Eric Florjancic

Following the dismissal of an estate application regarding beneficiary designations, the court determined the costs payable to the successful respondent.

The respondent sought full or substantial indemnity costs, while the Estate argued for a reduced amount.

The court found no reprehensible conduct to justify elevated costs and noted that public policy considerations in estate litigation generally limit recovery to reasonable costs.

The court also disregarded the respondent's offer to settle, finding it lacked meaningful compromise.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $26,963.13 for fees and $2,081.76 for disbursements, payable by the Estate.

The appellant appealed a municipal drainage report under section 48(1) of the Drainage Act, arguing that the benefits of the proposed works were not commensurate with the estimated costs.

The Tribunal found that while the proposed erosion and sediment control works would benefit the drainage area, the works were not currently required and were deferred to an undetermined future date.

Consequently, assessing properties now for the engineering fees of possible future improvements was not justified.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal and ordered the municipality to pay 50% of the engineering fees out of general funds.

The applicant estate trustee sought a declaration that the deceased's TFSA and RRIF, which designated the respondent as beneficiary, were subject to a resulting trust in favour of the estate or were the product of undue influence.

The court held that the presumption of resulting trust from Pecore does not apply to beneficiary designations on registered accounts, preferring the reasoning in Amherst Crane and Mak Estate over Calmusky.

The court found no evidence that the deceased intended the accounts to form part of his estate, nor any evidence of undue influence by the respondent.

The application was dismissed and the funds were ordered paid to the respondent.

The moving party, an unrepresented landowner, brought a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal under section 48 of the Drainage Act regarding the relocation of a municipal drain through his agricultural lands.

The municipality opposed the motion, arguing the appeal should have been brought under section 47 and was therefore outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

The Tribunal found that a realignment of a proposed drain falls under section 48.

Applying the four-factor test for extending time to appeal, the Tribunal found that the two-and-a-half-week delay was minimal, there was no significant prejudice to the municipality as other appeals were still in early stages, and the proposed appeal had some merit.

The motion for an extension of time was granted.

Following a prior motion decision, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful moving party sought partial indemnity costs after prevailing on the motion.

The responding party argued that any costs should instead be borne by a third party municipality, alleging administrative error and a breached undertaking not to take a position on the motion.

The court found the municipality had merely consented to the motion and had filed no evidence or submissions beyond that consent.

As there was no pleading supporting liability against the municipality, the court ordered the unsuccessful responding party to pay partial indemnity costs to the moving party.

The appellants sought an extension of time under s. 100 of the Drainage Act to pursue a late appeal from an engineer’s report concerning a municipal drain.

The Tribunal held that use of the wrong generic notice form and citation to the wrong statutory provision was not fatal where the written materials clearly disclosed an intended appeal under s. 48(1) and satisfied the Tribunal’s procedural rule for commencing an appeal.

Applying the Tribunal’s four-factor extension test adopted from court practice, the Tribunal found a bona fide intention to appeal within time, no non-speculative prejudice to the municipality, a delay explained by the appellants’ mistaken pursuit of relief before the Court of Revision, and sufficient merit because the proposed grounds were recognized statutory grounds and not frivolous.

The extension was granted retroactive to the original filing date, Linda Horton was added as an appellant, and the municipality’s request to restrict the appeal grounds was refused on this motion.

The defendant brought a motion to rectify the land registry record under section 159 of the Land Titles Act.

The parties are abutting landowners, and the defendant's property requires an easement over the plaintiff's land for access.

The Committee of Adjustment had previously granted a permanent easement as a condition of severing the land, but a temporary one-year easement was mistakenly registered on title following a private agreement between the parties.

The court held that the Certificate of Consent under the Planning Act does not immunize the resulting transfer from rectification where the registered instrument does not match the approved instrument.

The motion was granted, and the title was ordered rectified to reflect a permanent easement.

Several landowners appealed their assessments for the maintenance and repair of the Harrop Municipal Drain under section 54 of the Drainage Act.

The appellants argued that their assessments were too high, that their lands did not benefit from the drain, and that the Hagersville Wastewater Treatment Plant should bear 100% of the maintenance costs.

The Tribunal accepted the evidence of the respondent's engineer, who used the Todgham Method and LiDAR data to determine the drainage area and outlet liability.

The Tribunal found no evidence to substantiate the appellants' claims or to support an alternate assessment methodology.

The appeals were dismissed.

Several landowners appealed the 2022 Engineer's Report for the Cranberry Creek Municipal Drain, arguing that the land use factors (LUFs) were incorrect, the Pump and Dyke System was improperly included, and their properties were assessed too high.

The Tribunal found that the LUFs should have followed the Tribunal's 2020 Decision, which assigned lower factors to forested lands and provincially significant wetlands.

The Tribunal also found that the Pump and Dyke System had been abandoned and its inclusion constituted reconstruction, which falls outside the scope of a section 76 report.

Due to these and other significant errors in land use classification, the Tribunal set aside the 2022 Report.

Several appellants brought motions for disclosure of documents and extensions of time in an appeal under section 54 of the Drainage Act regarding the Cranberry Creek Drain.

The Tribunal found that most of the moving parties failed to provide affidavits with their motion materials as required by the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure, and failed to establish the relevance of the requested documents or grounds for an extension.

The Tribunal dismissed the motions of Larwill, Leger, and the Whitmores, but ordered the City of Ottawa to produce one specific document relating to land use factors to the Harpers.

Following an appeal where the appellants achieved mixed success, the appellants requested to make written costs submissions, arguing that each side should bear their own costs of the appeal and costs below should be in the cause.

The Court of Appeal affirmed its original costs order, finding that the respondent was more successful on the appeal as the appellants' claim was largely statute-barred.

The original award of $6,500 in appeal costs to the respondent was maintained.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the successful plaintiff sought costs of $11,000.

The Condominium defendants argued that costs should not be awarded due to pleading deficiencies or should be in the cause.

The court found that this case fell within the exceptional class of cases where costs in the cause is warranted, as the merits were yet to be adjudicated and the motion materials would be useful at trial.

Costs were ordered in the cause.

The appellants commenced an action in nuisance and negligence against the respondent municipality for property damage allegedly caused by heavy truck traffic vibrations.

The action was commenced after the Ontario Municipal Board declined jurisdiction over the appellants' injurious affection claim.

The motion judge dismissed the civil action as statute-barred under the two-year limitation period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the application of the two-year limitation period and the finding that it was not legally appropriate to wait for the OMB decision before commencing the civil action.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the municipality engaged in ongoing wrongful conduct causing damage within the two years prior to the statement of claim.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim and enforce alleged minutes of settlement.

The plaintiffs argued no binding settlement was reached and that summary judgment was unavailable without a statement of defence.

The court exercised its discretion under Rule 2.03 to allow the motion despite the lack of a statement of defence, given the plaintiffs had waived the requirement.

However, the court found the evidence regarding the plaintiffs' acceptance of the settlement equivocal, indicating a genuine issue for trial.

Due to evidentiary deficiencies and credibility issues, the court declined to grant summary judgment and instead ordered a mini-trial under Rule 20.04(2.2) to determine whether a binding settlement agreement was reached.

The appellant sought to appeal the dismissal of his summary judgment motion regarding fraudulent conveyances.

The motion judge had dismissed the motion on the basis that the underlying debt was discharged in bankruptcy and the appellant had failed to follow the correct procedure under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's order was interlocutory because it did not determine the substantive rights of the parties.

Therefore, the appeal properly lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order striking his claims for wrongful dismissal and severance pay.

The respondents cross-appealed seeking to strike the appellant's remaining claims for emotional distress, breach of human rights, and occupational health and safety violations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the wrongful dismissal claim but set aside the striking of the severance pay claim, finding that the limitation period for severance claims should run from the date of completion of employment rather than from the date of notice of termination.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's decision not to strike the remaining claims, finding them entangled with factual issues inappropriate for determination on a rule 21 motion.