Deepak Paradkar

The applicant, charged with drug and firearm offences, brought an application to exclude evidence seized by police during the execution of a general warrant and upon his arrest.

The court previously found that the applicant's Charter rights were breached.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court found that the police conduct was serious, noting that the lead investigator provided misleading information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) regarding the necessity of a general warrant.

Although the evidence was reliable and essential to the Crown's case, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the serious state misconduct.

The application was granted, and the evidence was excluded.

The applicant brought an application to quash a general warrant and exclude evidence obtained during a covert entry and search of his residence.

The police had obtained a general warrant that authorized them to enter the applicant's unit once identified, provided they determined there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe evidence of drug trafficking was inside.

The Superior Court of Justice found the general warrant invalid on two grounds: it impermissibly delegated the judicial function of determining reasonable and probable grounds to the police, and it violated s. 487.01(1)(c) of the Criminal Code because the police could have obtained a standard search warrant under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act once the unit was identified.

The applicant's s. 8 Charter rights were breached, and a subsequent hearing was ordered to determine the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The applicant brought a Garofoli application to exclude evidence obtained from a search of his residence and motor vehicle, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained material misrepresentations and omissions.

The court found that the affiant included misleading information regarding a witness's belief about whether a firearm was real and whether it was kept at the applicant's residence.

Concluding that the affiant lacked reasonable and probable grounds to authorize the search, the court found a breach of the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing the serious impact of the breach on the applicant's privacy interests in his home.

The applicant brought a section 8 Charter application to exclude evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) was misleading and failed to disclose reasonable grounds.

The court applied the standard of review for search warrants, finding that despite some minor errors and omissions, the amplified record contained reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on which the warrant could have issued.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the applicant was involved in a bank fraud scheme and that evidence would be found in his home and vehicle.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with importing a controlled substance, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to import cocaine after a package containing 3.5 kilograms of cocaine from Peru was intercepted by border services.

The police conducted a controlled delivery, tracking the package as it was handed from one co-conspirator to another, eventually arriving via taxi at the accused's apartment building.

The accused met the taxi, paid the fare, and fled when police announced their presence.

Relying on circumstantial evidence, including phone records, the pattern of delivery, and the accused's post-offence conduct, the court found the accused guilty on all counts.

Four offenders with no prior criminal records were sentenced for their roles in a sophisticated commercial cocaine trafficking operation involving 43 kilograms of cocaine.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount principles for large-scale cocaine trafficking.

The directing mind received 12 years, a fully committed participant received 11 years, a trusted courier received 10 years (less pre-trial credit), and a minor participant whose vehicle was used received 6 years.

A forfeiture order was also made for the vehicle used in the offence.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to review a justice of the peace’s decision granting judicial interim release to the accused on serious drug and firearms conspiracy charges.

The Crown argued the justice of the peace misapprehended the seriousness of the offences, underestimated the risk of reoffending, and improperly accepted a proposed surety.

Applying the standard from R. v. St. Cloud, the court held that a reviewing judge may intervene only if the decision contains an error of law, fresh evidence, or is clearly inappropriate.

The court found no such error and held the justice of the peace reasonably assessed the secondary and tertiary grounds and the proposed plan of release.

The bail review application was therefore dismissed.

During a trial for conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances, the Crown sought to introduce ten recorded conversations obtained via a room probe.

The accused opposed the admission of the evidence, arguing the audio quality was too poor to be reliable.

Following a voir dire, the court found that eight of the recordings were largely inaudible and lacked sufficient context to permit a fair and reliable assessment of their substance.

Portions of two recordings were found to be sufficiently clear to meet the threshold test for admissibility, subject to the Crown satisfying the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule at trial.

Following a jury conviction for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, a document was discovered in the jury room containing excerpts from an online article criticizing a high-profile acquittal and model jury instructions from the Canadian Judicial Council.

The accused sought a mistrial or stay of proceedings, alleging juror misconduct and a violation of their Charter rights after it appeared that at least one juror had consulted external legal materials contrary to the trial judge’s instructions.

The court held it lacked jurisdiction to grant a mistrial or stay after the jury had been discharged, as the trial judge was functus officio except in narrow circumstances not present here.

However, relying on appellate authority recognizing the ability to create an evidentiary record for appeal, the court concluded it retained jurisdiction to conduct a limited post-verdict inquiry into extrinsic influences affecting the jury.

Because the document suggested independent legal research and potential dissemination among jurors, an inquiry was ordered while preserving the jury secrecy rule.