaine and breach of trust, brought applications under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude intercepted private communications.

They alleged their s. 8 rights were violated because the police affiant deliberately misled the authorizing judge regarding the investigative plan to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the wiretap.

The court found the affidavit was materially misleading, though not deliberately so, and that without the misleading information, the authorization lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court concluded the wiretap violated s. 8 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the serious police carelessness and subsequent false testimony by the affiant outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The accused, charged with drug importation offences, brought a pre-trial Charter application challenging five successive wiretap authorizations.

The Crown objected to his standing to challenge the first authorization, as he was not named and his communications were not intercepted under it.

The court held that the accused lacked standing to challenge the first authorization directly because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

However, the court ruled he had standing to challenge the subsequent authorizations that did intercept his communications, and in doing so, he could seek to excise information from their supporting ITOs that was allegedly obtained in violation of his co-accused's Charter rights under the first authorization.